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Abstract
The industry of safety-critical and dependable embedded systems calls for
even cheaper, high performance platforms that allow flexibility and an effi-
cient verification of safety and real-time requirements. In this sense, flexibil-
ity denotes the ability to (online) adapt a system to changes (e.g. changing
environment, application dynamics, errors) and the reuse-ability for different
use cases. To cope with the increasing complexity of interconnected func-
tions and to reduce the cost and power consumption of the system, multicore
systems are used to efficiently integrate different processing units in the same
chip. Networks-on-chip (NoCs), as a modular interconnect, are used as a
promising solution for such multiprocessor systems on chip (MPSoCs), due
to their scalability and performance. Hence, future NoC designs must face
the aforementioned challenges.
For safety-critical systems, a major goal is the avoidance of hazards. For
this, safety-critical systems are qualified or even certified to prove the cor-
rectness of the functioning under all possible cases. A predictable behaviour
of the NoC can help to ease the qualification process (e.g. formal analysis) of
the system. To achieve the required predictability, designers have two classes
of solutions: isolation (quality of service (QoS) mechanisms) and (formal)
analysis. For mixed-criticality systems, isolation and analysis approaches
must be combined to efficiently achieve the desired predictability. Isola-
tion techniques are used to bound interference between different application
classes. And analysis can then be applied verifying the real-time applications
and sufficient isolation properties.
Traditional NoC analysis and architecture concepts tackle only a sub-
part of the challenges—they focus on either performance or predictability.
Existing, predictable NoCs are deemed too expensive and inflexible to host
a variety of applications with opposing constraints. And state-of-the-art
analyses neglect certain platform properties (e.g. they assume sufficient buffer
sizes to avoid backpressure) to verify the behaviour. Together this leads to a
high over-provisioning of the hardware resources as well as adverse impacts
on system performance (especially for the non safety-critical applications),
and on the flexibility of the system.
In this work we tackle these challenges and develop a predictable and
runtime-adaptable NoC architecture that efficiently integrates mixed-critical
applications with opposing constraints. Additionally, we present a modelling
and analysis framework for NoCs that accounts for backpressure (i.e. full
buffers in network routers delaying the progress of network packets). This
framework enables to evaluate the performance and reliability early at design
time. Hence, the designer can assess multiple design decisions and trade-offs
(such as area, voltage, reliability, performance) by using abstract models and
formal approaches.
Zusammenfassung
Die Industrie der sicherheitskritischen und zuverlässigen eingebetteten
Systeme verlangt nach noch günstigeren, leistungsfähigeren Plattformen,
welche Flexibilität und eine effiziente Überprüfung der Sicherheits- und
Echtzeitanforderungen ermöglichen. Flexibilität bezeichnet in diesem Sinne
die Fähigkeit, ein System zur Laufzeit an Veränderungen (z.B. sich verän-
dernde Umgebungen, Anwendungsdynamik, Fehler) anzupassen als auch
die Wiederverwendbarkeit für verschiedene Anwendungsfälle. Um der
zunehmenden Komplexität der zunehmend vernetzten Funktionen gerecht zu
werden und die Kosten und den Stromverbrauch eines Systems zu reduzieren,
werden Mehrkern-Systeme eingesetzt. On-Chip Netzwerke (NoCs) werden
aufgrund ihrer Skalierbarkeit und Leistung als vielversprechende Lösung für
solch Mehrkern-Systeme eingesetzt. Daher müssen sich zukünftige on-Chip
Netzwerke den oben genannten Herausforderungen stellen.
Bei sicherheitskritischen Systemen ist die Vermeidung von Gefahren
ein wesentliches Ziel. Dazu werden sicherheitskritische Systeme quali-
fiziert oder zertifiziert, um die Funktionsfähigkeit in allen möglichen Fällen
nachzuweisen. Ein vorhersehbares Verhalten des on-Chip Netzwerks kann
dabei helfen, den Qualifizierungsprozess (z.B. die formale Analyse) des Sys-
tems zu erleichtern. Um die erforderliche Vorhersagbarkeit zu erreichen, gibt
es zwei Klassen von Lösungen: Isolation (Quality of Service Mechanismen)
und (formale) Analyse. Für Systeme mit gemischter Relevanz müssen Isola-
tionsmechanismen und Analyseansätze kombiniert werden, um die gewün-
schte Vorhersagbarkeit effizient zu erreichen. Isolationsmechanismen werden
eingesetzt, um Interferenzen zwischen verschiedenen Anwendungsklassen
zu begrenzen. Und die Analyse wird angewendet, um die Echtzeitfähigkeit
und eine hinreichende Isolation zu verifizieren.
Traditionelle Analyse- und Architekturkonzepte für on-Chip Netzwerke
lösen nur einen Teil dieser Herausforderungen—sie konzentrieren sich en-
tweder auf Leistung oder Vorhersagbarkeit. Existierende vorhersagbare on-
Chip Netzwerke werden als zu teuer und unflexibel erachtet, um eine Vielzahl
von Anwendungen mit gegensätzlichen Anforderungen zu integrieren. Und
state-of-the-art Analysen vernachlässigen bzw. vereinfachen bestimmte Plat-
tformeigenschaften (beispielsweise wird eine ausreichend große Puffergröße
angenommen, um einen Paketrückstau zu vermeiden), um das Verhalten
überprüfen zu können. Dies führt zu einer hohen Überbereitstellung der
Hardware-Ressourcen als auch zu negativen Auswirkungen auf die System-
leistung (insbesondere für die nicht sicherheitskritischen Anwendungen) und
auf die Flexibilität des Systems.
In dieser Arbeit gehen wir auf diese Herausforderungen ein und en-
twickeln eine vorhersehbare und zur Laufzeit anpassbare Architektur für
on-Chip Netzwerke, welche gemischt-kritische Anwendungen effizient in-
tegriert. Zusätzlich stellen wir ein Modellierungs- und Analyseframework
für on-Chip Netzwerke vor, das den Paketrückstau berücksichtigt (d.h. die
Puffer im Netzwerk dürfen überlaufen). Dieses Framework ermöglicht es, die
Leistung und Zuverlässigkeit bereits zur Designzeit zu bewerten. Somit kann
der Konstrukteur mehrere Designentscheidungen und Kompromisse (wie
Fläche, Spannung, Zuverlässigkeit, Leistung) anhand abstrakter Modelle und
formaler Ansätze frühzeitig beurteilen.
To Marlen.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Safety-critical and dependable embedded systems play an important role in
our daily life. For example, modern vehicles integrate over 100 electronic
control units (ECUs). Due to the ever-increasing demand for high perfor-
mance together with low energy consumption and size, multicore systems,
as known from general-purpose computing, are adopted by the safety-critical
embedded market. The integration of multiple cores in a chip to a multipro-
cessor system on chip (MPSoC) offers the possibility to consolidate multiple
functions or ECUs, which previously had been distributed and isolated by
external buses. This consolidation of functions with different overall im-
portance leads to mixed-criticality multicore systems [28]. In this context,
a critical function is essential for the safety of the system. Therefore, this
function is developed with high diligence and so the behaviour (e.g. timing)
is well specified and tested. For non-critical functions the confidence in the
characteristics is lower, e.g., the possibility that the function deviates from
the specification is higher. Additionally, non-critical functions might be user
provided and the risk of malicious functions trying to endanger system safety,
e.g., through denial-of-service attacks, increases.
Figure 1.1 presents an example for typical features in a modern car. These
include classical applications, such as engine control or entertainment func-
tions, but also new complex functions for highly automated and autonomous
driving, which all have different requirements. To provide all these features,
a system must offer high performance and parallel processing, as well as
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efficient communication and synchronization between different, possibly
heterogeneous processing units. Figure 1.2 shows the functions of a vision
based driver assistance system with the different processing needs of the
functions. It consists of functions running well on classical CPUs, as e.g. the
feedback loop or standard processing, which require complex computations
but work on a small data set. But also of more advanced functions suited for
processing on a DSP or GPU based system, as these need to process huge
data sets but require less complex computations. Hence, heterogeneous and
interconnected systems are needed to efficiently handle the workload.
Figure 1.1: Electronic features used pervasively in automobiles.
To cope with the increasing complexity of interconnected functions and
to reduce the cost and power consumption of a system, multicore systems are
used to efficiently integrate different processing units in the same chip. This
leads to a transition from many distributed (low performance) ECUs, which
require massive wiring and have a high synchronization and communication
overhead, over a domain centralized architecture to a software defined vehicle,
as shown in Figure 1.3. In a domain centralized architecture or software
defined vehicle, high-performance multicore ECUs are used to provide the
functionalities, which were previously distributed. And while the domain
centralized architecture tries to provide one ECU for each domain for domain-
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Figure 1.2: Vehicle computing evolution (based on [1])
common processing and domain isolation, the software defined approach
processes the workload of different domains on the same ECU. Such an
approach improves the synchronization and communication between the
processing units and hence the performance. At the same time it reduces
the isolation properties as functions of different domains with diverse safety
requirements are now using the same MPSoCs and network connections,
leading to mixed-criticality systems.
Figure 1.3: Vehicle computing evolution.
Especially with the upcoming autonomous driving, the correct function-
ing of the system must be guaranteed. With the transition of the responsibility
from the human to the machine, there will be no driver supervising the de-
cisions and actions of the system, cf. Figure 1.4. Hence, as sketched in
Figure 1.5, there will be no driver overtaking in case of errors (as e.g. in-
duced by interferences in mixed criticality systems) and the system must
provide a technical fallback. Such technical fallback requires to prove the
correct functioning under all cases.
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
Human MachinesTransition of Responsibility
0
Driver Only
1
Assistance
2
Semi-
Automation
3
High
Automation
4
Full
Automation
5
Autonomous
no active
assistance
systems
early warning
systems
feet o 
tra✁c control
auto-parking
hands o 
awareness
for take
over
eyes o 
general
awareness
mind o 
no driver
Figure 1.4: Transition of responsibility (based on [1]).
S
e
n
s
o
rs
Fusion Function
● Driver monitors
● Driver is responsible
Engine
Brake
Steering
S
e
n
s
o
rs
Fusion Function
Engine
Technical fallback
Brake
Steering
Driver is in control and has the responsibility Fail Safe: Machine is Fallback
Figure 1.5: Machine as fallback (based on [1]).
Safety standards explicitly mention this problem in context of mix-
ing different criticalities and, for example, require sufficient independence
(IEC 61508-2, 2010 [15]):
7.4.2.3: Where an E/E/PE safety-related system is to implement
both safety and non-safety functions, then all the hardware and
software shall be treated as safety-related unless it can be shown
that the implementation of the safety and non-safety functions is
sufficiently independent (i.e. that the failure of any non-safety-
related functions does not cause a dangerous failure of the safety-
related functions).
R Sufficient independence of implementation in a mixed-criticality
system is established by proving that timing interference or the proba-
bility of a dependent failure between the non-safety and safety-related
parts is sufficiently low in comparison with the highest safety integrity
level associated with the safety functions [15]. While a failure can
result from, for example, a fault, wilful timing attack, or wilful mem-
ory manipulation and influence timing, data consistency, or other
parameters of the system.
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Networks-on-chip (NoCs), as a scalable and modular interconnect, are
used as a promising solution for MPSoCs, due to their performance, power,
and size benefits [31]. In a NoC resources, such as the output ports of the
routers, are shared among the different functions and safety classes [126;
216]. Hence, applications of different safety levels will inevitably compete
with each other in a NoC for resources (cf. Section 4.1). This resource
sharing couples the execution behaviour across cores and, thus, impacts
non-functional properties like timing, which are of particular interest in
safety-critical environments (as discussed above).
One approach to solve the problem of mixed-criticality is to develop all
functions to the highest relevant safety level (cf. IEC 61508-2, 2010 [15]).
This leads to higher development costs and lower system utilization. Another
approach is to provide sufficient independence through quality-of-service
(QoS) mechanisms. The challenging part of the latter approach is to ef-
ficiently utilize system resources while providing a bounded and feasible
interference. This typically leads to a trade-off between providing real-time
guarantees for certain applications and performance for the others, as well as
the introduced overhead by the quality-of-service mechanisms.
1.2 Standards for Safety
The safety of the public is a major driver of the automotive, railway, industry
automation and aviation industry. Based on Part 4 of the IEC 61508, safety
can be defined as “freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of
damage to the health of people, either directly, or indirectly as a result of
damage to property or to the environment” [15]. To ensure the safety of
a system there are industrial and research efforts towards standardization
of the safety life cycle for electronic products. To reach a safety level and
certify or qualify a system, several standards and guidelines must be fol-
lowed depending on the field of application. There are many national and
international organizations, which publish design guidelines and regulations
for different domains. Some of these are the International Standards Orga-
nization (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and the Society of
Automotive Engineers (SAE). Furthermore, there exist national restrictions
by law. Several of the domain specific safety standards are based on the
IEC 61508 as sketched in Figure 1.6. This chapter gives a summary of some
safety standards relevant for the on-chip network architecture.
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
IEC 61508
Generic
ISO 26262
Automotive
ISO 25119
Agriculture
ISO 13849/
IEC 62061
Machinery
ISO 15998
Earth Moving M.
IEC 60335
Household
Appliances
IEC 50156
Furnaces
IEC 61513
Nuclear Power
EN 50129
IEC 62279
Railway
IEC 61511
Process Ind.
DO-178B
Aviation
IEC 60601
Medical
...
Figure 1.6: IEC 61508 as the root of several safety standards.
The IEC 61508 defines design and verification requirements to establish
safety in systems that incorporate electronic/electrical components and their
communication [15].
For the avionics, the DO-178B, DO-254, and DO-297 handle respec-
tively the development and validation of software, hardware, and integrated
modular avionics [2; 5; 6]. Together these include design considerations
on system, hardware, and software level. The ARP-4754 and ARP-4761
describe methods and considerations to get through the certification process
of a complex highly-integrated avionics system [13; 14].
Similarly, standards and approaches exist for the development of heavy
machinery (IEC 62061), systems for process industries (IEC 61511), railway
(IEC 62279), and power plants (IEC 61513).
For the automotive domain so far no necessity for certification exists.
However, qualification approaches are used to ensure the correct functioning
of the system. The ISO 26262, for example, states that “If the embedded
software has to implement software components of different ASILs, or safety-
related and non-safety-related software components, then all of the embedded
software shall be treated in accordance with the highest ASIL, unless the
software components meet the criteria for coexistence in accordance with
ISO 26262-9:2011, Clause 6.”, where Clause 6 proposes “In the case of
the coexistence of sub-elements that have different ASILs assigned or the
coexistence of sub-elements that have no ASIL assigned with safety-related
ones, it can be beneficial to avoid raising the ASIL for some of them to
the ASIL of the element. When determining the ASIL of sub-elements of
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an element, the rationale for freedom from interference is supported by
analyses of dependent failures focused on cascading failures”. The freedom
of interference is later defined as “absence of cascading failures between two
or more elements that could lead to the violation of a safety requirement”.
Besides the ISO 26262, other standards exists, which can influence the
design of an automotive system. The ISO 15005 describes constraints to
ensure the safe operation of a road vehicle while it is in motion. This concerns
especially the interaction of the user and the vehicle’s information and control
system [3]. The ISO 16951 handles the prioritized presentation of messages
and windows to the user by the vehicle’s information and control system [4].
Hence, if such applications use components of an interconnected system,
they can influence the design of the network architecture.
By applying these rules to a system-on-chip, the parts of the hardware
and runtime environment (RTE), which are always used, must be certified
to the highest relevant safety level. For all other components “sufficient
independence” must be implemented. Therefore, NoCs, whenever used
for communication between safety critical components such as automotive
functions, are or will be, depending on the safety-critical domain, the subject
of regulation through standards and certification procedures to ensure their
correct functioning. In this context, not only the possibly high average
performance and low costs play a critical role but also the ability to prove
adherence to the safety requirements. This adds another complexity layer
to the design process and requires traceability with respect to real-time
properties, e.g., application of formal analysis methods such as Real-Time
Calculus [213], Network Calculus [134], or Compositional Performance
Analysis [99].
1.3 Real-Time Traffic Properties
Modern safety- or mixed-critical embedded systems host heterogeneous
applications, with different requirements and behaviour (cf. Section 1.1).
This includes applications with different safety-criticality as well as differ-
ent real-time requirements. An example for the automotive domain is the
integration of pedestrian detection in advanced driver assistance systems and
entertainment applications. In this sense, criticality can be broken down into
at least two orthogonal aspects as shown in Figure 1.7: safety criticality and
time criticality.
For real-time (time-critical) applications the correctness of the system
function depends not only on functional but also on temporal aspects. That
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Figure 1.7: Two dimensions of mixed-criticality [24].
is, these applications should always finish computations before a given time
or receive a certain minimum throughput to ensure correctness or safety. The
time by which a specific result must be produced is called deadline. Typical
examples for such applications without safety requirements are embedded
mobile communication (e.g. UMTS or LTE) or entertainment applications.
For purely safety critical systems the integrity of computation needs to be
preserved. An example are traffic lights that are controlled by a centralized
controller. A failure might lead to catastrophic consequences, e.g., pedestri-
ans or car passengers can be injured or killed. However, it is not important if
the (correct) computation result is achieved within milliseconds or seconds.
A non-switching traffic light is more acceptable as a wrong state.
Domains with both safety and real-time requirements are of special inter-
est, as they cover many of the important future scenarios like advanced driver
assistance system (ADAS) or autonomous driving (cf. Figure 1.7). In these
domains, the failure of the function (e.g. violation of a real-time requirement)
can have catastrophic effects. While this domain is already challenging, as
techniques from real-time and dependability (e.g. predictability) need to be
combined, the demands for lower energy consumption and higher efficiency
of systems lead to the integration of different domains on the same MPSoC
(cf. Section 1.1). In such mixed-critical systems, applications with safety
and real-time requirements (e.g. engine control, ADAS) are running together
with applications with purely real-time requirements (e.g. entertainment) or
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no strict requirements at all. Hence, the system must efficiently combine
real-time, dependability, and high performance mechanisms.
The timing properties can be further divided into best-effort, throughput
bound, soft real-time, and hard real-time [71; 114; 142]. Figure 1.8 shows an
example for possible timing requirements for some automotive applications.
General Purpose Throughput Bound Soft Real-Time Hard Real-Time
Route Planning Voice Control Traffic Sign Recognition Autonomous Local Navigation
Data Encryption Intelligent Cruise Control
Emergency
Collision Avoidance
Driver Display Automatic Lane Following
Movie Player
Backup Camera
Warning System
Eye Tracking Autonomous Control
Speculative Evasion Pre-Planning
Figure 1.8: Exemplary timing requirements for some automotive applica-
tions [71; 114].
Hard real-time applications have firm deadlines, i.e., the utility of the
produced result is zero or even renders the whole system as unfeasible when
the deadline is crossed. For safety-critical real-time applications, any delay
in their execution beyond their deadline, including high latencies of on-chip
transmissions, may have severe consequences for the whole system, i.e., fatal
failures and prohibitive degradation of service. Hence, these applications
are usually not allowed to miss any deadline. That is, for example, the
worst-case latency must stay below an assumed upper limit, which is derived
from the deadline. For purely hard real-time applications, the functionality
does not directly affect user safety but is, for example, important for the user
experience. Hence, a deadline violation can cause client loss or substantial
financial penalty. To achieve the needed performance for hard real-time
applications, the system is typically dimensioned for the worst-case behaviour.
Additionally, for safety-critical systems, the correctness of the behaviour,
even in the worst-case, must be verified according to safety standards. Due to
these requirements the characteristics of safety-critical hard real-time senders
and their network traffic are usually well specified and tested and hence
known at design time.
Soft real-time applications, on the other hand, may tolerate occasional
deadline misses. The main difference, when compared to hard real-time
senders, is that these applications are rarely required to rigorously meet all
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their deadlines, i.e., the produced results have some utility after the deadline
or are not affecting the safety (e.g. can safely be discarded) [142; 201]. An
example are control algorithms based on a feedback loop or video analysis
for night vision in a car. The algorithms in such systems may tolerate a
limited number of cases when instead of new sampling data old values are
used. Thus, it can compensate occasional deadline misses without any severe
consequences for the system [193; 218; 239].
Similar to soft real-time, there are throughput bound applications, which
must comply to overall real-time performance objectives in terms of a min-
imum achieved throughput over a given period. Again, these applications
are rarely required to rigorously meet all their deadlines, i.e., the short term
throughput can underrun the required throughput as long as the long-term
throughput is acceptable. For instance, video streaming done as a part of an
infotainment function in a car does not influence vehicle safety, but video
frames must still arrive with a certain latency to prevent quality drops and
glitches. Still, for a producer of an infotainment system the quality of user
experience may play a critical role in the market success of a product. Con-
sequently, a producer may accept sporadic drop of the video quality but may
lose clients whenever it happens too often.
The last category of general purpose or best-effort (BE) does not have
strict temporal requirements, e.g, a deadline miss will not endanger system
safety. However, this typically also means that such application are less
tested with respect to temporal properties and only designed targeting average
performance metrics. For example, the frequency and size of accesses to
the (on chip) network are not known. Still, the system should provide
sufficient resources to process such applications (e.g. be work conserving),
as they can, for example, be used to increase the long-term efficiency or user
experience (e.g. diagnosis functions or route planning). Hence, achieving
high performance and low latency is a common design goal, as long as all
guarantees for safety- or time-critical applications can be delivered.
1.4 Requirements of Safety-critical Embedded Systems
As shown in the sections before, the communication of safety-related data
must be protected at run-time against effects of faults, which may lead
to failures of the system. These faults include transient faults, physical
damage as well as lack of sufficient independence between tasks (e.g. timing
interference or data corruption). For example, the ISO 26262 provides a list
of faults, presented in Table 1.1 regarding the exchange of information, which
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must be considered in case of an interconnect for certification purposes. An
end-to-end protection defines a set of mechanisms, which avoid these faults
or allow a reliable detection and appropriate countermeasures.
Some of these faults directly relate to real-time metrics for the on-chip
interconnect, e.g., a delay of information or blocking access to the communi-
cation channel. Others relate to consistency and the protection of packets
done directly in the interconnect. For example, without a proper flow control
in the network, packets might be dropped or overwritten leading to corruption
of information. Other faults, although not directly related to the temporal
metrics, can influence the predictability indirectly. Transient errors, mal-
functioning, or malicious senders, for example, can introduce uncertainty
and dynamics to the system, e.g., sporadic overloads due to re-transmissions
or babbling idiots. Such dynamics hinder predictability or even render it
impossible.
These faults can be detected and partly avoided in the software layer of
a system. For example, AUTOSAR provides several mechanisms to cope
with these faults (cf. Table 1.2), as e.g., CRC, Data ID, Counter, Regular
transmission + timeout monitoring [10; 77]. The Data ID is a unique identi-
fier to verify the identity of each transmitted (safety-related) data element.
The Counter is a simple counter that is incremented on every send request. It
can be used to implement an alive counter and a sequence counter. For the
sequence counter, the value is checked at receiver side for correct incremen-
tation, while for the alive counter it is only checked whether is changes at all.
Based on these mechanisms receiver communication and sender acknowl-
edgement timeouts can be implemented. For this, a receiver is executed
independently of the data transmission (e.g. periodic activation and checking
for new data) and checks the validity of the received data (based on CRC,
counter, and Data ID). With this, a wrong counter detects a duplication of
previous data, loss of communication, or timeouts. Table 1.2 shows the fault
coverage of different mechanisms. These mechanisms can be realized in
software (cf. AUTOSAR E2E Protocol Specification [10]), hardware, or a
hybrid solution. To increase the efficiency of a system, the hardware can
provide support to detect and avoid such faults, e.g., hardware CRC checking
or quality of service (QoS) mechanisms to limit interference. The latter are
of special interest, as such mechanisms change the timing and behaviour
of the system. Additionally, they can drastically degrade the performance,
utilization, or adaptability of a system. For the other mechanisms (and faults),
the influence on the system design and behaviour can be straightforwardly
derived.
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Table 1.1: Summary of communication faults in the design of the automotive
systems according to ISO 26262 [7; 10].
Fault Type Description
Repetition of information
A type of communication fault,
where information is received
more than once.
Loss of information
A type of communication fault,
where information or parts of information
are removed from a stream of
transmitted information.
Delay of information
A type of communication fault,
where information is received later than
expected.
Insertion of information
A type of communication fault, where
additional information is inserted into
a stream of transmitted information.
Masquerading
A type of communication fault, where
non-authentic information is accepted
as authentic information by a receiver.
Incorrect addressing
A type of communication fault, where
information is accepted
from an incorrect sender
or by an incorrect receiver.
Incorrect sequence of information
A type of communication fault,
where information is accepted from an
incorrect sender or by an incorrect receiver.
Corruption of information
A type of communication fault, which
changes information.
Asymmetric information from
sender to multiple receivers
A type of communication fault, where
receivers do receive different information
from the same sender.
Information from a sender received
by only a subset of the receivers
A type of communication fault, where some
receivers do not receive the information.
Blocking access to
a communication channel
A type of communication fault,
where the access to a communication
channel is blocked.
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Table 1.2: Fault detection coverage for different mechanisms.
Counter Data ID CRC
Transmission on
regular bases and
timeout monitoring
QoS
Repetition of information x — — — —
Loss of information x — — — —
Delay of information x — — x x
Insertion of information x x x — —
Masquerading — x x — —
Incorrect addressing — x — — —
Incorrect sequence
of information x — — — —
Corruption of information — — x — —
Asymmetric information from
sender to multiple receivers — — x — —
Information from a sender
received by only a
subset of the receivers
x — — — —
Blocking access to
a communication channel x — — x x
As discussed in Section 1.1, NoCs are foreseen as a communication
backbone for large systems-on-chip (SoCs) integrating different ECUs. As
a result of such integration, it can happen that different traffic classes, i.e.,
hard real-time tasks, soft-real time, throughput bound, and best-effort (BE),
share the SoC resources. This causes co-dependencies between applications
running on different cores, what may endanger safety. Unpredictable and
bursty accesses from BE senders may lead to contention in network buffers.
In on-chip interconnects without appropriate QoS mechanisms transmissions
are scheduled as soon as they arrive, and all traffic receive equal treatment.
This leads to the possibility of an unbounded timing interference, which
may lead to missed deadlines for real-time traffic. Hence, NoCs for future
safety-critical systems need to provide QoS mechanisms.
NoC architectures are judged by performance (e.g. latency, throughput,
utilization), cost (e.g. design effort, HW overhead), predictability (e.g. formal
analysis; guarantees on performance metrics), and flexibility/adaptability
(e.g. adapt to system internal and external changing conditions; re-use for
different use cases) [24; 54; 69]. The challenge in providing mechanisms
for these is that they can be contradictory. For example, an arbitration based
on a static time-division multiplexing (TDM) achieves a high predictability.
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Under certain conditions, it can even achieve a fair performance, e.g., when
the TDM slots can be fully utilized. However, the design is usually developed
according to the worst-case behaviour, leading to unused slots during normal
operation of the system. Hence, the design is not work-conserving leading
to a low utilization and degradation of performance. Additionally, a TDM
approach can typically not easily adapt to changing conditions. Summarizing,
the most important requirements of a NoC architecture are:
• efficient support of different traffic types
– sufficient independence (limited interference between applications)
– guaranteed worst-case performance for real-time applications (pre-
dictability)
– as good as possible actual-case performance for non-real-time ap-
plications (e.g. high utilization, work conserving, no “second class
citizens”)
• low cost
– low design effort
– low hardware overhead
– reusability: allow the same architecture to be used for different
usecases/domains
– allow efficient verification (bounds on interference)
• flexibility
– allow to adapt to system internal and external changing conditions
– reusability: allow the same architecture to be used for different
usecases/domains
– safety and real-time “as a feature”
1.5 Research Objective and Contribution
For safety-critical systems, a major goal is the avoidance of hazards. For
this, safety-critical systems are qualified or even certified to prove the correct
functionality under all possible cases. A predictable behaviour can help to
ease the qualification process (e.g. analysis) of the system. Thus, achieving a
predictable behaviour is an important goal for these systems. For the inter-
connect (e.g. the NoC) design, this means that providing predictable resource
sharing between concurrent transmissions is a major driver. However, the
support for temporal properties should not cancel out benefits resulting from
the application of NoCs, e.g., high efficiency, scalability, flexibility, and low
production costs. Hence, these other design goals shall also be reached, to
reduce cost, increase efficiency, and market competition.
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To achieve the required predictability, designers have two classes of
solutions: isolation (QoS mechanisms) and (formal) analysis. For mixed-
criticality systems, isolation and analysis approaches must be combined
to efficiently achieve the desired predictability. Isolation techniques are
used to bound the interference between different application classes. And
analysis can then be applied verifying the real-time applications and sufficient
isolation properties.
For safety-critical systems, state-of-the-art approaches for isolation have
adverse impacts on system performance (especially for the non safety-critical
applications) and on the flexibility of the system. These mechanisms usually
prioritize hard real-time senders over best-effort traffic and soft real-time
traffic. Hence, BE traffic suffers from high latencies although time critical
traffic has no to little benefit from a reduced latency [201]. Moreover, state-
of-the-art approaches apply a worst-case dimensioning, which frequently
leads to resource over-provisioning. However, during regular work of the
system such extreme conditions may rarely occur. This results in a significant
drop of average utilization, i.e., underutilized resources. Consequently, an
efficient co-execution of mixed-critical applications is still an open research
question with possibly high engineering and economic impact.
The goal of this work is to develop a NoC architecture that provides tim-
ing/isolation guarantees (for safety-critical applications), high performance
(i.e. less adverse impacts for BE), and flexibility (application dynamics, de-
sign dynamics, errors, updates, usage in different use cases). Additionally,
the work shall provide the mean to analyse the architecture to prove its
real-time (and performance) capabilities.
The contribution of this thesis to address the aforementioned research
objectives is twofold: We present a modelling and analysis framework for
NoCs that accounts for backpressure (i.e. full buffers in network routers
delaying the progress of network packets). This framework enables the evalu-
ation of performance and reliability early at design time. Hence, the designer
can assess multiple design decisions and trade-offs (such as area, voltage,
reliability, performance) by using abstract models and formal approaches.
State-of-the-art analysis approaches typically cannot handle backpressure.
Hence, the occurrence of backpressure must be avoided in the system. This
can be reached by providing sufficiently sized buffers to avoid buffer over-
flow or by restricting the interconnect access rates. The first case leads to
a resource over-provisioning and high hardware overhead due to the buffer
sizes. This results from the fact, that the buffers must be configured to cover
the worst-case behaviour of the system. Additionally, analysis approaches
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apply some conservatism amplifying this effect. The seconds case leads to
a decreased performance of the system. In such a design, the traffic source
is only allowed to send a certain amount of data to the interconnect by us-
ing, for example, rate limiters. To avoid buffer overflow, the rate limiters
must again be designed according to the worst-case. Hence, they typically
slow down the applications too often during normal operation, leading to de-
creased performance. With the new backpressure-aware analysis framework,
buffer overflow is covered by the analysis avoiding deep buffers or restrictive
rate-limiters. Hence, such an analysis allows a more efficient design for the
interconnect and helps to avoid the conservative over-provisioning of buffer
space.
Furthermore, we provide a QoS-aware architecture that provides safety
support, high performance, and flexibility. For this, we investigate different
QoS mechanisms for a NoC. This includes two hardware based mechanisms
(i.e. QoS-aware router designs) and a HW/SW co-design approach. The latter
uses a control layer for a safe but flexible and high-performance admission
control and NoC resource management. While the general benefits of the
NoC resource management are already explored in [122; 125; 223], this thesis
provides an architecture supporting the control layer of the NoC resource
management. This support allows to increase the benefits of the NoC resource
management and to reduce its overhead w.r.t. to area and performance.
To address the previously described research objectives, this thesis is
structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the basics of NoCs and an
overview of some existing NoC architectures.
Chapter 3 provides the backpressure-aware analysis to formally verify
real-time constraints of a NoC.
Chapter 4 investigates different QoS mechanisms for a NoC. First, we
investigate hardware mechanisms for guaranteed latency and through-
put (i.e. QoS-aware router designs). This is followed by an overview
on a control-layer centric QoS mechanism, which can simplify the
network routers and increase the flexibility of an architecture.
Chapter 5 provides a NoC architecture that supports the control layer
for QoS to increase its benefits and shows its general applicability to
NoC designs.
Chapter 6 provides an evaluation of the proposed architecture.
Chapter 7 summarizes this work and draws a conclusion, including
possible directions for future work.
  
2. Networks-on-Chip
This chapter provides an introduction to the basics of networks-on-chip
(NoCs) and an overview of some existing NoC architectures. NoCs, as a
modular interconnect, are used as a promising solution for multiprocessor
systems on chip (MPSoCs) (cf. Section 1.1). A NoC has three major building
blocks: network interfaces (NIs), routers, and network links. A dedicated
NoC architecture is formed by interconnecting these elements in different
configurations (forming a topology) and choosing certain functionalities and
implementations for each element.
2.1 Network-on-Chip Basics
There exist several architectures for the on-chip interconnect of systems-on-
chip (SoCs). Some commonly used architectures are the shared bus, the
crossbar, and the network-on-chip (NoC).
The shared bus is widely used in small or low performance commercial
SoCs. In a bus-based system the components are connected to the same
shared medium (the bus) and divided into different groups, namely master and
slave devices. A bus arbiter grants a master access to the bus with respect to
an arbitration protocol. Bus-based architectures are very simple to implement
and have a low area cost. However, the simplicity of this architecture results
in some disadvantages. One disadvantage is the absence of scalability, since
there is a high competition for bus cycles with an increasing number of
devices (e.g. processors). The shared medium between all components also
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causes a low overall throughput. Examples for bus architectures are amongst
others the AMBA Bus, Avalon, CoreConnect, Marble, STBus, and Wishbone.
Bus-based systems can also be hierarchically structured or divided into
different partitions by the usage of gateways. In different layers or tiles it is
possible to use different buses or even interconnect architectures.
For a low number of components, a crossbar switch or dedicated point-
to-point (P2P) connections offer a second interconnect architecture. The
crossbar switch can be used to offer a point-to-point connection between any
input and every output of the switch. Dedicated point-to-point links do not
require a switch in between, but multiple interfaces at each component. For
a system with four components (e.g. cores), for example, these architectures
can offer two independent connections between disjoint communication
partners (e.g. core0 with core1 and core2 with core3). This offers a higher
overall throughput compared to the shared bus, since concurrent connections
are possible. Nevertheless, an increasing number of channels in the crossbar
or needed interfaces for dedicated links causes a raise in complexity. This
limits the amount of components that can be interconnected efficiently in
such fashion. And while some designs for crossbars with a high number of
ports exist, the complexity of physical routing of wires gets complex [169;
170].
Another approach is the usage of networks-on-chip (NoCs). Here the
components are connected to a network of switches (also called routers).
Figure 2.1 shows a conceptual overview of a NoC based system. In a NoC,
packets are used to exchange data between different nodes. Between distinct
switch pairs concurrent connections to send the packets are possible. The
computing blocks are commonly connected through a network interface
(also called network interface unit (NIU)) to the routing elements. The
network interfaces (NIs) naturally offer the possibility for isolation between
a component and the network (or remainder of the system). In such a
switched network several possible routes between two components can exist,
which offers redundancy for the communication channels and can be used to
improve the reliability of the connection and for load balancing.
Based on analytical estimations and measurements on an FPGA pro-
totype, Ogras and Marculescu identified the following properties of the
different architectures [164]:
1. The performance and scalability of NoC-based implementations is
very close to that of the point-to-point (P2P) for the same application,
while bus-based implementations scale much more poorly.
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual view of a network-on-chip (NoC).
2. In terms of area, the NoC scales as well as the bus. The P2P implemen-
tation does not scale well due to the overhead involved in redesigning
the interfaces. This also allows the integration of new cores to an
existing design to be much easier in NoC-based designs.
3. The energy consumption of NoC-based architectures is smaller and
scales better than that of P2P or bus-based designs.
In summary, bus-based architectures have a low design effort and area
overhead. But they scale poorly with respect to performance and energy
consumption. Point-to-point architectures can deliver a high and scalable
performance. However, they scale poorly in the overall design effort, energy
consumption, and area overhead. Compared to this, NoC architectures scale
better in terms of overall design effort, area overhead, energy consumption,
and performance. Hence, NoC architectures are a reasonable choice for
future embedded systems.
Argarwal et al. [22] and Bjerregaard and Mahadevan [36] present an
overview of the main properties of network-on-chip design. When designing
a NoC several aspects, e.g. the topology, the routing protocol, the switching
technique, and the flow control, have to be defined. All these aspects have a
great impact on the behaviour and predictability of the system under design.
The most important aspects are summarized in the following of this section.
2.1.1 Topology
The topology of a NoC defines how the network nodes are connected to each
other, i.e., the shape of the network. This impacts directly the system cost
and performance, as well as the reliability of the network. Figure 2.2 shows
some commonly used topologies. There are several parameters defined by
the topology. The most important are the diameter, link capacity, and node
degree.
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The node degree defines the number of input and output ports of the
network. This can be taken as a measure for the input/output complexity
of a node. If all nodes have the same degree, the network is called regular,
otherwise irregular. The node degree can be constant or varied according
to the network size. Typically, a high node degree reduces the average
path length but also increases the complexity, where a smaller node degree
requires less hardware cost on links. In many cases there is a constraint on
the node degree, which results from the number of direct neighbours of a
node. For topological characteristics, a small and fixed node degree is more
effective.
The diameter describes the distance between nodes, i.e., the maximum
number of links (or maximum hop count) between any two nodes taking the
shortest path. Each node travelled by a packet introduces a delay and hence
the overall delay increases with the maximum hop count. A small diameter
can help to achieve low latencies and to ease routing (e.g. as fewer decisions
need to be made).
The link complexity describes the number of links. As a network scales,
the link complexity increases. More links in a network can help to reduce
the diameter and provide better communication between nodes. However, a
higher link complexity increases the hardware and area overhead.
Related to this, the bisection width and bisection bandwidth of a net-
work are metrics for the complexity and performance. The bisection width
describes the number of links between two sub-networks, if the topology
is divided into two networks with approximate equal size. A higher bisec-
tion width then provides more paths between the two sub-networks and
thus improves the overall performance of the network. The bisection band-
width then describes the throughput that can be achieved between these two
sub-networks.
In the mesh topology nodes form a 2D-array/grid, where each inner node
is connected to the four adjacent routers and the routers at the edges or
borders have two or three connections. A simple mesh network has a node
degree of 5, but may vary according to the type of the mesh network. The
torus topology extends the mesh by wraparound link on the edges. Hence,
each node (also the ones at the borders and edges) has four connections
to neighbouring routers. This enables a better path diversity than in the
mesh and reduces the hop count. In an irregular mesh-based architecture,
nodes are placed in a grid. However, a component might span multiple grid
elements. Instead of connecting such component to multiple network routers,
the unnecessary routers are removed from the grid, leading to an irregular
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(a) Mesh (b) Torus (c) Irregular/Custom
(d) Irregular Mesh-based (e) Star (f) Ring
(g) Octagon (h) Binary Tree
(i) BFT (j) SPIN
Figure 2.2: Examples for different network topologies.
network. In the star topology a central switch connects all resources. In the
ring topology every node is connected to two neighbouring nodes forming
a ring. A transmission through the network passes each of the nodes in the
ring until it reached the destination node. The ring topology has a fixed
node degree of three. The octagon is an extension of the ring, consisting of
eight nodes and 12 bidirectional links. Additional to the links in the ring,
there exist direct links between adjacent nodes. In a tree topology, a central
switch is used as the root of a tree and is connected to one or more nodes
of a lower hierarchy. The resources are then connected at the leafs of the
tree. One example is the butterfly fat tree (BFT). If each node has a specific
fixed number of nodes in the lower level it is connected to, the tree has a
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symmetrical hierarchy. The Scalable, Programmable, Integrated Network
(SPIN) architecture is similar to a butterfly fat tree topology. Here, each node
in a level has the same number of ports to the higher and lower level.
2.1.2 Routing
The routing defines the strategy to select a path from the sender to the
receiver in a network [54]. The routing protocol is crucial for the safety and
predictability of the system. If dynamic or adaptive routing protocols are
used, the traversal time of a packet through the network is unknown because
it dynamically changes depending on the system state. Without evidence that
this time can be bounded, the behaviour of the whole system gets dynamic
and unpredictable. Additionally, it influences the load distribution across the
network, the overall throughput and performance, and the connection path
length, influencing latency and the amount of possible points of failure. The
routing protocol determines also how the system will behave when errors on
a link occur.
Several aspects can allow classification of the different routing proto-
cols. The most important aspect is the adaptability. The routing can be
deterministic or adaptive. A deterministic routing always uses the same path
through the network and the path is statically defined during the design time
along with the choice of the routing protocol like dimension ordered routing
(e.g. XY-routing). This determinism avoids deadlocks and leads to a better
analysability of the network. Adaptive routing protocols, on the other hand,
use the current network state to dynamically determine an optimal route. In
such a way, they allow better load distribution and network utilization but
usually are more complex and harder to analyse. Therefore, adaptive routing
is not as predictable and reliable as deterministic routing. Detailed overviews
of different routing algorithms have been presented, for example, by Rantala
et al. [187] and Mello et al. [148].
Besides the general routing protocol, routing can be implemented at the
source (source routing) or distributed in the network. For source routing the
sending node (e.g. its network interface) decides on the path through the
network. This path is typically stored directly in the packet header. Each
router then just selects the correct output port based in this information. This
approach can simplify the router architecture and lead to a lower latency [69;
106; 155]. The route can be stored in various encodings in the packet header.
For example, each hop can be encoded directly or a run length encoding can
be used. As source routing adds information to the header, source routing
schemes typically introduce overhead to the packet and may reduce the
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effective utilization. The overhead depends on the encoding, the size of the
network, and the size of a packet (e.g. the payload to header ratio).
For distributed routing protocols only the address of the destination node
is stored in the packet header. Each router then computes based on this
address the correct output port. This computation can induce an additional
delay in each router (compared to source routing). As only the destination
address has to be stored in the header, this approach induces less overhead to
the packet. However, as not the full path is stored in the header, the sender of
a message cannot directly be identified. Hence, if knowledge of the identity
of the sender is required, a sender ID needs to be stored in the packet header
or payload.
Figure 2.3 shows the required number of bits in the packet header for a
symmetric mesh topology with a single node per router, where in addition to
the destination address also the address of the sender is encoded in the packet
header. For source routing scheme, the sender ID can be extracted from the
route while for distributed routing an additional sender ID field in the packet
header is needed. The figure shows that distributed routing scales well with
the NoC size. However, for distributed routing each router has to compute
the desired output port before a packet can be processed. Hence, distributed
routing typically requires one pipeline stage more than the other schemes.
This additional pipeline stage can be avoided by speculation, which in turn
leads to more complex router designs. The basic source routing, where each
hop is encoded in the header, scales worse with the NoC size. For the run
length encoding two variants are shown. The first variant stores up to four
directions where a single direction can cross the whole NoC in one direction.
That is, the length field of the run length encoding covers the maximum hop
count for a single direction. The second variant uses a reduced length field,
such that a single run can only cross half of the direction. Hence, at least
two runs are needed to cover the maximum hop count for a single direction.
Doing this, the size of length field and the counter for the current run can be
reduced. The different run length encodings scale well, depending on the
number of used directions and the length of a single run. However, for small
NoCs there is an overhead compared to the other schemes.
2.1.3 Switching
The switching technique defines how connections are established in the
network. It specifies how a router removes a packet from an input port and
places it to an output port and thus influences how the network allocates
channels and buffers to the packets.
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Figure 2.3: Routing overhead of different encoding schemes.
Switching techniques can be divided into circuit switching and packet
switching approaches. Circuit switching approaches allocate the entire
source-destination path before the data is sent. With an allocated path there
is no need for routing information in the header of the packet stream. The
routing information is, for example, stored in a special configuration message
reserving the whole path. Circuit switching can be pipelined along the path
through the network. The pipelining and the absence of routing information
lead to a high performance for continuous streams. However, for short mes-
sages, the overhead through the path reservation limits the performance. The
alternative to circuit switching is to divide the data into packets that can be
transmitted independently through the network and therefore require not to
reserve the whole path at once. Packet switching techniques can be divided
in Store and Forward, Wormhole, and Virtual Cut Through switching. In
Store and Forward (S&F) switching a complete packet is stored at each stage
in the network before the next link is switched. This decouples the links
completely from each other. The storing of the packets at each stage induces
an additional latency on each stage to each packet and requires enough buffer
space in the switches to store whole packets. The buffer size and the storing
time on each switch can be reduced with the usage of smaller packets. An-
other way to reduce the induced latency caused by storing the whole packet
is to forward parts of it, before the complete packet has arrived, as done in
cut-through packet switching. In this approach, the header of a packet can
be forwarded immediately to the next link while the payload is still on the
current link (or previous router). On each stage the packets are processed
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in a pipeline, which makes this approach very efficient for multi-stage net-
works. There are two different versions of the cut through switching: the
Wormhole and Virtual Cut Through (VCT) switching. In VCT switching the
flow control and buffer allocation is done on the packet level, i.e., a packet
is completely buffered in a switch if the header is blocked. Therefore, the
router requires sufficient buffer size to store the complete packet at every
switch like in the case of S&F switching. In wormhole switching the packets
are split into smaller flow control units (flits). These flits are then transported
independently through the network and a packet is represented as a stream
of flits. If a flit is blocked, all following flits are blocked too, but possibly
on different switches. Because of that, buffers used for wormhole switching
can be smaller, capable of storing data in the size of a flit. This reduces
the cost but leads to an earlier congestion in the network when not using
special mechanism to avoid congestion (like virtual channels). A survey of
wormhole switching techniques in comparison with other techniques was
presented by Al-Tawil et al. [21].
Usually the selection of a particular technique strongly depends on the
needs of a platform. For example, a store-and-forward technique was used in
Nostrum [151] network while designers of Æthereal [81] and Mango [37]
decided to use combinational techniques depending on their different needs.
2.1.4 Virtual Channels
Virtual Channels (VCs) are used to split a physical link into multiple virtual
links. For the implementation of a VC on a link the buffer on the link (e.g.
in the ingress or egress port of the switches) has to be extended to include
multiple (virtual) buffers, one for each VC. By providing multiple buffers
for each link, the allocation of buffers is decoupled from allocating of links.
Virtual channels increase the area needed for the switch but introduce some
advantages. One advantage is the reduction of the deadlock and livelock
problematic. The VCs introduce more output paths per link, which reduces
the probability for streams to compete for the same buffer. Additionally, the
VCs introduce an isolation of the different concurrent streams in the network.
A VC can also be used to offer support for quality of service (QoS) for parts
of the communication. For this, a VC can be reserved for high priority traffic
and be privileged in all switches. Virtual channels also allow packets to pass
blocked packets or streams and hence links can be used that otherwise would
have been idling. This increased utilization of the links then can lead to a
higher overall performance of the network.
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Table 2.1: Summary of channel and buffer allocation schemes.
Technique Channel Buffer Description
S&F Packet Packet
Head flit must wait for the
arrival of the entire packet
before proceeding on next link.
VCT Packet Packet
Head flit can begin traversal
on next link before tail flit
arrives at current node.
Wormhole Packet Flit
Channel allocation on
packet level.
VC Flit Flit
Can interleave flits of
different packets on links
(if they use different VCs).
Can be combined with the
three others.
Virtual channels can be combined with the three switching techniques
mentioned before. Table 2.1 provides a summary for the different buffer and
channel allocation schemes. In the table, the buffer column denotes how
buffers are allocated. That is, if there must be sufficient buffer space for a
packet or flit at the next node before a flit/packet can be transmitted. The
channel column then denotes how the link/channel between two nodes is
allocated to transmissions. That is, if a packet needs to be fully transmitted
before a packet from another transmission can be scheduled or if different
packets can be interleaved.
2.1.5 Flow Control
The flow control determines how the downstream node communicates for-
warding availability to the upstream node (i.e. the buffer management). It
is needed for non-circuit switched networks to deal with congestion at the
network buffers. Flow control is connected to the switching strategy. Basi-
cally, the switching strategy defines the size of the data chunks and needed
buffer space before data may proceed, while the flow control monitors the
current available buffer space, such that data is only forwarded when the
needed space is free or delayed until the buffer is free. The choice of the flow
control technique influences the fraction of the ideal bandwidth that can be
reached and the predictability of the timing in the network. For example, a
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poor designed control flow technique might lead to idling resources when
not necessary and therefore a low utilization.
For buffered flow control techniques, it is important to control the avail-
ability of the buffers during the communication in order not to lose or over-
write information and thus guarantee reliability of the transmission. Hence, a
network node communicates the availability of its buffers to the preceding
node. If no buffer space is available, a packet backlog can occur leading
to blocking and possibly to a propagation of blocking. This effect is called
backpressure. Common implementations for buffered flow control are:
• credit-based flow control: For the sending node an amount of credits
is defined and decreased when sending a flit. When the receiver node
processed a flit, it sends a credit signal back to the sender to increase
the available credits.
• ON/OFF flow control (also called STALL-GO): Is a simple technique
using one control bit as a flag, signalizing if a sending node is permitted
to send the data (ON) or not (OFF).
• ACK/NACK protocol: The sending node sends a flit and buffers it until
an ACK or NACK signal is received from the receiving node. When an
ACK is received, the next flit is sent and when an NACK is received,
the old flit is sent again.
2.1.6 Baseline Switch Architecture
This section presents a basic architecture of a NoC switch. It is based on
the one presented by Dally [54]. It constitutes a common selection for the
parameters introduced above.
Figure 2.4 presents a simple block diagram of the switch architecture
using wormhole switching and virtual channels. It consists of input and
output modules, which are connected by a crossbar, and control modules.
The control modules comprise route computation, VC allocator, switch
arbiter, and credit counters. Together they control the transfer of data.
An input module has several sub-modules: a demultiplexer, buffers, and
a multiplexer. As the presented switch uses virtual channels, it has several
FIFO buffers per input module (one FIFO buffer for each VC) to prevent
head-of-line blocking between different VCs. The FIFO buffers are organized
in fix-sized flow control digits (flits), i.e., they can store one or multiple flits.
Data arrives from the input channel and the input demultiplexer assigns
the arriving flit to the corresponding VC buffer (based in the VC in the flit
header). To reduce the complexity of the crossbar, the FIFO buffers of an
input module are connected through a multiplexer to the crossbar. Hence,
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Figure 2.4: Baseline switch architecture.
an input module can only send a single flit per cycle through crossbar to an
output module. The output module then is responsible for forwarding the
flit to the next router. It can contain buffers for output-buffering, but the
presented design uses only input-buffering.
Each control module can be implemented as a centralized module or
decentralized. The route computation module computes the output port of
a packet. Hence, it is invoked once per packet (i.e. on the arrival of the
head-flit). There can be a single route computation module per switch to
save area or one for each input module. The latter approach has the benefit
of computing the output port for several input ports in parallel. With the
known output port, the VC allocator selects an output VC for the packet. This
module is again invoked once per packet. There can be a global VC allocator
on the switch or one for each output port. With the known output port and
VC, the switch allocator selects the time slot on the crossbar to forward a flit
to the output. The switch allocator is invoked for each flit. As there might be
multiple input modules or VC requesting for the same output port, the access
to the crossbar and output ports also needs an arbitration. The arbitration
can be implemented in a centralized or distributed way. For a centralized
implementation, all requests and status information are handled by a central
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Figure 2.5: Three phase arbitration between input and output ports.
arbiter. For the distributed implementation, the arbiter can be distributed
across the input or output modules. As the arbitration is performed for each
flit and there can be a high number of requests (e.g. one for each input VC),
the arbitration is typically implemented hierarchically. That is, for example,
the arbitration is first performed at the output module, deciding which input
is allowed to use the output port. Then, in a second arbitration step, the
input module decides on the VC that is forwarded. This leads to three phase
arbitration as shown in Figure 2.5. In the figure four input ports are sending
requests to possibly multiple different output ports (e.g. when in an input
module the VCs requests for different output ports). In a second phase, the
output arbiter decides on the input port that can use the output port, for
example, based on a round-robin policy. It then sends a grant to the input
port that won the arbitration. As an input module might receive multiple
grants, it locally arbitrates between the multiple VCs that received a grant
and sends an acknowledge to the output port.
Processing of a Packet
With the architecture described above, the transfer of a packet in a switch
is performed in multiple stages: upon the reception of a packet, or more
precisely of its head flit, the route computation module decides to which
output port the packet is forwarded based on destination information stored
in the head flit. In the second step, the packet requests a virtual channel (i.e.
a FIFO) in the next switch (along the path of the packet) at the VC access
controller. For source routing schemes these steps can be done in parallel,
where in the route computation step the output port for the next hop is
calculated. With the known VC, the packet can proceed and request access to
the output port (and crossbar) at the switch arbiter. This is only done if there
is sufficient buffer space in the downstream VC, which is determined using
the credit counter module. If this is the case, the switch arbiter decides when
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a specific flit (e.g. input module and VC) may use the crossbar and hence
be transferred to the downstream switch. Upon the successful transferral
of a flit, the switch arbiter asserts the credit out signal to let the upstream
switch know that space became available in the corresponding VC. While
route computation and VC allocation only happen for the head flit, switch
arbitration is done for every flit of a packet. Once the tail flit has been
forwarded, the allocation of the VC is released.
With this, we can differentiate four typical pipeline stages as shown in
Figure 2.6. During the route computation (RC) the router computes the
output port of the packet. This is followed by the virtual-channel allocation
(VA), during which a VC is allocated for the head flit. With the known
port and VC the stream competes for output physical channel in the switch
allocation (SA) stage. When the stream is selected, the data is transferred
on the output physical channel in the switch traversal stage. Depending on
the implementation, some stages can happen in parallel. For example, if the
RC stage computes the output port for the next router as the current port is
already encoded in the header, the RC stage can happen in parallel with VA.
Additionally, if fixed VC assignments are used, the VA stage can be omitted,
such that RC and SA will be in parallel. Next to this typical router pipeline
stages, an additional buffer write (BW) and link traversal (LT) phase might
respectively be at the beginning and end, inducing additional delay.
RC VA SA ST
-- -- SA ST
-- -- SA ST
-- -- SA ST
Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Head flit
Body flit 1
Body flit 2
Tail flit
Figure 2.6: Typical pipeline stages (for a four flit packet).
2.2 Selected NoC Architectures
There exist several implementations of NoC architectures. This section
presents a brief description of some selected NoC architectures in alphabetical
order followed by an enumeration of their most relevant architectural features
in Table 2.2.
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Aelite
Aelite is a modification of the Æthereal network architecture [90]. In con-
trast to Æthereal, Aelite only implements guaranteed service and skips the
dedicated best-effort part. Additionally, it uses mesochronous links, avoiding
the need for a global clock synchronization between the routers.
Arteris FlexNoC
The Arteris company provides a commercial NoC architecture for SoCs. The
architecture is based on the Danube NoC IP library and most design parame-
ters, such as topology, routing algorithm, flow control, and number of input
and output ports, are user defined [23; 135]. The Danube library provides
three major building blocks: Network Interface Units (NIU) for connecting
IP blocks to the network, Packet Transport Units (PTU) constituting the
network devices, and physical links. Based on this, Arteris provides a design
flow and tools to create a customized NoC architecture.
Æthereal
Æthereal is a virtual-circuit switching network with time division multiplex-
ing (TDM) and quality of service [81]. It uses two dedicated router parts,
one for guaranteed service (GS) and one for best-effort (BE). In Æthereal the
routers are time synchronized to allow the use of time slots, which form the
most important mechanism of Æthereal. The time slots define which block
of data can be forwarded through particular output of a router and for how
long it is forwarded. Thus, time slots form schedules repeated periodically
for the whole network, enabling a TDM based network scheduling. In such a
way, the time slots avoid interference between different streams and provide
a predictable behaviour of the communication leading to a contention-free
routing. Best-effort traffic is allowed to use all unreserved or unused time
slots. For BE traffic, wormhole switching and source routing are used with a
credit based flow control.
CHAIN
The CHAIN network (CHip Area INterconnect) is an asynchronous (i.e.
clock-less) network [25]. It uses priority based arbitration to offer bandwidth
and latency guarantees [73; 74]. The arbitration is performed only during set-
ting up the route, where CHAIN uses a source routing scheme. After setting
up the route, the transfer relies on an asynchronous handshake backpressure
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scheme. CHAIN is based on cricuit-switching, hence after setting up a route,
there is no sharing of the link among different traffic streams.
DyAD
The DyAD NoC is an 2D mesh topology without virtual channels that sup-
ports distributed adaptive routing and wormhole switching [102]. It applies
deterministic or adaptive routing based on the state of the system. If there is
no congestion, deterministic XY routing is used. When the network becomes
congested, the routers switch to a different mode and apply an adaptive
odd-even routing scheme. For this, each router is applied with a congestion
flag, which is sent to neighbouring routers when the router is congested. If a
router receives such a flag, it switches to the adaptive mode.
IDAMC
The IDAMC is a highly scalable NoC based architecture [128; 216] offering
a general purpose system with support for applications of different (safety)
criticality. It supports several models of SoC architectures: bus, crossbar, and
full NoC. The network nodes are connected through NIs to the NoC. The NI
are used as an abstraction layer and support address translation, monitoring
and rate limiting. In general a NoC router has up to eight ports. Thus, it
supports implementing different topologies. For small systems (four tiles or
less) the router can be degraded to a crossbar, since the routing mechanisms
are not needed [128; 216].
The NoC supports virtual channels and guaranteed service on pre-
reserved connections. The QoS support is based on the “Back Suction”
scheme [58]. For the routing of the data, source routing and wormhole
switching are used. The routing is based on a flexible run length encoding
of directions (in a mesh network) with up to three turns (i.e. four different
directions). For the physical transport of the flits, the IDAMC uses serialisa-
tion and thus sends each flit as multiple phits over the network links. That
way the link width can be decreased. The data and header information is
protected using by a CRC [184].
iNoC
The invasive Network-on-Chip (iNoC) is a scalable, autonomous, self-
optimizing and QoS-aware, interconnect architecture [93; 96; 97]. It im-
plements a 2D mesh topology, but also supports other regular topologies,
like 3D mesh or torus. For routing, iNoC supports two distributed routing
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algorithms: XY and adaptive odd-even-turn routing. QoS can be achieved
using a weighted round-robin arbitration and end-to-end connections. Once
an end-to-end connection is established, hard throughput guarantees can be
given [93]. The iNoC uses wormhole switching and induces a static protocol
overhead of 4–6 bit additionally to the destination address in the header flit
and two bits in the tail flit.
Mango
The Mango (Message-passing Asynchronous Network-on-Chip providing
Guaranteed services through OCP interfaces) NoC implements an asyn-
chronous network providing a globally asynchronous locally synchronous
system (GALS) [37]. Mango utilizes virtual channels with dedicated physi-
cal buffers and a router with dedicated parts for best-effort and guaranteed
service traffic. The routers are organized in a 2D mesh, having five input
ports. Latency and throughput are controlled with the usage of special ar-
bitration modules for each network hop. Mango supports a fair or priority
based arbitration scheme between different VCs. The configuration of all set-
tings is done during the boot-up phase of the system. The transmission time
in the network mainly depends on the number of VCs sharing a particular
connection and the selected arbitration policy.
MPPA
The MPPA2-256 (Bostan) is a commercial architecture that is based on
a NoC [42; 65; 66; 67; 190]. The MPPA architecture (Multi-Purpose-
Purpose Processing Array) integrates 256 processing engine (PE) cores and
32 resource management (RM) cores on a single chip. These cores are
divided into 16 compute clusters and four I/O subsystems. The MPPA
uses two distinct physical network layers: a control NoC (C-NoC) and
high-bandwidth data NoC (D-NOC). Both NoCs support full duplex links,
wormhole switching, and output buffering without virtual channels. The
routers have five ports and implement a 2D torus topology connecting the
clusters and the I/O subsystems. The MPPA routers implement a round-robin
arbitration and nodes offer rate limiters with a fine-grained traffic control. The
flow regulation is adjusted for network calculus [134], and allows defining a
set of linear constraints on the link bandwidths and on the router FIFO queue
sizes.
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Nostrum
The Nostrum mesh architecture is a virtual-circuit switching network with
support for quality of service [150]. Nostrum is utilizes a time-division
multiplexing (TDM) approach to provide guaranteed service. It implements
Temporarily Disjointed Networks (TDNs) for temporal isolation between
different traffic types (BE and GS) as well as between different virtual chan-
nels. In the VCs, Looped Containers (LCs) are used to provide guaranteed
throughput [149].
The TDNs are based on “colouring” of outputs and inputs of routers in
such a way that packets will move during time slots simultaneously using only
their own colour assigned to a specific VC. This enables to ensure that no
other packets will be placed in a particular buffer, allowing time multiplexing.
LCs, on the other hand, are containers travelling from the source to the
destination and back (in a loop) over a given VC filled with data or empty
as place holders. The number of reserved containers for a VC corresponds
to the throughput guarantee of this VC. LCs that belong to different circuits
are allowed to share the same path. As the architecture is based on TDM,
Nostrum does not require additional flow control. The network configuration
is designed statically offline and initiated during system start-up, but allows
some online modifications (e.g. the route is decided at design time but the
bandwidth can vary at run-time).
Proteo
The Proteo architecture provides a parametrizable on-chip communication
architecture [20; 189]. It targets hierarchical on-chip interconnects and thus
provides, additional to the usual network components, bridges to interconnect
sub-networks. Proteo supports different topologies, such as buses or star, but
the main network is based on a bidirectional ring. It uses a destination-tag
routing policy, where the destination address is stored in the packet header.
QNoC
The Quality of service NoC (QNoC) is a generic architecture for providing
different levels of quality of service (QoS) at the communication layer [38;
39; 68]. QNoC is based on a 2D mesh topology and uses wormhole switching
and XY source routing. The design assumes a reliable (physical) architec-
ture and thus does not provide support for error correction. For quality of
service, QNoC uses a priority based round robin scheduling on flit level. It
distinguishes between four priorities, named service levels (SLs): signal-
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ing (inter-tile control signals), real-time (hard delay constraints), read/write
(short data access), and block transfer (large data bursts). The priority is
assigned in the order as listed, with signaling the highest and block transfer
the lowest priority.
RAW
The RAW processor uses four homogeneous 2D mesh networks to connect
16 tiles [210; 211]. In each tile, four routers are used, one for each network.
Two routers provide a static network for single-word packets with in-order
delivery following a route specified at design-time, flow-control, and reliable
communication. The static network is targeted for instructions. The other two
routers provide a dynamic network for interrupts and user-level messaging.
It uses wormhole switching and a dimension ordered routing scheme.
SoCBUS
SoCBUS [234; 235; 236] uses Packet Connected Circuits, which is based
on circuit-switching. Thus, SoCBUS operates on point-to-point connections
owning exclusively all resources on a path. The connections are established
by special configuration packets routed through the network, which reserve
the resources. If a path is successfully reserved, a positive acknowledge is
sent back and the data transfer starts. At the end of the transmission, a cancel
message releases the reserved path. This results in a 4-phase transaction
handling:
1. configuration packet from sender to sink, locking resources
2. acknowledge packet from sink to sender
3. data transfer from sender to sink
4. final acknowledge packet from sink to sender, cancelling the circuit
SoCBUS can instantiate any topology, but most examples use a 2D mesh
topology. Here routers are connected with up to four ports to neighbouring
routers and a wrapper is used to connect processing cores (via a fifth port) to
a router.
SPIN
The Scalable Programmable Integrated Network-on-chip (SPIN NoC) im-
plements a fat-tree topology with two one-way 32 bit data paths [18; 88].
The network uses wormhole switching and credit-based flow control. The
flow control is on end-to-end basis between source and destination, where
the destination has dedicated feedback wires to notify the sender of accepted
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data. SPIN uses an adaptive routing, such that routes can select any of the
redundant paths to a destination to reduce traffic hot-spots. The routers use
small (4 word) input buffers (to hide delay of control logic and link latency)
and have two shared output buffers (18 word each) for blocked packets. The
use of such shared buffers (compared to bigger input buffers) allows to reduce
the overhead (needed buffer space) for networks/use cases where contention
occurs rarely. The topology offers a non-blocking network and therefore no
dedicated support for guaranteed service is provided (i.e. it uses round robin
arbitration).
STNoC
STNoC is a commercial NoC architecture by STMicroelectronics [205]. It
is based on the spidergon network topology and uses wormhole switching,
output queuing, and deterministic source routing. Quality of service is
achieved by using a fair bandwidth allocation scheme that enables to provide
latency and throughput guarantees.
Tilera iMesh
The iMesh is a commercial NoC architecture by Tilera used in the Tile64 and
TilePro64 [214; 233]. The iMesh is composed of multiple two-dimensional
mesh networks. The Tile64 uses five and the TilePor64 uses six of these
networks. In the basic design the links are 32 bit wide. Each mesh network
handles a specific traffic type. These are: user-level messaging (UDN),
I/O traffic (IDN), memory traffic (MDN), intertile traffic (TDN), caches
coherence trafic (CDN), and compiler scheduled traffic (STN). The CDN
network is only present in the TilePro64. The networks are classified in
dynamic and static networks. The dynamic networks (UDN, IDN, MDN,
TDN, CDN) use a distributed dimension ordered routing with the destination
address encoded in the XY coordinates in the packet header. They use
wormhole switching with a credit based flow control and without virtual
channels. The routers implement a single stage pipeline during the straight
portions of the routes, while there is an additional route calculation stage
when turning. The static network (STN) uses circuit switching allowing high
throughput streaming traffic. For this, a setup packet first reserves a specific
route, the subsequent messages then follow this route.
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XGFT
The XGFT (eXtended Generalized Fat Tree) NoC uses a fat tree topology and
wormhole routing [109]. It supports pipelined circuit switching, which is an
extension of the traditional wormhole mechanism. In this scheme, the header
flit of a packet can be routed one step backwards when blocking occurs to
take a different path using adaptive turn around routing. Additionally, XGFT
is able to handle faults and to reconfigure the routers to provide some fault-
tolerance. When a fault is detected, the routing is changed to a deterministic
source routing, such that the packets can be routed around faulty NoC areas.
×pipes
Xpipes is a highly customizable architecture using wormhole switching and
source routing [33; 55]. Due to the deterministic source routing, the routers
can be kept simple and are similar to traditional virtual channel routers [54;
69]. The topology and hence also the number of input and output ports as
well as number of virtual channels are design parameters. Various topologies,
like mesh, torus, hypercube, clos, and butterfly, as well as routing algorithms,
like dimension-ordered, minimum-path, traffic splitting across minimum-
path, and traffic splitting across all paths, have successfully been evaluated
using Xpipes. Xpipes supports a go-back-N retransmission strategy for link-
level error control, where an error is indicated by a CRC module running
concurrently.
Summary of SoA NoC Architectures
Table 2.2 presents an overview of the most important parameters of selected
NoC architectures.
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Table 2.2: Overview of Selected SoA NoC Architectures.
NoC Topology Routing Switching/Flow Control Flit Size Buffering QoS
Aelite mesh (any)
contention-free
routing/
pipelined
time-division-
multiplexed
circuit switching
no link level flow
control
3 words
input (single
word)
pipelined
TDM/offline
scheduling of flits
Arteris
FlexNoC
custom n/a
wormhole or
S&F
custom custom Priority based
Æthereal
(2002)
mesh (any)
BE: source; GS:
contention-free
routing/
pipelined
time-division-
multiplexed
circuit switching
BE: wormhole,
credit based; GS:
TDM based
32 bit + 2 bit
control
input queue
BE+GS router. GS:
pipelined
TDM/offline
scheduling of flits
CHAIN custom source circuit switching — — priority based
DyAD mesh
deterministic
(XY)/ adaptive
wormhole — input —
IDAMC
mesh (any
with 8 port
router)
source
wormhole/ credit
based
140 bit
(35 bit link
width)
input GT VCs
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Table 2.2: Overview of Selected SoA NoC Architectures.
NoC Topology Routing Switching/Flow Control Flit Size Buffering QoS
iNoC
mesh (other
regular)
distributed XY
and adaptive
off-even-turn
wormhole — input
VCs with weighted-
round-robin & E2E
connections
Mango mesh deterministic
wormhole/
lock-based or
credits
— output
BE+GS router; GS:
E2E reservation of
VCs
MPPA 2D Torus source
wormhole/credit
based
32 bit output
round-robin +
source rate limiting
Nostrum
(2001)
2D mesh hot potato S&F
128 bit data
+ 10 bit
control
—
TDM based VC
reservation
Proteo
(2002)
bi-dir. ring
(distributed)
destination-tag
circuit variable
input and
output
—
QNoC
(2003)
2D mesh XY wormhole
16 bit data +
10 bit
control
Input queue +
single position
output queue
GT virtual channels
(four different
traffic classes)
RAW four meshes
design-time
route/ dimension
ordered
design-time/
wormhole
— input / output —
SoCBUS
(2002)
2D mesh XY adaptive —
16 bit data +
3 bit control
single position
input and
output buffers
Circuit switching
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Table 2.2: Overview of Selected SoA NoC Architectures.
NoC Topology Routing Switching/Flow Control Flit Size Buffering QoS
SPIN
(2000)
fat-tree
deterministic &
adaptive
wormhole/ credit
based
32 bit data +
4 bit control
input queues +
2 shared output
queues
—
STNoC spidergon source wormhole — output
fair bandwidth
allocation
Tile64 2D Mesh distributed XY
wormhole/
circuit switching
(32bit link) input —
XGFT Fat-tree adaptive wormhole 36 bit input/ output —
×pipes
(2002)
arbitrary
source static
(street sign)
wormhole
32, 64 or
128 bit
virtual output
queue
—
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2.3 NoC Performance Verification
There exist many parameters influencing the performance (e.g. latency,
throughput) of a NoC (cf. sections 2.1 and 2.2). For example, the designer
needs to investigate the topologies, routing, switching, flow-control, buffer
sizes, virtual channels, and link sizes (e.g. packet and flit serialisation). All
these parameters influence the performance, predictability, robustness, and
flexibility of the system. To understand the impact of the different parameters,
their performance-cost tradeoffs, and the interdependencies between them,
performance analysis and verification tools can be used. Applying these tools
early in the design, enables to make design decisions an iterative process,
where the feedback information can include functional (e.g. throughput, la-
tency, jitter, reliability) and non-functional (e.g. network utilization, area,
power consumption) measures. We can distinguish network performance
verification methods in at least two categories: simulation based or formal
analysis.
Simulation based approaches are frequently used when designing NoCs.
They can be used for an evaluation of the general working of the design, to
estimate the performance, and identify bottlenecks. Such an approach builds
a network and traffic model and then simulates the functioning by loading
the traffic into the network. The models can either be on an abstract level,
only modelling the general behaviour (e.g. only routing and arbitration on the
whole network level), or detailed by modelling all components in detail (e.g.
internals of the switches and their interconnections). However, the level of
detail can influence the speed of the simulation, where more details typically
slow down the simulation [145]. A simulation can use synthetic or realistic
traffic models or traces and can also include the interaction between the
network and other resources to examine the performance-cost tradeoffs [173;
191; 192]. However, the applicability of simulation based approaches for
verification with respect to safety is limited, as in a simulation there is
typically no guarantee to observe the worst-case behaviour.
Formal analysis approaches, on the other hand, use mathematical models
for the network and traffic to formally derive the behaviour of the system,
including the best, worst and average case. Examples for analysis approaches
are the schedulability analysis (response time analysis) [198], queueing
theory [86], network calculus [53], and compositional performance analy-
sis [99]. While some formal analysis approaches allow to derive bounds on
the worst-case behaviour (e.g. maximum latency of messages), they typically
use simplifications or (over-) approximations when modelling a system. This
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Table 2.3: Overview of NoC simulators.
Simulator Framework Topologies Heterogeneity Synchronous/Asynchronous
AdapNoC [108] C++ Mesh/Torus No Synchronous
BookSim [105] C++
Mesh/Torus/
Tree No Synchronous
DARSIM [141] C++ All Lim. (#VCs) Synchronous
ENoCS [229] Java Mesh/Torus Yes Synchronous
Garnet2.0 [19] C++ (gem5) All Yes Synchronous
HNOCS [32] Omnet++ All Yes Both
Nigram [104] SystemC Mesh/Torus No Synchronous
Nostrum [144] SystemC
Mesh/Torus/
Tree/Ring No Synchronous
Noxsim [48] SystemC Mesh Yes Synchronous
NS-2 [127] C++, OTcl All Yes Synchronous
ORION 2.0 [107] C++ – No –
Sicosys [175] C++ Mesh/Torus No Synchronous
SunFloor [196] SystemC Mesh No Synchronous
Wormsim [136; 163] C++ Mesh/Torus No Synchronous
is needed to cope with situations that are to complex to be expressed (easily)
under mathematical models. However, this also leads to pessimistic results
that might not be reached in the implemented system. For example, a derived
maximum latency might not be able to occur in the real system. Chapter 3
provides more details on analysis approaches for NoCs.
Simulation and analysis methods can also be combined, for example to
validate against each other or to speed up simulation based performance veri-
fication [131]. Table 2.3 presents an overview on commonly used simulation
frameworks.
In this work, we use the HNOCS library [32] for the OMNeT++ frame-
work [226; 227]. OMNeT++ is an object-oriented, modular, discrete event
network simulation framework based on C++, which has gained widespread
popularity as a network simulation platform in the scientific community
(more than 200 OMNEST/OMNeT++ related publications per year) as well
as among industrial partners [12]. OMNeT++ offers an easy integration of
different libraries (e.g. various traffic sources) and an integration of on-chip
and off-chip traffic. There are also several extensions for real-time simulation,
network emulation, database integration, SystemC integration, and several
other functions.
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To model the NoC architectures in this work, we used and extended
the open-source HNOCS library (Heterogeneous Network-on Chip Simu-
lator) [32]. HNOCS offers a tool for modelling of heterogeneous NoCs
with variable link capacities and number of VCs per unidirectional port.
The HNOCS simulation platform provides a modular, scalable, expandable,
and fully parametrizable framework with support for heterogeneous NoCs.
For supporting performance evaluation and verification, the libraries offer
a high number of tools for statistical measurements at flit and packet level:
end-to-end latencies, throughput, VC acquisition times, etc.

3. Formal Performance Verification of NoCs
In the domain of real-time systems, we need a performance evaluation or even
verification of the system (cf. Chapter 1). Traditionally, such an evaluation
of networks-on-chip (NoCs) is largely based on simulation. But for safety-
critical or mixed-critical systems, a formal verification of the performance
behaviour and hence formal guarantees for the worst-case behaviour of all
real-time senders are needed. Thus, a simulation based approach is not
suitable.
Most existing analysis approaches for NoCs are capable of providing such
guarantees only under the assumption that the queues in the routers never
overflow, i.e., that backpressure not occurs and a subsequent router or port
can always accept incoming data. This leads to overly pessimistic guarantees
or unfulfilled design requirements in many systems using commercially
available NoCs where buffer space is limited. Therefore, this chapter presents
an analysis methodology, providing formal timing guarantees for packet
latencies also in a NoC where backpressure can occur. The analysis allows
exploiting the behaviour of individual traffic streams to determine safe upper
bounds on the latency of individual packets. The developed model can be
used not only to obtain fast and accurate timing guarantees, but also to guide
the NoC design process within an optimization loop. The accuracy of the
analysis is evaluated experimentally through comparison with simulation
results.
The chapter is partially based on the work published in [217; 220].
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3.1 Introduction
In a typical design process, the application and platform models are designed
independently [139; 140]. This independent development is done to cope
with the design complexity of heterogeneous systems and to speed up the
design process. The resulting application models are then mapped to the
target platform. This mapping typically does not handle or solve all side
effects and interferences that occur after integrating multiple applications
to the NoC platform, as these effects only occur after the mapping is done.
Hence, especially for safety-critical real-time systems, a performance and
timing verification of the resulting system is needed. Simulations are not
suitable for this, as they are slow and it cannot be verified that the worst-case
behaviour was observed during the simulation, as required for safety-critical
systems (cf. freedom of interference in ISO 26262 [7]). Hence, fast and
accurate formal analysis approaches are needed. These need to adequately
cover the actual platform architecture and provide fast and accurate results.
The use of a fast analysis can then be combined with the mapping or even the
design of the platform (e.g. layout, topology, and architecture). This enables,
besides the individual verification of requirements, an iterative design and
mapping process as sketched in Figure 3.1 [113; 139]. Such formal approach
can be combined with the simulation-based approaches. For example, the
analysis can be used in an iterative mapping to find a few possible mappings
that satisfy all safety requirements in the worst-case. These few possibilities
can then be investigated further in a simulation to obtain results on the
average performance for selected use-cases and select the most promising
candidate.
Most existing analysis approaches are capable of providing such formal
verification only under certain simplifications. For example, these approaches
assume an unlimited buffer space (i.e. that no backpressure occurs and a sub-
sequent router or port can always accept incoming data), single flit buffers, no
sharing of (virtual) channels between different streams, or no self interference
(i.e. that a packet or even flit must have left the NoC before the succeeding
packet or flit is released: WCRT < D < T ). However, such simplifications
lead to overly pessimistic guarantees or unfulfilled design requirements in
many systems using commercially available NoCs where buffer space and
the number of channels are limited. In this chapter we develop a backpressure
aware analysis for a NoC with multiple virtual channels (VCs) and priorities.
It supports a priority based arbitration between VCs with a different priority
and a round-robin arbitration between VCs with the same priority as well
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Figure 3.1: Role of analysis during system design [113; 139; 164].
as VC sharing between multiple traffic streams. The proposed network per-
formance analysis approach provides the following performance metrics for
each router and end-to-end:
• minimum accepted throughput;
• worst-case response times (WCRT) of single flits, single packets, and
multiple packets;
• maximum buffer occupancies;
• output event models for tasks/streams (at each router).
And hence, the proposed analysis approach can be used for the verification
of safety requirements, as well as for design and optimization purposes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 pro-
vides an overview on related work. Section 3.3 briefly introduces the used
analysis framework—the compositional performance analysis (CPA). Sec-
tion 3.4 then presents the proposed analysis approach accounting for back-
pressure. And finally, Section 3.5 presents an experimental evaluation of
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the approach, comparing the analysis results against simulation and another
analysis.
3.2 Related Work
There exist various methodologies for the analysis of networks-on-chip in-
cluding support for quality-of-service (QoS). For example, [27; 110; 115;
143; 198; 199; 200] provide techniques for timing analysis of priority-based
wormhole switching NoCs. In [143] the authors formulate a contention tree
that captures interference in the network. Similarly, Shi and Burns [198]
define two different delay components: direct interference and indirect inter-
ference. Based on these, a worst-case network latency analysis is presented.
However, all these schemes do not account for the effects of pipelining and
parallel transmission of data. This is tackled by Kashif et al. [110], by re-
fining the communication resource and its associated communication task
model.
Still, the mentioned approaches assume global and unique priorities with
unique virtual channel assignment for each priority. Such implementation
policy typically results in high buffer cost and energy overhead. Hence, in
many commercially available NoCs the foreseen number of (virtual) channels
is usually lower than the number of tasks or priority levels. To address this
problem, Shi and Burns [199; 200] allow shared priorities in a priority-
based NoCs. While [199] requires that the deadlines are not larger than the
period for all traffic-flows (and thus that a packet has left the NoC before the
succeeding packet is injected), [200] removes this constraint.
In [56; 75; 76; 178; 180; 183] the authors present worst-case latency
analysis approaches for networks using round-robin arbitration and with
without special QoS support. For this, Ferrandiz et al. [75; 76] and Rahmati
et al. [180] use a recursive calculus to obtain an upper bound on the traversal
time of a packet. However, they do not take the individual behaviour of
streams (e.g. inter-arrival time and periods of packets) into account, resulting
in overly pessimistic results. This is addressed by Dasari et al. [56], where
the authors extend the existing model by integrating the characteristics of the
tasks that generate the packets. Another approach is presented by Rambo
and Ernst [183], which uses a compositional performance analysis approach
to analyse a NoC with iSLIP arbitration and shared virtual channels and
hence allows non-symmetrical guarantees and to exploit behaviours of single
streams (arbitrary event functions).
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However, the approaches mentioned above assume that network nodes
and routers are equipped with sufficient buffer space to prevent backpressure.
For this, the network must be adopted to the particular application set, which
is hard or even impossible, or the traffic injection-rate must be limited. As
the rate limiting must be done according to the worst-case behaviour, this
can lead to a decrease in system performance as the network cannot be fully
utilized. To overcome these drawbacks, recent research focused on analysis
techniques supporting backpressure [111; 177; 179].
Qian et al. [177] present an analysis for latency bounds in wormhole
networks with finite sized buffers. The approach is based on network cal-
culus [134] and computes global end-to-end service curves for each stream.
Based on these performance parameters, as the maximum latency and mini-
mum throughput, can be derived. This approach is close to ours. However,
instead of computing global service curves, we follow the compositional
approach of CPA [99; 100] and thus we can provide more fine-granular
results, e.g., bounds for the behaviour at each router. This can help to more
accurately account for interference and also to identify bottlenecks in the net-
work. Kashif and Patel [111] present an extension of SLA [110] accounting
for backpressure for priority based NoCs. And recently Nikolic´ et al. [162]
present an analysis approach for priority-preemptive NoCs with per-traffic
flow dedicated virtual channels that accounts for backpressure. However,
the analyses assume unique priorities for each stream with individual virtual
channels for each priority level and focuses on simple periodic activation
models. On the contrary, our approach allows arbitrary activation models
and sharing of the same (virtual) channel between different applications, as
common for commercially available NoC architectures [17; 92; 233].
A slightly different approach is presented by Qian et al. [179]. Here the
authors propose an average-case analysis for round-robin based NoCs. While
the authors account for finite sized buffers (i.e. backpressure), the analysis
does not provide safe upper bounds on the latency. The model only provides
a fast approximation of the average latency as a fast alternative to simulation.
3.3 Compositional Performance Analysis (CPA)
3.3.1 Introduction
The proposed analysis is based on the Compositional Performance Analysis
(CPA) framework [99; 100]. For modelling a system, CPA uses three main
components: resources, tasks, and event models. Resources are used for
modelling of processing or network nodes (e.g. CPUs, router ports). Tasks
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are mapped to resources and compete for service provided by the resources.
The allocation of the service to the tasks depends on the selected scheduling
policy.
To capture the dynamics of the system behaviour, task activations are
abstracted using event models. These models define arrival functions η−(∆t)
and η+(∆t), which provide lower and upper limits on the number of events
(task activations) in any half-open time interval ∆t. These have counterparts,
the so called minimum and maximum distance functions δ−(n) and δ+(n).
The minimum and maximum distance functions define the lower and upper
limit on the time interval between the first and the last event of any sequence
of n consecutive event occurrences. Both, η and δ , models can be straight-
forwardly converted to each other [49; 99; 188; 194]. Figure 3.2 shows an
example for both models. These models allow to capture all possible event
arrival patterns within these limits. Thus, they cover all corner-cases and not
only a single scenario as in case of a recorded memory trace.
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Figure 3.2: Event models covering all traces which stay between
η+(∆t)/δ−(n) and η−(∆t)/δ+(n).
The execution of an application in a system is modelled using a directed
graph. In such a graph, nodes denote tasks and edges symbolize dependencies
between tasks. A task consumes temporal service of a resource, which can
vary per activation between a best- and a worst-case execution time. The
jitter (the difference between maximum and minimum response time) permits
deriving new output event models of each task. Consequently, each element
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changes the event model, i.e., the output event model of a task on a particular
resource becomes the input event model of its dependent task(s). Additionally,
the CPA framework allows covering of functional dependencies between
tasks such as task chains. For instance, activations of tasks that depend
on inputs from multiple other tasks. This can be covered by joining the
event models from several tasks using AND or OR functions [99]. CPA
offers an iterative approach following the busy window method [215]. It
minimizes and maximizes the response time of the currently analysed task
by deriving the best- and worst-case blocking through all other interfering
tasks, e.g., assuming the simultaneous activation of all interfering tasks and
their maximum load (e.g. worst-case activation patterns). Figure 3.3 presents
the approach. For this, CPA performs a local busy window analysis for each
resource to compute worst-case timings and output event models for each
task. The local resource-level analysis uses a critical instant scenario that
assumes the worst-case arrival of all interfering tasks to obtain the maximum
delay for the task under consideration. The output event models from the
local analysis are then forwarded as input models for all dependent tasks
and resources. With the new input models these tasks are then analysed
again. The local analysis and propagation are iteratively applied until all
output event models remain stable [99]. After each iteration, some output
event models are updated, based on the analysis of the corresponding tasks.
Tasks with updated activation event models are re-analysed. This potentially
results in updated task output (and hence activation) event models in the
next iteration and so forth. The initial event models for all tasks are derived
from the external input event model of each task chain. In addition to the
validation of the schedulability (i.e. all deadlines met) the analysis also yields
upper bounds on the worst-case response-time (WCRT) of tasks and other
timing properties such as the worst-case end-to-end path latency of a chain
of tasks and the maximum backlog of activations.
Local
Scheduling
Analysis
Local
Scheduling
Analysis
Environment
Model
Input
Event
Models
Local
Scheduling
Analysis
Output
Event
Model
Convergence
or not
scheduable?
Terminate
yes
no
Figure 3.3: Iterative analysis approach of CPA.
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3.3.2 CPA for NoCs
This section provides an overview on the compositional performance analysis
(CPA) for NoCs. The CPA approach uses a similar composition and event
models as Real-Time Calculus (RTC) [213], but differs in the used local
analysis for the links and routers (cf. Section 3.3.1). For this, the network-on-
chip (NoC) domain is translated to the processor resource model known from
real-time scheduling [215]. This approach has been successfully applied to
analyse on-chip networks [60; 63; 183; 198; 220]. The use of a CPA based
framework enables to analyse heterogeneous systems using the same analysis
and model. That is, the approach allows the routers to be different (e.g.
to use different arbitration schemes, different serialisation of packets/flits,
etc.) and to include the on-node/on-core behaviour to provide a system-wide
end-to-end analysis.
The CPA framework uses a multicore processor model to represent the
NoC [60; 183; 220]. In the model, processing resources represent the output
ports of a router and shared resources with mutually exclusive access the
input ports (or input virtual channels when each VC is directly connected to
the crossbar). The exclusive access models the limitation of an input port
(or VC) to send only one flit at a time to an output port (or output VC). A
traffic stream is modelled as a chain of tasks mapped to the resources based
on its path in the network. This is done through mapping the router ports
to scheduled resources and the traffic streams to task chains that use a set
of these resources based on their path in the network. Figure 3.4 shown an
exemplary mapping of a router with four streams. In the example, streams 2
and 3, represented by tasks τ2 and τ3, share the input port and thus access
the same shared resource InS. Stream 3 additionally shares the output port
with stream 4.
In this model, the arrival of a flit is a task activation at the processing
resource and the transmission of a flit at an output port is the execution of
that task. Each task τi is assigned a best- and worst-case execution time C−i
and C+i for each task activation denoting the time needed to process a flit.
The activations of a task can be triggered by an external source (network
interface) or other tasks (routers).
In CPA, NoC analysis is performed iteratively using individual resource-
level analysis steps to obtain the worst-case timing information. Figure 3.5
shows this approach. In the local analysis step, each router (i.e. each router
output port) is analysed using the current input event models. Based on
these models, the best- and worst-case response times and the jitter on each
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Figure 3.5: Iterative CPA analysis of a NoC.
router are calculated. These are then used to generate updated output event
models for dependent tasks (on other routers). If the output or input models
of a router have changed (compared to the previous iteration), the router is
re-analysed with the new models. If the iterations remain stable, the response
times for each task on each router are known. With these, an upper and lower
bound on the end-to-end latency can be derived, e.g., by summing up the
individual response times and accounting for additional timing parameters
(cf. Section 3.4.4).
3.4 Backpressure Aware NoC Analysis
In this section we describe the proposed analysis of a network-on-chip with
backpressure using CPA. We do this for a network-on-chip with multiple
virtual channels (each VC having its own input buffers in a router), where we
allow different and also the same priority for VCs, and also sharing of a VC
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between different streams. For the arbitration between different priorities we
assume a priority based arbitration (packet or flit level) while requests with
the same priority are handled using a round-robin scheme. While this is not
a common design for existing NoC architectures, as this architecture is too
complex, it allows to derive a general analysis approach that can cover most
existing commercial designs, as e.g. [17; 92; 233]. That is, when applying
the proposed analysis to a specific design certain terms will cease to exist.
For the analysis we derive the corresponding worst-case multiple acti-
vation processing time of a stream [63; 99; 220]. Based on this, we then
derive metrics for a single router and for a complete network, such as the
path latency.
Definition 3.4.1 The worst-case multiple activation processing time
B+i (q,a
q
i ) of a stream i denotes the maximum time the resource (i.e.
the router port) is busy processing q flits of stream i, given that all but
the first flit arrive before their respective predecessor has been transferred
and the q-th flit arrives at time instant aqi . The resource is considered
busy if it processes a stream or if a backpressure signal to this resource is
asserted.
To derive the worst-case multiple activation processing time, we first
derive possible factors that influence the arbitration and hence the processing
of a flit in the switch. Based on this, we then formally derive the actual
influence these factors have on the processing time.
3.4.1 Influencing Factors
From Section 2.1.6 we know that a flit is only transferred from the input
module of a switch to the output module if the following conditions are
true: (1) to be able to request for the transmission, the flits must be at the
front of the FIFO queue (i.e. all preceding flits inside the queue are already
transferred); (2) the flit (i.e. its virtual channel) wins the arbitration at the
input and output module; and (3) there must be sufficient space available at
the next router (or the resource) to receive the flit (e.g. there must be available
credits).
For the first condition, all flits that precede a stream inside the FIFO
buffer must be transmitted. Figure 3.6 presents an example for this. When a
flit of a stream i arrives at the network router, there might be already other
flits in the FIFO queue waiting for transmission. These flits can be from the
same or from different streams sharing the buffer. In the figure, for example,
the flits of stream i are preceded by flits from a stream j that takes a different
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output port than stream i. Hence, stream i will have to wait until all these
flits of stream j are transferred. Such a stream j may experience interference
through other streams due to, for example, the arbitration at the output port.
For the remainder of this work we will call such interference through other
streams in the FIFO queue FIFO blocking.
stream i
stream k
i is blocked by
preceding flits
Input W
Input N
stream j
Out E
Out S
Out N
Figure 3.6: FIFO blocking
For the second condition, the arbitration policy at the input and output
modules as well as the presence of other traffic streams influences when a
stream i may win the arbitration. For the router described above, we can
differentiate two different situations that influence the arbitration: traffic
sharing the input port with a stream i and traffic sharing the output port with
a stream i. Figure 3.7 shows an example for two streams sharing an input
port (Input W). As the different virtual-channels are connected through a
multiplexer to the crossbar, only a single VC can access the crossbar at a
certain point in time. To handle the requests of multiple VCs, an arbitration
is done between the VCs. With the definition of the router under analysis, a
stream i may compete for access to the crossbar with other streams (i.e. other
VCs) that have the same priority or a higher priority. Here, higher priority
streams are always served before the stream i, while there is a round-robin
arbitration between VCs with the same priority. If traffic on such VCs is
present, it therefore might delay the processing of stream i. For the remainder
of this work we will call such interference input blocking.
Besides the arbitration at the input module, there is an arbitration at the
output module (cf. Section 2.1.6). Similar as for the input blocking, a stream i
under consideration can be delayed by other streams at the output model.
Figure 3.8 shows an example for this. As we already accounted for streams
sharing the same input port, these interfering streams come from different
input ports. With the definition of the router under analysis, a stream i may
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Figure 3.7: Input blocking
compete for access to the output port with other streams from other input
ports that have the same priority or a higher priority. Similar as before,
higher priority streams are always served before the stream i, while there is
a round-robin arbitration between streams with the same priority. For the
remainder of this work we will call such interference output blocking.
stream i
stream j
Out E sends grant
to Input N:
i is blocked by jInput W
Input N
Out E
Out S
Out N
Figure 3.8: Output blocking
In addition to the input and output blocking, there is a special kind of
blocking resulting from the independent arbitration at the input and output
module. As discussed in Section 2.1.6, multiple input ports might request for
the same output while each input port can send requests to multiple output
ports. Hence, the arbiter of an output port can select a request of an input
port but this input port might select a stream heading to another output port.
Figure 3.9 shows an example for this. In the figure, streams i and j share
the output port (Out E) and streams j and k the input port. If the shared
output port now selects streams j but the northern input port (Input N) selects
stream k, stream i is indirectly blocked by stream k. That is, a stream i can
be delayed by a stream k that is not sharing the input or output port with
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the stream i. For the remainder of this work we will call such interference
indirect output blocking.
stream i
stream j
stream k
(1) Out E sends grant
to Input N:
i is blocked by j
(2) Input mux selects k:
j is blocked by k
Because of (1) and (2):
i is blocked by k
Input W
Input N
Out E
Out S
Out N
Figure 3.9: Indirect output blocking example: stream i is blocked by stream j
at the shared output port and stream j is blocked by stream k on the input
port of stream j.
For the third condition, there must be sufficient buffer space at the subse-
quent router (or the resource) to accept the arriving flits. As the processing of
a flit can be delayed by many factors (see above), the buffer of a router might
get full. In this case, the flow control will prevent the preceding router from
sending additional flits. Hence, when looking at the flit processing of a router,
the processing time is also influenced by the delay resulting from insufficient
buffer space. Figure 3.10 shows an example for this. In the figure, a stream i
at the current router cannot send its flits to the subsequent router as the input
buffer is full. In such a situation, the buffer of the subsequent router may
host flits of stream i or any other stream sharing this buffer. To be able to
send a flit to the subsequent router, the current router has to wait until a flit at
the subsequent router is processed (i.e. is fully transmitted). The processing
at the subsequent router is again influenced by all factors discussed above,
including the lack of free buffer space. For the remainder of this work we
will call such interference backpressure blocking.
3.4.2 Sources of Blocking
With the known factors influencing the processing time of a flit, we now
formally derive the worst-case multiple activation processing time. For
this we first define various sets and auxiliary functions used throughout
the remainder of this section. This is followed by the derivation of the
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stream i
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insufficient buffer space
at subsequent router
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Figure 3.10: Backpressure blocking: lack of free buffer space leads to a
delay.
individual blocking factors. For the different sets of streams, ports, and
(virtual) channels we distinguish:
• OutPi : Set of all input ports accessing the same output port as stream i
but not including the input port of stream i.
• VCEPi,p : Set of all VCs at port p that have the same priority as stream i
without the VC of stream i.
• OutHPi : Set of all streams with a higher priority than stream i that share
the same output with stream i but not the input port.
• InHPi : Set of all streams with a higher priority than stream i that share
the same input port with stream i.
• OutPEPi,p,c: Set of all streams at input port p using VC c with the same
priority as stream i that share the same output with stream i.
• OutPHPi,p : Set of all streams at input port p with a higher priority as
stream i that share the same output with stream i.
• InPEPi,c : Set of all streams at the input port of stream i using VC c that
have the same priority as stream i.
• Buf i: Set of all streams sharing the (input) buffer with stream i.
Additionally, we use the following auxiliary functions
Definition 3.4.2 Let ρ+i (∆t) be the maximum number of flits that can
arrive in any time interval ∆t at a stream i considering whole packets:
ρ+i (∆t) =
⌈
η+i (∆t)
n
⌉
·n (3.1)
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Definition 3.4.3 Let ρˆ(∆t, in,out,vc) be the maximum number of packets
that can arrive in any time interval ∆t at input port in on virtual channel c
for output port out considering whole packets:
ρˆ(∆t, in,out,vc) = min
{⌈
∆t
n
⌉
, ∑
j∈S(in,out,vc)
ρ+j (∆t)
}
, (3.2)
where S(in,out,c) denotes the set of all streams on input in using virtual
channel vc and output out. In the equation, the first term of the min-
function denotes the fact that there cannot arrive more packets than time
has passed (assuming a flit transfer time of 1 cycle and the time to be
in cycles). The second term then accumulates the maximum number of
packets from each stream using input in, VC vc, and output out.
Definition 3.4.4 LetΘ(port,vc,k) denote the set of all possible mappings
of k packets to streams using VC vc and port port. Then θ ,θ ∈Θ defines
a specific mapping for k packets, such that θ denotes for each of the k
packets the stream it belongs to and hence also the destined output port.
With these definitions, we can now derive the multiple activation pro-
cessing time. To conservatively capture all possible worst-case scenarios, we
break down the multiple activation processing time into a sum of different
terms addressing all possible blocking factors. For a router as described
above the processing time is influenced by:
• Flit transfer time C: the time to transfer a flit in a router excluding
any kind of blocking. For the sake of simplicity and since it is the
usual case in NoCs, we consider that all flits have the same constant
transfer time of 1 cycle. However, other transfer times, e.g., when flits
are transmitted in different numbers of phits, can be used.
• Packet size n: the length of a packet in flits. To improve readability,
we assume all packets to have the same size, while the analysis can be
straightforwardly extended to account for different packet sizes.
• Buffer size Qb: the size of the buffer in the number of flits that can
be stored. Without loss of generality, we assume all buffers to have
the same size, while the analysis can be straightforwardly extended to
account for different buffer sizes.
• Output blocking Bout,hpi and Bout,epi : the time streams from other
inputs than i use the same output port.
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• Indirect Output blocking Biouti : the amount of time that stream i is
blocked by streams k from other inputs that do not share an input or
output with i but directly block streams j sharing the output with i at
their respective input.
• Input blocking Bin,hpi and Bin,epi : the time required to transmit flits
from streams at the same input port but different VC than i.
• FIFO blocking Bfifoi : the time required to transmit flits from other
streams in the FIFO queue preceding the q-th flit of stream i.
• Backpressure blocking Bbpp,c: the blocking resulting from lack of free
buffer space at the downstream router or resource using port p and
VC c.
• LP blocking Blpi : the time required to transmit the flits of a lower
priority packet that already got selected.
With these we can define the worst-case multiple activation processing
time in Theorem 3.4.1:
Theorem 3.4.1 — Multiple activation processing time. The worst-case
multiple activation processing time B+i (q,a
q
i ) denotes the longest time
required to transfer q flits of stream i on a router, given that all but the first
flit arrive before their respective predecessor has been transferred and the
q-th flit arrives at time instant aqi . It can be obtained by maximizing all
blocking effects and summing them up:
B+i (q,a
q
i )≤q ·C+Bout,hpi (B+i (q,aqi )−C+ ε,q)
+Bout,epi (B
+
i (q,a
q
i )−C+ ε,q)
+Bin,hpi (B
+
i (q,a
q
i ),q)
+Bin,epi (B
+
i (q,a
q
i ),q)
+Biouti (B
+
i (q,a
q
i )−C+ ε,q)
+Bfifoi (B
+
i (q,a
q
i ),a
q
i )
+BbpP(i),VC(i)(q)+B
lp
i , (3.3)
where P(i) and VC(i) denote the output port and virtual channel of stream i.
The equation forms an integer fixed point problem, which is typical for
busy-time based scheduling analysis. It can be resolved iteratively starting
with B+i (q,a
q
i ) = q ·C.
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Proof. The theorem directly results from the definition of the NoC and its
arbitration. The total multiple-activation processing time of q flits of a stream
is bounded by the time required to transfer those flits (q ·C) plus the maximum
time the stream may be blocked. Because flit-transfers cannot be preempted,
the blocking only needs to be considered until the q-th flit begins transferring
(B+i (q,a
q
i )−C + ε). Adding ε is required because the η+ function used
inside the blocking terms to compute the number of interfering activations is
defined as an open interval, i.e., η+(0) = 0. 
Next, we derive upper bounds for the individual blocking factors from
Equation 3.3.
Lemma 3.4.2 — Output Blocking with higher priority. The higher pri-
ority output blocking that a stream i experiences is bounded by:
Bout,hpi (∆t,q)≤ ∑
j∈OutHPi
C ·η+j (∆t) . (3.4)
Proof. Proven directly. Due to the priority based arbitration each stream with
higher priority from other input ports that shares the output port with stream i
and has flits waiting will be served before stream i if their output channel is
ready. Hence, we need to account for the flit transmission time of all flits that
arrive during the processing time of stream i. As higher priority streams are
only served if their respective output port and VC is ready, we do not need to
account for the backpressure blocking these streams may experience. 
Lemma 3.4.3 — Output Blocking with equal priority. The output
blocking with equal priority that a stream i experiences is bounded by:
Bout,epi (∆t,q)≤ ∑
p∈OutPi
(
C · ψˆp (VC(i))+BbpP(i),VC(i) (ψˆp (VC(i)))
)
+ ∑
p∈OutPi
∑
vc∈VCEPi,p\VC(i)
(C · ψˆp(vc)) (3.5)
with ψˆp(vc) = min
{⌈q
n
⌉
·n,n · ρˆ (∆t, p,OUT(i),vc)
}
,
where IN(i), VC(i), and OUT(i) denote the input, virtual channel, and
output of stream i.
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Proof. Proven directly. With the definition of the arbitration and output
blocking, there can only be output blocking of equal priority from two
different types of streams: streams from other inputs using different VCs,
and streams from other inputs using the same VC as stream i.
The first sum accounts for the blocking through streams with the same
priority from other inputs using the same VC as i. Due to wormhole switching,
once the scheduler grants access to an output port VC, no other input port
can access this output port VC until it is released, i.e., the packet is fully
transmitted. This is captured by ρˆ , which considers that after a head flit
arrives within the time interval ∆t, the whole packet will be served before
stream i. Additionally, due to the round-robin arbitration between streams
with the same priority, each head flit belonging to stream i may only be
blocked once by each other input port. This is addressed with the min-
function, where
⌈ q
n
⌉
is an upper bound on the number of head flits. Each
of these head flits can be blocked at most for n flits from each other input
port. Moreover, each of the interfering flits then will block stream i for the
flit transfer time C and the backpressure blocking these flits experience.
The second sum/line accounts for the blocking from VCs with the same
priority as stream i (but not using the same VC of i) from each input port
(but not the input of i). Similar as for the first sum, these streams are served
following a round-robin scheme. Hence, each of these streams can block
stream i for each of its header flits. As these different VCs are only served
when their respective output port and VC is ready, we do not need to account
for backpressure.
As all of these streams share the set of higher priority output interferers,
the interference of these is already accounted for when analysing stream i.
Hence, we do not have to account for it again.
The sum of all possible blocking factors then derives the output blocking
in Lemma 3.4.3. 
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Lemma 3.4.4 — FIFO. The FIFO blocking that a stream i experiences is
bounded by:
Bfifoi (∆t,a
q
i )≤m ·C+ maxθ∈Θ(IN(i),VC(i),k){Aθ}
+ max
θ∈Θ(IN(i),VC(i),1)
{
BbpP(θ),VC(θ)(m− k ·n)
}
(3.6)
with m =min
{⌈
aqi
n
⌉
·n, ∑
j∈Buf i
{
ρ+j (a
q
i )
}}
k =
⌊m
n
⌋
Aθ =∑
j∈θ
{
Bout,epj (∆t−C,n)+Bioutj (∆t,n)+BbpP( j),VC( j)(n)
+ ∑
k∈OutHPj \OutHPi
C ·η+k (∆t)
}
,
where IN(i) denotes the input of stream i; VC(i) denotes the virtual
channel of stream i; and k denotes the maximum number of whole packets
(and hence head flits) of other streams.
Proof. Proven directly. The blocking caused by other streams in the same
buffer consists of the flits that will be transmitted before stream i and the
interference those flits observe. The first term accounts for the transmission
of these flits. For this, only flits that arrived before the arrival of the q-th flit
can be in the buffer. Thus, m provides the maximum number of flits of other
packets that can be before the q-th flit of stream i in the buffer.
The interfering flits can be grouped into flits of whole packets as well
as a packet partially transmitted at the front of the queue. The second term
accounts for the blocking whole packets can experience. It considers for the
k packets all possible mappings to streams and takes the maximum blocking.
This blocking consists of output, indirect output, and backpressure blocking
each packet may experience. For the output blocking with higher priority
we only need to account for additional interference at other outputs (i.e. the
ones not used by stream i), as for the same output it is already included when
analysing the higher priority output blocking with of stream i. The third term
accounts for the blocking of a partial packet. As the header of this packet has
already been sent, we only need to account for backpressure blocking. 
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Lemma 3.4.5 — Indirect Output. The indirect output blocking that a
stream i may experience can be bounded by:
Biouti (∆t,q)≤ ∑
p∈OutPi
(ψ1(p)+ψ2(p)+ψ3(p)) (3.7)
with
ψ1(p) = ∑
vc∈VCEPi,p \VC(i)
min
{⌈q
n
⌉
·n,
∑
j∈OutPEPi ,p,vc
{
Bin,epj (∆t,η
+
j (∆t))
+Bin,hpj (∆t,η
+
j (∆t))
}}
ψ2(p) = ∑
j∈OutPEPi,p,VC(i)
{
Bin,epj (∆t,ρ
+
j (∆t))+B
in,hp
j (∆t,ρ
+
j (∆t))
}
ψ3(p) = ∑
j∈OutPHPi,p
{
Bin,epj (∆t,η
+
j (∆t))+B
in,hp
j (∆t,η
+
j (∆t))
}
,
where VC(i) denotes the virtual channel of stream i.
Proof. Proven directly. Indirect output blocking occurs when a stream j that
shares the output port with stream i wins the arbitration at the output port
but loses the arbitration at the input port to another stream. Hence, stream i
may be blocked for the input blocking of such a stream j. This blocking can
occur due to higher priority streams or same priority streams on the same or
different VC than stream i. The first term accounts for all streams on different
VCs on each other input port. Due to the round robin scheduling, stream i
may be blocked by each of these streams for the number of the head flits,
covered by the min-function. The second term accounts for streams using the
same VC. Due to wormhole switching, we have to account for the blocking
of the entire packet of the interfering streams. And the third term accounts for
all higher priority streams from other input ports. As higher priority streams
are always preferred at the arbiter, we need to account for all flits that can
arrive during the considered time interval and their interference. 
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Lemma 3.4.6 — Input HP Blocking. The input blocking caused by
higher priority streams that a stream i may experience can be bounded
by:
Bin,hpi (∆t)≤ ∑
j∈InHPi
{
η+j (∆t) ·C
}
. (3.8)
Proof. Proven directly. Higher priority streams are served before stream i.
Hence, for all arriving flits of higher priority streams, we need to account for
their transmission. As these streams are only served (i.e. receive a grant from
an output port) if the output channel is ready and no other input port receives
the grant, we do not need to account for backpressure or output blocking
of these streams. Additionally, as we already account for all higher priority
streams when analysing stream i, we do not need to account for the higher
priority streams of any stream j. 
Lemma 3.4.7 — Input EP Blocking. The input blocking caused by
streams with the same priority that a stream i may experience can be
bounded by:
Bin,epi (∆t)≤ ∑
vc∈VCEPi,P(i)
C ·min
q, ∑
j∈InPEPi,vc
{
η+j (∆t)
}
 . (3.9)
Proof. Proven directly. Due to the round robin arbitration each VC can send
a flit for each flit of stream i. Hence, we need to account for their transmission
time. As streams from other VCs are only selected, when their respective
output port and VC are ready, we do not need to account for any blocking of
these flits. For a “winner takes it all” arbitration (i.e. packet based arbitration
between different VCs of the same priority) each other VC might send a full
packet for each of the head flits of stream i. When using different packet sizes
for the streams, we would have to select the worst (i.e. longest) candidates
for the interfering streams. 
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Lemma 3.4.8 — Low Priority Blocking. The low priority blocking a
stream i may experience can be bounded by:
Bl p ≤

0, if no lower priority (LP) streams exist,
(n ·C)− ε, if LP exists and packet level preemption,
C− ε, if LP exists and flit level preemption,
(3.10)
where ε is the smallest time unit (e.g. a cycle) between the start of a flit
transmission and the selection/start of a new flit.
Proof. Proven directly. When a flit of stream i arrives, the router might just
have selected a low priority stream. Depending on the preemption policy,
stream i then has to wait until a flit or a packet is fully transmitted. As the
flit of stream i must have arrived at least ε time after the low priority flit
was selected (otherwise the arbiter would have selected i), we can subtract ε .
Additionally, as the low priority stream can only transmit when the output
port is ready, there is no backpressure or additional blocking. For different
packet sizes we would have to search for the worst candidate based on all
low priority streams sharing the input or output with stream i. 
Definition 3.4.5 — BP. The backpressure blocking that a stream may
experience on its path through output p and VC c in router k is given by:
Bbpp,c(q) = Bˆ
+
p,c,k+1(q), (3.11)
where Bˆ+p,c,k+1 is the worst-case waiting time for VC c at the downstream
router (k+1) until the q-th flit can be received. This accounts for the
propagation of the new event model for backpressure in CPA.
Lemma 3.4.9 — Waiting. The worst-case waiting time of a port (i.e.
buffer) p denotes the time until the port is ready to receive the q-th flit.
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For a router it can be bounded by:
Bˆ+p,c(q)≤
{
q ·C+maxθ∈Θ(p,c,k) {Aθ} , if bp > Qb
0, otherwise
(3.12)
with Aθ =∑
j∈θ
{
Bout,hpi (Bˆ
+
p (q)−Ci + ε,n)
+Bout,epi (Bˆ
+
p (q)−Ci + ε,n)
+Biouti (Bˆ
+
p (q)−Ci + ε,n)+Bin,hpi (Bˆ+p (q)−Ci + ε)
+Bin,epi (Bˆ
+
p (q)−Ci + ε)+BbpP( j),VC( j)(n)
}
,
where bp denotes the worst-case backlog of the port and k is an upper
bound on the number of packets q flits form (k = d qne). For router ports
connected to a resource, the worst-case waiting time can directly be
derived from the possible service (i.e. acceptance rate of flits) of the
resource. This enables to use rate-limited resources that do not allow
consuming a flit each cycle.
Proof. Proven directly. With the definition of the arbitration and waiting
time, backpressure (i.e. waiting) can only occur, if the worst-case backlog
of the port exceeds the buffer size (i.e. bp > Qb). If backpressure occurs,
the port is conservatively assumed to be fully backlogged (i.e. buffer full).
Hence, to receive q flits, the port must transmit q flits to any output. For these
flits we must account for their transmission time (q ·C) and the worst-case
interference they suffer. For this, the term maxθ∈Θ(p,c,k) {Aθ} obtains the
worst-case blocking from each possible mapping of flits to streams and output
ports. 
With the lemmas 3.4.2 to 3.4.9, we have fully derived the inequality in
Equation 4.1 for the local analysis step. For the iterative approach, we now
define the derived metrics that are propagated between the routers and that
can be used for performance and schedulability characterization.
3.4.3 Derived Metrics
With the worst-case multiple activation processing time, we can now derive
the worst-case latency of a single router. The worst-case single hop latency
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R+i of a stream i denotes the maximum time between the arrival time a
q
i of
the q-th activation (i.e. flit) and the processing of q activations B+i (q,a
q
i ) [61;
220]:
R+i = maxq∈Qi
{Ri(q)} with (3.13)
Ri(q) = max
aqi ∈Aqi
{
B+i (q,a
q
i )−aqi
}
+Or ,
where Or denotes the router’s overhead, such as the time required by the
router to determine and acquire the output port and virtual channel, and Ri(q)
is the worst-case response time of the q-th activation. This equation considers
for each number of q activations within a busy-period all possible arriving
times aqi of the q-th event. This is necessary, as a later arrival time might
increase the interference in the FIFO queues. Additionally, a delayed arrival
reduces the response time. However, the authors of [61; 183] proved that the
number of possible candidates for aqi is finite. The authors showed, that it is
sufficient to consider only candidates that coincide with activations of the
interfering workload. Hence, we can define the set of candidates as:
Aqi =
⋃
j∈I(i)∪Iˆi
{
δ−j (k) | δ−i (q)≤ δ−j (k)< B+(q,aqi )
}
k≥1
, (3.14)
where I(i) defines the set of all interfering streams for stream i using the
same queue in the router and Iˆi represents a stream corresponding to the
combined arrival curves of the interfering streams. This set again includes
a fixed-point iteration as B+(q,aqi ) is required to compute the set. For Iˆi,
the arrival curves of all interfering streams in the FIFO queue of stream i
are combined and shaped such that only one flit can arrive per cycle. This
additional factor (compared to the classic approach [183; 220]) is needed as
the FIFO blocking (cf. Lemma 3.4.4) assumes that only one flit per cycle can
arrive at the FIFO. Hence, for example, if there are two interfering streams
that have a flit arriving at time instant 1, the set of I(i) would obtain the
arrival candidate of 1. Thus, the case where both streams are present in the
FIFO queue is lost. The additional (virtual) stream Iˆi now leads to the arrival
candidates of 1 and 2, covering the effects of multiple streams sharing the
FIFO. In the classic approach this is tackled by assuming all interfering
streams to have flits waiting in the FIFO when deriving the FIFO (e.g. input)
blocking (i.e. that multiple flits can arrive in a cycle). However, that way
the classic analysis assumes more interfering flits than physically possible.
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Additionally, we need to consider all scenarios where an activation arrives
within the busy-period of the previous activation when defining the number
of activations q. Thus, we have to find all q ≥ 1 that are smaller than the
maximum number of events q+i forming one busy-period [61]:
Qi = {1,2, . . . ,q+i } with (3.15)
q+i = min
{
q ∈ N+ | δ−i (q+1)≥ max
aqi ∈Aqi
{
B+i (q,a
q
i )
}}
.
With the worst-case waiting time, we can also derive the minimum
accepted throughput βˆ−p at a router port as:
βˆ−p (∆t) = min
{b∆t−Cc ,max{m∣∣Bˆ+p (max(0,m−Qb))< ∆t}} (3.16)
with ∆t ∈ N+ .
The max-function selects the highest number of events that can be accepted
during a time interval ∆t based on the waiting time. For this, only events that
can arrive before ∆t can be accepted. As the first Qb flits can be accepted
immediately, we only have to account for the waiting time of m−Qb flits.
Additionally, the port cannot accept more flits than can be physically be
transmitted (e.g. one flit every C time units), covered by the first term of the
min-function. The minimum accepted traffic for a sender then corresponds
to the minimum accepted throughput at the first router port on the path of the
sender. If this service is equal or higher the requested throughput in the long
term, the stream is schedulable (w.r.t. to throughput requirements).
Based on the multiple activation processing time we can also derive the
worst-case backlog in each buffer. The worst-case backlog of a port bp of a
router can be derived as:
bp = ∑
i∈Buf p
{
max
q∈Qi
{
max
aqi ∈Aqi
{
η+i (B
+
i (q,a
q
i ))−q+1
}}}
, (3.17)
where Buf p denotes the set of streams sharing the buffer p. This equation
examines all numbers of activations q which arrive during the processing time
of their predecessor. For each, B+i (q,a
q
i ) yields the completion time of the
q-th activation. At this instance of time, at most η+i (B
+
i (q,a
q
i )) activations
may have arrived since the start of the busy window, of which q−1 have been
processed. Hence, the difference yields the amount of backlogged activations,
of which we have to determine the maximum for all q ∈ Qi providing the
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worst-case backlog of a stream. The sum of the worst-case backlogs of all
streams sharing a buffer then returns the worst-case buffer backlog. However,
due to backpressure (i.e. the flow control), this backlog only describes an
analysis artefact used to estimate if backpressure can occur. The number of
backlogged flits inside a router can never exceed the buffer size.
3.4.4 Analysis of Multiple Routers
With the analysis of a single router, we can now analyse a whole network
using the compositional approach from Section 3.3.1. For this we iteratively
perform a local analysis of the routers and propagate the event models
(including backpressure) to neighbouring routers. Based on the local analysis,
we can define the output events models for each stream that become the input
event models of the subsequent routers according to [183] as:
δ−i,out(q) = max
{
(q−1) ·C,δ−i,in(q)− (R+i − (C+Or))
}
(3.18)
where (q− 1) ·C denotes the best-case execution time, δ−i,in(q) the input
event model, and (R+i − (C+Or)) denotes the response time jitter (i.e. the
difference between worst and best case execution times of a flit).
The worst-case waiting time Bˆ+p (q), as it is effectively propagated to
preceding routers, is also an output event model—a new one. Hence, we ex-
tended the event (propagation) model of the CPA as sketched in Figure 3.11.
Additionally, the worst-case waiting time influences the event model prop-
agation of interfering streams and the blocking of the task under analysis.
Hence, it takes part in other blocking factors. As backpressure depends on
the downstream switch (or resource) the simple forward analysis (of CPA)
becomes bi-directional. This can lead to cyclic dependencies that might lead
to an infinite runtime of the analysis. Hence, this raises the question, whether
there is a guarantee for the analysis to terminate.
The authors of [202; 204] showed that the CPA algorithm reaches the
global fixed point under certain circumstances. First, the system-level anal-
ysis function shall execute all local component-level analyses at leas once.
And secondly, all analysis functions, i.e. component-level analysis, compu-
tation and propagation of task termination event models, and the order in
which local analyses are performed, must be order preserving. That is, for
example, a component-level analysis (i.e. the analysis of a router port) must
result in larger or equal results if any of its inputs increases. That is the case
for the general CPA approach for NoCs as proved by Diemer [63]. Hence, we
only need to prove that the backpressure blocking (i.e. the worst-case waiting
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time) is order preserving, i.e., monotonous increasing for increasing inputs
(e.g. if ∀x,y ∈ N0 : x ≤ y→ Bˆ+p (x) ≤ Bˆ+p (y) is true). With the definition
of the worst-case waiting time (cf. Lemma 3.4.9) we can differentiate three
cases: (1) there is no waiting as the buffer is not full (bp <= Qb); (2) there is
always some waiting as the buffer is full (bp > Qb); (3) the buffer state (full
or not full) changes during the analysis.
For the first case, the condition is always true as Equation 3.12 results in
a constant value. For the second case, Equation 3.12 sums up other blocking
factors. These factors are monotonous increasing functions [63]. And as
the sum of monotonous increasing functions is a monotonous increasing
function, the worst-case waiting time is increasing too. For the third case, we
need to derive the possible state changes of the buffer. From the definition of
the backlog (cf. Equation 3.17) and the event-models (η+ [63; 99; 204]), we
know that the backlog is increasing. Hence, the buffer state can only change
from not full to full during the analysis and not vice versa. That is, during the
analysis we might first have some iterations leading to the first case, followed
by iterations leading to the second case. And from the definitions of the
other blocking factors, we know, that the worst-case waiting time for the
second case always results in values higher or equal zero and the condition is
fulfilled. Thus, the worst-case waiting time is monotonous increasing (i.e. it
never decreases).
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Figure 3.11: CPA model propagation extension.
With the input models of all routers, we can limit the worst-case end-
to-end latency l+p (q) for transmitting q flits on a path p for each stream. It
consists of the worst-case response time for each hop on the path p, the time
to inject the q flits, and the packetization overhead. We can differentiate two
different worst-case latencies: (1) when injecting q flits at any time (i.e. as-
suming there is already backlog); and (2) when injecting q flits assuming the
network interface to be idle (i.e. no backlog when starting the transmission).
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For injecting the q flits at any time (e.g. with backlog) the latency can be
derived by:
l+p (q)≤max
{
δ−First(p)(q), Bˆ
+
P(First(p)),VC(First(p))
(
q+bP(First(p))−Qb
)}
+Op + ∑
j∈Tasks(p)
R+j , (3.19)
where First(p) defines the first task of the chain (i.e. network path); Tasks(p)
denotes the set of all tasks of path p (i.e. one per hop); Op denotes the constant
de/packetization overhead; R+j denotes the worst-case single hop latency;
δ−First(p)(q) denotes the time the sender needs to inject q flits (assuming no
contention); Qb is the size of the buffer; and Bˆ+1 (q+bi−Qb) denotes the
overhead induced by backpressure until the q-th flit and all backlogged flits
of previous transmissions can be injected to the first router.
For the seconds case, when the first buffer is assumed to be empty, the
latency can be derived by:
l+p (q)≤max
{
δ−First(p)(q), Bˆ
+
P(First(p)),VC(First(p)) (max(0,q−Qb))
}
+Op + ∑
j∈Tasks(p)
R+j . (3.20)
In this case, we do not have to account for the waiting time of already
backlogged flits but only for those flits that do not fit into the first buffer,
covered by the max-function in Bˆ+.
Basically the equations compute the time interval required by a stream to
inject q flits when the sender is fully backlogged or idle and then assume the
last one of these to experience the worst-case blocking on all intermediate
routers. Due to the in-order delivery of the network, all previous flits will
have arrived at the destination before the last one. And the delay previous
flits may observe is included as interference in the worst-case blocking of
the last flit.
3.5 Evaluation of the Analysis Approach
In this section we evaluate and compare the analysis from Section 3.4 against
simulation results. The results were obtained using the OMNeT++ frame-
work [226; 227] and the HNOCS library [32]. For the evaluation we use
the simple system shown in Figure 3.12. This system is compact enough to
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be comprehensively displayed but shows all relevant effects of the analysis.
It consists of four streams periodically injecting traffic from source Sx to
destination Dx with a packet size of four flits. Each router induces a four
cycle routing overhead (Or) to the flits and has buffer space for two packets.
D3
S2
D2
S3
D4
S1
S4/
D1
Figure 3.12: Setup with four different streams, each sending from source Sx
to destination Dx.
In a first experiment we varied the requested bandwidth of each sender,
where all senders request for the same bandwidth. Figure 3.13 shows for this,
for each of the streams, the analysed and simulated worst-case flit end-to-
end latency when using the same virtual channel for all traffic streams. The
analysis for all streams for a single configuration took in average 908 ms. The
results show that the analysis delivers conservative results for the experiment.
For low bandwidths (up to 10 % per sender) the results from analysis are
comparatively accurate w.r.t. simulation. For higher loads, the influence of
backpressure and head-of-line blocking lead to a higher over-approximation
for streams 1 and 2. For streams 3 and 4 the analytic results are much tighter,
as these streams compete for a lower number of links and, thus, experience
lower interference. Due to the over-approximation of blocking, the analysis
reaches the saturation point earlier. This point is the bandwidth at which the
backlog of a sender, and hence its latency, goes to infinity due to the NoC
load.
For the same setup, Figure 3.14 compares the requested and obtained
throughput per sender. As long as the analysis provides results for the latency
(i.e. before network saturation), the analysed throughput is similar to the
simulated. As soon as the saturation point (for a stream) is reached, the
analysed throughput diverges from the simulation and remains on nearly
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Figure 3.13: Flit worst-case latency over requested bandwidth (per sender)
with a buffer depth of eight flits, a packet size of four flits and all streams
sharing a single VC.
constant level. Along with the increasing load, the simulated throughputs
start to decrease and to converge to the analysed values. This is especially
visible for streams 1 and 2. This shows that for systems with a shared channel
the complex blocking scenarios hinder tight latency bounds in analysis but
nonetheless permit accurate bandwidth estimations. We can also observe,
that the accumulated throughput of all senders is always below 100 %. This
results from the effects of head-of-line blocking and backpressure, which
render the full usage of available throughput impossible in most use cases.
In Figure 3.15 we vary the buffer depth and compare the simulated latency
against the analysis from Section 3.4 and the basic iSLIP analysis of Rambo
and Ernst [183] that assumes infinite buffers. For this experiment we used
a packet size of four flits and requested load of 12.5 % for each sender. For
small buffer sizes, our analysis delivers a high over-approximation of the
latency. This is because for small buffers the head-of-line blocking and
backpressure occur more likely and propagate faster through the system.
Hence, the conservatism of the analysis and blocking propagation have
a higher influence on the results. For larger buffer sizes, the results of
the analysis become tighter, as backpressure is lower or even disappears,
diminishing the negative effect of blocking propagation. Indeed, for buffer
sizes greater than eight packets, our analysis delivers results as tight as the one
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Figure 3.14: Received versus requested bandwidth (per sender) for a buffer
depth of eight flits and a packet size of four flits.
of Rambo and Ernst [183] for the experiment. However, the results of Rambo
and Ernst [183] are not proved to be safe for this setup as backpressure can
occur.
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Figure 3.15: Flit worst-case latency for stream S1 for different buffer depths
and 12.5 % requested bandwidth per sender.
For the same setup Figures 3.16 and 3.17 show the analysed and simulated
worst-case flit end-to-end latency when using different VC assignments. For
Figure 3.16 we assign stream S2 to a high priority VC while the other streams
are sharing a single low priority VC. For Figure 3.17 we assign stream S2 to
a high priority VC while the other streams are sharing the same priority level
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but use dedicated VCs (i.e. one VC for each stream). The results are similar
as before and the analysis delivers conservative results for the experiments.
Contrary to the results before, we do not reach the saturation for stream S2
(when only requesting up to 40 % of the link bandwidth). This is due to the
high priority of S2, which avoids high interference from the other streams.
The results also show, that an increased number of VCs can help to reduce
the interference experienced by a stream in the simulation as well as in the
analysis.
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Figure 3.16: Flit worst-case latency over requested bandwidth (per sender)
with a buffer depth of eight flits and a packet size of four flits, where S2 uses
a higher priority VC and the other streams share a VC.
The evaluation shows that our analysis provides safe upper bounds on the
worst-case flit latency for a NoC with backpressure. However, it also shows
that backpressure can lead to overly pessimistic guarantees for a system.
This has two reasons. First, the analysis is pessimistic when accounting
for the interference. It does not consider correlations or the pay bursts only
once [134] phenomenon, but applies an over-approximation. This leads to an
analytical worst-case that can never happen in the real system. For instance,
when sending a flit, the analysis assumes the worst-case backlog to occur
during injection (i.e. backlogged sender) followed by the worst-case end-to-
end latency for the flit transmission. However, this assumes the worst-case
interference to happen twice: when building the backlog and when the flit
flows through the NoC.
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Figure 3.17: Flit worst-case latency over requested bandwidth (per sender)
with a buffer depth of eight flits and a packet size of four flits, where S2 uses
a higher priority VC and the other streams use dedicated VCs with the same
(low) priority.
Second, backpressure constitutes a significant problem in systems with
shared channels. Analyses typically introduce pessimism that will be in-
creased when accounting for backpressure. The adverse effects of back-
pressure and blocking can also be seen in simulation (or real) systems, as,
for example, shown in Figure 3.14, where the system could not be fully
utilized. Hence, for real-time systems, the concurrent access to a shared
channel between multiple real-time senders must be avoided or restricted,
as, for example, with the use of rate limiting for the injection rates. This
permits limiting the interference and improving the analysis results as shown
in Figure 3.13.
3.6 Summary
This chapter provided an overview on the formal verification of the perfor-
mance behaviour of safety-critical or mixed-critical NoCs. Most existing
NoC analysis approaches are capable of providing formal performance guar-
antees only under the assumption that the queues in the routers never overflow,
i.e., that backpressure not occurs. This leads to overly pessimistic guaran-
tees or unfulfilled design requirements in many system using commercially
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available NoCs where buffer space is limited. To solve this problem, this
chapter presented a new analysis methodology that provides formal timing
guarantees for packet latencies also in a NoC where backpressure occurs.
The analysis is based on the CPA framework. It exploits the behaviour of
individual traffic streams to determine safe upper bounds on the latency of
individual packets. The developed model can be used not only to obtain fast
and accurate timing guarantees, but also to guide the NoC design process
within an optimization loop. The accuracy of the analysis was evaluated ex-
perimentally through comparison with simulation results. Hence, we showed
that the CPA framework can be applied for real-world systems where buffer
space is limited, such as the Kalray MPPA-256 [42; 65] or Tile64 [214; 233].
However, the evaluation also demonstrated that backpressure and block-
ing propagation can lead to overly pessimistic analysis results, especially
for systems with shared buffers. From this we can follow two aspects. First,
the analysis approach needs further refinements to capture the system be-
haviour more accurately. That way the conservatism might be reduced,
which possibly leads to better results (e.g. results that are closer to the real-
world/observed behaviour). Secondly, systems with limited, shared buffer
space need advanced quality of service (QoS) mechanisms that can optimize
the buffer usage. With this, the conservatism of the analysis can be decreased
and the adverse effects of blocking propagation (also for simulation and
real systems) be reduced. Such mechanisms can be used to decrease the
worst-case contention that must be assumed by the analysis and to reduce
blocking propagation. Both factors can lead to better analysis results and
even to an improved performance.
4. Quality of Service in NoCs
Networks-on-chip (NoCs) for future mixed-criticality systems must handle a
growing variety of traffic requirements, ranging from safety-critical real-time
traffic to bursty latency-sensitive best-effort traffic. This requires mechanisms
to provide sufficient independence to enable an efficient design (cf. Chapter 1).
Sufficient independence is typically achieved with quality of service (QoS)
mechanisms implemented in or on-top of the network architecture. However,
most existing solutions for performance isolation degrade the flexibility of
the system or the performance of the non safety-critical senders. But this
degradation is often unnecessary.
In this chapter we present run-time configurable QoS designs for a NoC
with reduced adverse impacts on the performance of best-effort traffic. We
show that the overhead implementing our approaches is affordable. And
through experimental evaluations, we show that the approaches reduce the
adverse effects through strict prioritization on best-effort applications.
The chapter is partially based on the work published in [125; 219; 221;
223].
4.1 Introduction
Multiprocessor systems on chip (MPSoCs) must frequently accommodate
heterogeneous workloads with different timing and safety requirements,
forming mixed-criticality multicore systems [28; 45]. The challenge in
integrating mixed-critical applications comes from the multicore inherent
architecture. Shared resources, such as the communication infrastructure or
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memories, couple the execution behaviour across cores. This impacts non-
functional system properties like timing, which are of particular interest in
safety-critical environments. Safety standards explicitly address this problem
and require sufficient independence between functions of different criticalities
(e.g. IEC 61508 [15], ISO 26262 [7]).
NoCs are foreseen as a promising interconnect solution for MPSoCs (cf.
Section 1.1). However, in a NoC resources, such as output ports in routers,
are typically shared among different functions and safety classes. Hence,
applications of different safety levels will inevitably compete for resources
in a NoC. One approach to solve this problem is to develop all functions to
the highest relevant safety level. However, this leads to higher development
costs and lower system utilization. Therefore, it is crucial to provide quality
of services (QoS) mechanisms guaranteeing sufficient independence in a
NoC. Figure 4.1 sketches the effect of QoS mechanisms. In the figure, traffic
stream B is claiming too many resources, such that the other two streams (A
and C) will not get sufficient service (top). When using QoS, stream B cannot
negatively disturb the service of the others (bottom). However, as stream B is
now not receiving all requested resources, it may be slowed down, compared
to the first scenario.
Tra c Stream B
Tra c Stream C
Tra c Stream A
Tra c Stream B
Tra c Stream C
Tra c Stream A
No Quality of Service
With Quality of Service
Figure 4.1: Exemplary quality of service (QoS) effect.
Most of today’s NoC designs achieve the independence through static
resource over-provisioning or static prioritization of safety critical traffic
(cf. Section 2.2). This typically leads to a degradation of the performance,
especially for non-safety critical applications. But for most safety-critical
applications, it is sufficient to arrive shortly before or by their deadline and
an early arrival provides no benefits [201]. On the other hand, a low latency
for best-effort (BE) traffic can drastically increase the performance of BE
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applications [156; 217]. Hence, this performance degradation, when using
static prioritization or static over provisioning, is often unnecessary. The
goal of this chapter is to present new QoS mechanisms that have a reduced
adverse impact on the system performance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 pro-
vides an overview on related work on providing QoS in NoCs. Section 4.3
presents an efficient mechanism to provide guaranteed latency. And Sec-
tion 4.4 describes the provisioning of guaranteed throughput. And finally,
Section 4.5 briefly presents an approach reducing the hardware complex-
ity and increasing flexibility through moving the contention control to the
boundaries of the network (e.g. to the network interfaces).
4.2 Related Work
There exist various packet-switched networks-on-chip providing quality-
of-service (QoS) for mixed criticality systems that can be categorized by
how they enforce service guarantees (cf. Section 2.2). One group uses
time-division multiple-access (TDMA) to limit the interference between
applications [84; 149; 174]. These rely on a pre-allocation of timeslots in the
network. Through assigning different safety classes to different time-slots,
they provide strong isolation between safety classes. The Nostrum [149]
architecture uses looped containers that are continuously routed through the
network. Applications are statically mapped to certain containers to isolate
them. Aetheral [84] defines schedule tables in each node and router. These
are used to define a static schedule for the whole communication in the NoC.
The DPSIN [152] network combines rate control and TDMA. For providing
guaranteed service (GS), a virtual channel (VC) in every switch is reserved
for GS traffic as a TDMA channel. In this TDMA channel, guaranteed
service is obtained by allocating time slots to the streams.
The fixed allocation of timeslots often leads to an inflexibility and a high
static overhead, as each packet might have to wait for its timeslot at multiple
network nodes, even when other timeslots are empty. This inflexibility
makes these architectures not suitable for high performance mixed-criticality
systems. PhaseNoC [174] tackles this problem by defining scheduling in form
of waves through the network. Through aligning the timeslots of all routers
on a path, packets can travel with a reduced latency through the NoC. Another
approach is the concept of channel-trees [89]. In this scheme, time slots are
shared between a selected set of applications, to utilize otherwise unused
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timeslots. However, as these approaches rely on static timing schedules and
slot assignments, they still introduce inflexibility.
To relax the conservatism and timing overhead introduced by TDM, more
flexible approaches were proposed. These are based on the idea of combining
interface-based design and system analysis [29; 231]. Components and ap-
plications provide well-defined interfaces and therefore introduce a bounded
interference to the system. With this, more dynamic and work-conserving
QoS mechanisms can be constructed based on rate controlling and dynamic
scheduling [35; 39; 44; 93; 103]. Bolotin et al. [39] propose the QNoC archi-
tecture. It uses four traffic classes and a fixed priority scheme in the switches
to arbitrate between packets of the different classes. To isolate critical traffic
from best-effort traffic, the critical traffic has a higher priority. Hence, it
blocks best-effort packets whenever these compete for network resources. In
the Mango NoC [35] switches consist of two parts, a best-effort (BE) and
a guaranteed service (GS) switch, and implement virtual channels. The GS
streams are prioritized over BE streams and a fair-sharing arbitration is used
between multiple GS streams. The latency of a message is bounded and
mainly depends on the number of VCs sharing a particular connection and
the selected arbitration policy. The Kilo-NoC [87] focuses on reducing the
overhead of QoS mechanisms. While using a priority based QoS approach,
it tries to reduce the overhead by a topology aware QoS design. Kilo-NoC
only provides QoS mechanisms in the parts of the network where needed
and uses simple routers for the remainder. This approach is orthogonal to
our approaches discussed in the remainder of this chapter. Hence, we can
combine the ideas to only introduce our mechanisms to the routers that need
to provide service guarantees, thus reducing the overall overhead of the QoS
mechanisms.
Lee et al. [137] introduce globally-synchronized frames (GSF), for pro-
viding guaranteed QoS in terms of bandwidth and latency bounds. GSF
coarsely divides the time into frames and introduces a scheme similar to
earliest deadline first scheduling based on these frames. For this, each QoS
packet from a source is assigned a frame number indicating the desired deliv-
ery time. Packets with an early delivery time are prioritized in the routers.
Heißwolf et al. [93] propose to use a weighted round robin (WRR) scheduling
policy. While GS traffic can use higher weights to obtain the needed QoS, it
does not preempt best-effort traffic. The exclusively reserved communication
resources allow to provide hard guarantees regarding throughput and latency.
Besides the prioritization of GS traffic, some approaches try to improve
the performance of BE traffic. For this, BE can have the same or even a higher
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priority than GS traffic. To limit the interference, i.e., to still guarantee a
minimum throughout for GS, mechanisms to dynamically adapt the priorities
are introduced. Burns et al. [44] present WPMC, a protocol for priority-
preemptive VC arbitration, guaranteeing that all (critical) packets will arrive
by their deadlines. It uses runtime monitoring at the network interfaces
(NI) to check whether critical traffic stays within a predefined behaviour (i.e.
message sizes and inter-arrival times). If an injecting network interface (NI)
detects a deviation from this behaviour, routers on the desired path switch
to a critical state, in which all best-effort traffic is dropped by a router to
favour the critical packets. This scheme is improved by Indrusiak et al. [103]
to not drop best-effort traffic but allow it to use idling ports of a router
even in the critical state. These schemes are similar to our approaches in
Sections 4.3 and 4.4, as they allow prioritizing best-effort traffic over critical
traffic, while monitoring is used to change the priority during run-time. The
main difference is the monitored behaviour. In [44; 103] the behaviour of
critical senders at the NI is monitored (i.e. message sizes and inter-arrival
times), while our approaches monitor the interference packets of critical
senders experience inside the network. Additionally, the monitoring at the
injecting NI only allows to differ between critical packets, that are transmitted
either with low or with high priority on the whole path [44; 103]. And after
switching to the critical state, the routers remain in this state and henceforth
prioritize critical traffic. Hence, the exploitation of the slack of critical
applications, to increase the performance of best-effort traffic, is limited in
the current design of [44; 103]. However, as these approaches monitor a
different part of the NoC, they can be combined with ours to further exploit
a system through monitoring the behaviour of critical tasks as well as the
interference induced by non-critical ones.
In [59] the authors present distributed traffic shaping (DTS), where each
output port uses a token bucket shaper. In this scheme, BE traffic is prioritized
over critical traffic and the shapers are used to ensure that sufficient bandwidth
remains for GS packets. However, this approach introduces a high overhead
in the routers through the token bucket shapers. The authors of [58] introduce
backsuction, in which BE is prioritized over GS traffic. In this scheme,
rate limiters at the destinations nodes are used that return a control signal
upstream along the transmission path. If a router recognizes a too low
bandwidth of critical traffic, it increases the priority of the critical stream.
This check is based on a threshold value in the routers, to denote when a
buffer underflow occurs. This scheme enables the same performance benefits
for BE as DTS [59] but can reduce the needed buffer size. As this approach
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uses a rate limiter at the destination node, it relies on the transmission of a
leading (BE) packet to set up QoS in the path before the main transmission
can start. Additionally, to correctly route the control signal upstream, this
scheme allows only a single ongoing transmission in a (virtual) channel that
uses the backsuction scheme (i.e. no sharing of virtual channels between
multiple GS streams).
The authors of [224] introduce a fluid meter in each router, which is used
together with a (3 bit) header extension denoting the bandwidth requirement
of a packet/stream. Based on these two values a router can dynamically
decrease or increase the priority of the packet. When GS requirements are
satisfied, less VCs must be allocated to (multiple) GT streams (i.e. as they
do not have to leave the router immediately). These VCs can be used by
BE, to not sacrifice performance of BE. However, the approach increases
the packet header and introduces an additional finite-state machine (FSM) in
each router.
In summary, most of today’s NoC architectures do not meet the require-
ments on isolation, flexibility, and high system utilization at the same time.
TDM based architectures introduce static overhead due to the static time
schedule, usually reducing the performance. Most of the dynamic QoS
approaches favour safety-critical over best-effort (BE) traffic (e.g. strict prior-
itization), thus reducing the BE performance or introduce complex additional
logic in the routers. However, the behaviour of the safety-critical applica-
tions is well-known and they do not benefit from finishing earlier than their
deadline [201; 217]. Hence, they typically have some slack available, where
the (latency) slack denotes the time budget between the worst-case latency
of a packet and its deadline at the destination. This slack can safely be used
to schedule other traffic [201; 217]. Hence, state-of-the-art QoS approaches
typically overly degrade the performance of BE communication. To solve
these problems, we propose methods that only introduce low overhead in
the routers. They exploit the slack of safety-critical applications to increase
the BE performance compared to other approaches, while still providing
sufficient isolation.
4.3 Providing Efficient Latency Guarantees
In this section we describe a new approach providing latency guarantees while
reducing the adverse effects of state-of-the-art QoS mechanisms on best-
effort applications [219]. The goal is to exploit the latency slack of critical
applications to increase the performance for best-effort traffic. Although the
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proposed mechanism is not specific to a certain network architecture, we
restrict the explanations to a basic and commonly used architecture as shown
in Section 2.1.6 and used, e.g., in [183; 216]). We assume a mesh network,
where every router is connected to up to four neighbouring routers and
one client (e.g. processing element or memory). The routers use wormhole
switching and credit based flow control, i.e., buffer management is performed
on equally sized flits, and have a four-stage pipeline. The input ports of the
routers provide multiple separate virtual channels (VC) to prevent head-of-
line blocking between certain traffic streams and thus to isolate different
criticalities, i.e., there is no VC sharing between different criticalities. To
reduce the size of the crossbar, each input can only send one flit from a single
VC at a time over the crossbar and the routers use a two-stage arbitration.
We use a “winner-takes-all” arbiter for requests of the same class, which
is similar to a round-robin arbiter, but maintains a grant until the end of a
packet. This improves average latency, as packets are sent in one piece if
possible [54]. We do not consider speculation and look-ahead mechanisms
like [130], which optimize the average latency. However, our approach can
be used together with such techniques. In fact, as it reduces the contention
latency of BE traffic, the relative effect of our approach can be even larger
when combined with low-latency routers.
4.3.1 Baseline Architecture of the Approach
The baseline implementation of our GL approach divides the traffic into
two different QoS classes: guaranteed latency (GL) and best-effort (BE).
Each class uses a dedicated set of virtual channels and is assigned a distinct
priority level. We use the GL channels for safety-critical traffic, while best-
effort channels only contain non-critical traffic. If distinct priorities between
different safety-critical applications are needed, more GL channels with
different priorities can be used, similar as for standard priority based NoCs.
To enable the exploitation of the latency slack, we extend the packet
header (for GL) with an additional field, which holds the slack information:
the blocking counter (BC). This value is set in the NI and decremented in
each router, based on the actual blocking experienced by the packet. The
current BC value is then evaluated in each router to monitor the remaining
slack time. This remaining slack time is used for a dynamic prioritization
of GL traffic (cf. Section 4.3.2). In the baseline version, this counter can be
on flit or packet level. Each time a GL packet is blocked by a higher priority
stream, the counter is decremented by one. For a packet level counter this
leads to some conservatism, as it is also decremented if GL is only blocked
86 Chapter 4. Quality of Service in NoCs
by a partial packet (e.g. the tail flit of a packet). If the network only supports
a single packet size for all streams and this size is only a few flits, the packet
level counter can be used to reduce the induced overhead, as fewer bits are
needed in the header to store the counter. For networks with different packet
sizes and long BE packets, it can be adverse for GL to be delayed by a full BE
packet. Hence, the flit level counter enables a more fine granular capturing
of the interference.
The use of the slack information in the header enables to freely distribute
the allowed additional blocking over the network. This allows accounting
for dynamics in the network, which typically lead to temporary, local traffic
hot-spots. Additionally, it offers the ability to adapt the allowed blocking at
the traffic source during runtime and to use different values for applications
sharing a VC or even for packets of the same application. Thus, it also offers
to integrate local monitoring information of the network interface [103; 217],
or global information [118] in the allowed blocking to handle uncertainties of
the system load. The initial value of the blocking counter is set in the network
interface based on the results of a performance analysis (cf. Section 4.3.5).
4.3.2 Dynamic Prioritization
The arbitration logic in the routers selects the next request (i.e. VC) based on
the priority of the VC. In our approach, the priority relation of the BE and
GL class can be adapted dynamically by the routers based on the remaining
slack time (i.e. current value of the blocking counter). We distinguish for
each GL channel two different states in each router: normal and critical. In
the normal state, the BE class has a higher priority than the GL channel. In
the critical state, the GL channel obtains a higher priority than the BE class
(and other GL channels in the normal state). With these priority levels and
state definitions, the blocking counter of a GL packet in the normal state is
decremented, each time the packet is blocked by a BE or a GL stream that is
in the critical state. To determine the state of the VCs, a monitor checks the
remaining slack time of the GL packets (i.e. state of the blocking counter). If
there is any GL packet in a (input) queue, which has no more slack available,
the state of the queue is set to critical until only packets with slack available
remain. Even though this scheme has the drawback of prioritizing flits, that
still allow more blocking (i.e. another packet at the queue head might still
allow blocking, while the last packet requests for prioritization), it allows
an easy implementation with a low hardware overhead. Additionally, for
small buffer sizes the effect is reduced, as less flits can be in front of the
packet that needs prioritization. Other possibilities are to move the packets
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that reached the maximum blocking to another queue (bypass) or to order
the whole queue according to the remaining allowed blocking. This leads
to a trade-off between increased BE performance and induced overhead
when deciding whether a bypass, reordering mechanism, or simple queue
prioritization should be used.
The arbitration of streams is packet based to increase the average per-
formance of the system. Packet based arbitration also guarantees that the
head and body flits of a packet experience the same additional blocking (e.g.
the body flits cannot experience additional blocking through BE in a router
after the header has been transmitted). Hence, the blocking counter must
only be stored in the header flit. To prevent additional priority inversion after
the slack is depleted, GL packets can preempt BE packets on flit level when
being in the critical state.
4.3.3 Operational Example
This section provides a brief, simplified operational example for the arbitra-
tion to illustrate the core idea of the mechanism using a packet level blocking
counter. In the normal state, the BE class has a higher priority than the GL
channels. To limit the interference through the BE class on the GL chan-
nels, the routers dynamically change to the critical state based on the actual
behaviour of the system. For this they monitor the blockage a GL packet
experiences in the network. If the blockage reaches a certain threshold, the
GL channel is prioritized over the BE class. Figure 4.2 shows a brief example
for this approach using single flit packets.
The figure shows seven arbitration cycles of a simplified router in which
two virtual channels (BE and GL) compete for the same output port. In
cycle t=0, two packets are pending in the GL queue, while the BE queue is
empty. Each GL packet is assigned the number of further allowed blocking,
where both allow one additional blocking. Each time the packet is blocked by
another packet with higher priority, this value is decremented. And when this
value reaches zero, the GL channel obtains a higher priority. As both packets
have a value greater zero, the state is normal. In the next cycle, the first GL
packet is scheduled on the crossbar as no other packet was competing for
it. At the same time, a new BE packet arrives. At cycle t=2, the BE and GL
packets compete for the crossbar. As the state is normal, the BE packet has a
higher priority and gets access to the crossbar. That way, it is not blocked
by GL and can pass the router with a low latency. In the same cycle, a new
BE packet arrives and the blocking counter of the GL packet is decremented,
reaching zero and initiating a state change. In cycle t=3, the state is critical.
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Figure 4.2: Example for dynamic prioritization between a GL and BE chan-
nel.
Hence, the GL packet is forwarded and the BE queue is blocked. Again, a
new BE packet arrives in this cycle. As there are no additional GL packets
with a blocking counter value of zero, the state is changed to normal again.
In the following cycle (t=4), one of the BE packets is forwarded, as no other
packets compete for the crossbar. Additionally, a new GL packet arrives
with a blocking counter value of two. In cycle t=5, the remaining BE packet
is scheduled and the blockage of the pending GL packet is decremented.
And finally, in the last cycle, the GL packet is forwarded, as no other packet
competes for the crossbar.
As can be seen from the example, BE packets can pass the crossbar with
a reduced latency, when the GL packets have a blocking counter value greater
zero. GL traffic is only scheduled, when there are no other pending packets
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or the state is critical. Thus, as long as the GL packets are not blocked too
often, BE can achieve a better performance.
4.3.4 Arbitration Logic
This section introduces an exemplary extension of the arbitration stage in the
routers to implement our mechanism. In the arbitration stage, requests from
all virtual channels and input ports must be processed along with their traffic
class and a priority signal, denoting if the slack of a packet is used up. As
we change the priority of the GL traffic according to the actual blocking in
the network, we need an arbiter that can switch between different priorities
for certain requests. Solutions for multi-priority arbiters are presented in [64;
232; 30, p. 11-27].
Figure 4.3 shows a simplified diagram of our arbitration stage of an
output port. It consists of a request multiplexing and masking unit that
assigns incoming requests from n input ports to the different class arbiters
based on their class identifier. Additionally, it masks the requests for which
backpressure is active and that do not have a priority forward (PF) signal. In
the baseline implementation, all classes use a round-robin arbiter, while other
arbitration policies are also possible. For the guaranteed latency class, we use
two arbiters. One for the normal state (GL norm) and one for the critical state
(GL crit). The two GL arbiters are used to individually keep track of the most
recent senders on both priority levels, while other implementations, such as a
single arbiter using two different states, are possible. If a GL request is raised,
the request multiplexer sends it to the corresponding GL arbiters. A small
qualifier logic then only allows requests that reached maximum blocking
(BC=0) or have a priority forward signal to be assigned to the arbiter of
critical GL requests. Additionally, this unit generates a priority forward
(PF) signal when a GL sender reached maximum blocking but receives a
backpressure signal. The priority forward signal is used to signal downstream
routers that GL needs a higher priority. This covers the case, where a GL
flit is blocked too often in a router but the preceding flits in the downstream
router still allow blocking. In this case, the downstream router might raise a
backpressure signal further delaying the GL flit. Next to the individual class
arbiters, we have a static priority arbiter, sending out the highest priority
grant to the requesting input ports.
Comparing the design with the arbitration logic of basic, priority-based
routers, only small changes are needed. A simple router, using two differ-
ent priorities for the virtual channels and round-robin arbitration between
requests of the same priority, requires all blocks but the qualifier, the priority
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Figure 4.3: Simplified output port arbitration logic.
forward signal, and the additional (low priority) GL arbiter (state) [64; 232;
30, p. 11-27]. Hence, our approach only extends an additional round-robin
arbiter (or state), a priority forward signal, and the qualifier logic, which is
mainly composed of and-gates forwarding only requests for which the slack
is used up.
4.3.5 Analysis of the Approach
In this section we present an analysis for the upper latency of GL traffic using
the compositional performance analysis (CPA) framework (cf. Section 3.4)
for our mechanism, proving sufficient independence. To improve readability,
we restrict the analysis to the case where all GL streams share a single VC.
However, it can straightforwardly be extended to handle multiple virtual
channels and additional priority levels (cf. Section 3.4). For the analysis
according to Section 3.4, we need to derive the corresponding worst-case
multiple activation processing time B+i (q,a
q
i ) of a stream in a router. It
denotes the maximum time required to transfer q flits of a stream i, given
that all but the first flit arrive before their respective predecessor has been
transferred and the q-th flit arrives at time instant aqi . Based on this, we
then derive metrics (e.g. path latency) for a single router and for a complete
network.
To conservatively capture all possible worst-case scenarios, we need to
extend the multiple activation processing time from Section 3.4 by the addi-
tional interference of the mechanism. We denote this as dynamic priority
blocking Bdyni,q , covering the (remaining) amount of time stream i is blocked
being in the normal state.
With this we can adapt the inequality from Equation 3.3. As all GL
senders share a single channel, we can remove some bocking factors. Ad-
4.3 Providing Efficient Latency Guarantees 91
ditionally, the new arbitration scheme for GL introduces a new one (Bdyn).
Hence, the upper limit for the multiple activation processing time can be
derived as:
B+i (q,a
q
i )≤q ·C+Bout,epi (B+i (q,aqi )−C+ ε,q)+Bfifoi (B+i (q,aqi ),aqi )
+BbpP(i),VC(i)(q)+B
dyn
i,q (B
+
i (q,a
q
i )−C)+Bl p . (4.1)
For the worst-case, we assume full blocking while being in the normal state
(Bdyn), followed by the maximum blocking from other GL streams on the
router (Bout +Bfifo) and backpressure (Bbp). As all GL senders share a single
channel and Bdyn accounts for all blocking while being in the normal state,
there can be no blocking through any higher priority streams. Hence, there
is no input, indirect output blocking, or higher priority output blocking
(compared to Theorem 3.4.1). To derive the multiple activation processing
time on a single router, we now derive the individual sources of blocking.
Theorem 4.3.1 The output blocking Bout,epi in the considered example that
a GL stream i may experience in any time window consists of the blocking
through other GL streams from other input ports. It can be bounded by:
Bout,epi (∆t,q)≤ ∑
p∈OutPi
(
C · χˆp +BbpP(i),VC(i)(χˆp)
)
with χˆp = min
{(⌈q
n
⌉
+1
)
·n,n · ρˆ (∆t, p,OUT(i),VC(i))
}
,
(4.2)
where n is the packet size, VC(i) and OUT(i) denote the virtual channel
and output of stream i, and OutPi is the set of other input ports.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof for Lemma 3.4.3. As we already
accounted for the full blocking being in the normal state in Equation 4.1
(Bdyni,q ), we only need to account for GL streams from other input ports. And
with the definition of the arbitration and output blocking, there can only be
blocking of other GL streams on the same VC.
Due to wormhole switching, once the scheduler grants access to an output
port VC, no other input port can access this output port VC until it is released,
i.e., the packet is fully transmitted. This is captured by ρˆ , which considers
that after a head flit arrives within the time interval ∆t, the whole packet will
be served before stream i. Additionally, due to the round-robin arbitration,
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each head flit belonging to stream i may only be blocked once by each other
input port. But as the state of the GL sender, and hence also the arbiter
state, might have changed, an additional round-robin cycle can occur. This is
addressed with the min-function, where
⌈ q
n
⌉
is an upper bound on the number
of head flits and the plus one denotes the additional round-robin cycle. Each
of these head flits can be blocked at most for n flits from each other input
port. Moreover, each of the interfering flits then will block stream i for the
flit transfer time C and the backpressure blocking these flits experience. 
Theorem 4.3.2 The FIFO blocking Bfifoi in the considered example of a
GL stream i in any time window consists of the blocking of other GL
streams that share the same input port (and VC). It can be bounded by:
Bfifoi (∆t,a
q
i ) = m ·C+ max
θ∈Θk
{Aθ}+ max
θ∈Θ1
{
BbpP(θ),VC(θ)(m− k ·n)
}
with m = min
{⌈
aqi
n
⌉
·n, ∑
j∈Buf i
{
ρ+j (a
q
i )
}}
k =
⌊m
n
⌋
Aθ = ∑
j∈θ
{
Bout,epj (∆t−C,n)+BbpP( j),VC( j)(n)
}
, (4.3)
where Buf i denotes the set of all streams sharing the buffer of stream i;
and k denotes the maximum number of whole packets (and hence head
flits) of other streams.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof for Lemma 3.4.4. The blocking
caused by other streams at the same input consists of the transmission time
of the flits that arrived before the q-th flit of stream i and the interference
those flits observe. The first term accounts for the transmission of these flits.
For this, only flits that arrived before the arrival of the q-th flit can be in the
buffer. Thus, m provides the maximum number of flits of other packets that
can be in front the q-th flit of stream i in the buffer.
These flits may also observe blocking that influences the q-th flit of
stream i. Here, the interfering flits can be grouped into flits of whole packets
as well as a packet partially transmitted at the front of the queue. The second
term accounts for the worst-case blocking whole packets can observe. It
considers for the k packets all possible mappings to streams and takes the
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maximum blocking. This blocking consists of the output and backpressure
blocking each packet will experience. And the third term accounts for the
blocking of a partial packet. As the header of this packet has already been
sent, we only need to account for backpressure blocking.
As streams i and j share the same interferer set at the input port, all FIFO
blocking of stream j is accounted for in the FIFO blocking of stream i and
must not be accounted here again. 
Theorem 4.3.3 The blocking while being in the normal (i.e. low priority)
state Bdyni,q in the considered example of the q-th flit of a stream i can be
derived from the blocking counter (BC) in the flit header. It can be denoted
as:
Bdyni,q (∆t)≤C ·min
{
∑
j∈hp(i)
η+j (∆t),κi(∆t)
}
with κi =
{
BCqi · nˆ, if BC counts packets
BCqi , otherwise
(4.4)
where BCqi denotes the current blocking counter value of the q-th flit and
hp(i) the set of all interfering streams for stream i that might have a higher
priority (i.e. BE and critical GL) at the router under analysis.
Proof. From Section 4.3.1 we know that the flit only is in the normal state
as long as the blocking counter has slack available. Depending on the
implemented granularity (packet or flit based counter) it is decremented
for each packet or flit with a higher priority (BE or critical GL) that blocks
stream i. When the counter reaches zero, no more blocking is allowed. Hence,
only BCqi packets or flits can interfere with the q-th flit of i. Additionally, we
only have to account for interfering flits that can arrive during the time the
q-th flit is waiting at the router, covered by the min-function and the sum of
arrivals of all interfering streams (η+j ). 
With all sources of blocking defined, the multiple activation processing
time from Equation 4.1 for a single router is fully defined. Based on this we
can derive an upper limit for the worst-case single hop latency and end-to-end
metrics for the whole network as discussed in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.3.
In addition to these metrics, we need to extend the path latency and derive
the maximum dynamic priority blocking that a GL packet allows in each
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router on its path (i.e. the current value of BC). A naive approach is to assume
the initial value in all routers, which leads to pessimistic but valid results.
The pessimism can be reduced, if we can assume a certain minimum and
maximum load from the interfering streams, such that there is always some
or no dynamic priority blocking for a stream i in the normal state and derive
more accurate propagation models for possible values. If there is a minimum
load through BE traffic on a router, some dynamic priority blocking will
always occur. And if there is an upper bound on the interfering load, not
more than this can occur. This information can be used to reduce the set
of possible combinations. For example, if we can assume the full initial
blocking value for the first router on a path, we know, that there will be no
additional dynamic priority blocking on the subsequent routers as the stream
switched to the critical state. Hence, to optimize the analysis results, we
then can analyse all possible distributions of the blocking counter on the
path p of a stream i and derive the maximum end-to-end latency l+p (q) for
transmitting q flits from all distributions. However, this exhaustive search
checks
(hops+BC−1
BC
)
combinations. Following this, the maximum end-to-end
latency consists of the worst-case response time for each hop on the path p
that depends on the assumed value for BC, the time to inject the q flits, and
the packetization overhead:
l+p (q)≤max
{
δ−First(p)(q), Bˆ
+
P(First(p))
(
q+bP(First(p))−Qb
)}
+Op + max
d∈Dist
{
∑
j∈Tasks(p)
R+j,d
}
, (4.5)
where First(p) defines the first task of the chain (i.e. network path); Tasks(p)
the set of all tasks of path p (i.e. one per hop), Op the constant de/packetiza-
tion overhead; R+j,d the worst-case single hop latency assuming a distribution
d of the dynamic priority blocking; δ−First(p)(q) denotes the time the sender
needs to inject q flits (assuming no contention); Qb is the size of the buffer;
Bˆ+1 (q+bi−Qb) the overhead induced by backpressure until the q-th flit and
all backlogged flits of previous transmissions can be injected to the first
router; and Dist the set of all possible distributions of the dynamic priority
blocking for the stream p. Basically the equation computes how long it takes
a stream to inject q flits and then assumes the last one of these to experience
the worst-case blocking on all intermediate routers. For this it checks all
possible distributions of the allowed additional blocking through BE streams.
Due to the in-order delivery of the network, all previous flits will have ar-
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rived at the destination before the last one. And the delay previous flits may
observe is included as interference in the worst-case blocking of the last flit.
4.3.6 Finding Admissible BC Values
The analysis above provides all means to find admissible values for the al-
lowed dynamic priority blocking (i.e. for the initial blocking counter value)
for a GL stream to exploit its slack. For this, we can define an iterative
approach that compares the worst-case end-to-end latency against the dead-
line of a stream to derive its slack. First, we analyse the system, assuming
all blocking counters to be zero (i.e. classic prioritization of GL) and the
system to be schedulable. Then we identify the GL streams that have slack
by comparing their derived worst-case latency with their deadline. If any
stream has slack, we can increase the initial BC value of this stream and
re-analyse the system to check whether all deadlines are still met. In this
step, all streams (or more precisely all streams that are directly or indirectly
interfered by the stream under consideration) need be to checked. This is
needed as the modified BC value can lead to changed output event models
for all streams on routers that are used by the stream under consideration.
Additional, these changed event models can propagate to other routers, and
thus influence further streams. Doing this, we can find feasible initial values
of dynamic priority blocking for all streams. Besides this simple approach,
more complex strategies for defining initial BC values are possible. For
example, the approach presented by Indrusiak et al. [103] can be used to
define BC values for different sender states based on the core- or NI-local
behaviour (e.g. message sizes and inter-arrival times). That way, global and
node-local information cab be used to derive a feasible value for BC and
adapt it during run-time.
4.3.7 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the GL mechanism and
compare it against the classic and widely used static prioritization [39; 87].
We divide the evaluation into two parts. In the first part, we use synthetic
workloads to evaluate the basic functioning and certain properties of our
mechanism, such as isolation between BE and GL and the correctness of
the analysis. In the second part, we use memory access and communication
traces of general purpose applications, to investigate the performance of
the mechanism on realistic workloads. All experiments were carried out
with the OMNeT++ simulation framework and an extension of the HNOCS
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library [32] (cf. Section 2.3) using routers with a four-stage pipeline, buffers
to store six packets in each virtual channel of each input port, and a packet
size of four flits.
Synthetic Workloads
The first set of experiments uses synthetic workloads, generated based on
average link loads, and the simple system shown in Figure 4.4. It comprises
a line topology to maximize the overlap between traffic streams. In the
example, we have five traffic streams, each periodically injecting packets
with a jitter of 25 % of its packet injection period. There is a guaranteed
latency (GL) communication from task τ1 on the first node to τ7 on the last
node. In between there are four best-effort (BE) communications, where
each BE task sends data to its direct neighbour on the right. This example
is compact enough to be comprehensively displayed but shows all relevant
effects of the mechanism.
CPUCPU CPU CPU CPUCPU CPU
GL communication
BE communication
τ
1
τ
2
τ
3
τ
4
τ
5
τ
6
τ
7
Figure 4.4: Simple communication scenario using a line topology.
In a first experiment, we set the GL task to generate an average network
load of 10 % and increase the load of the BE tasks (i.e. reduce the period
between packets), to measure their interference on GL. For GL, we evaluate
four different values for the allowed dynamic priority blocking (BC) on flit
level granularity. Figure 4.5 shows the end-to-end latency of full packets for
the GL sender in this experiment. In the figure solid lines show the measured
maximum latency and dashed lines the results of the worst-case analysis
for GL assuming maximum BE load. If we allow zero dynamic priority
blocking (BC=0), GL traffic always has a higher priority than BE traffic,
which corresponds to classic prioritization of GL. In this case, an increasing
BE load does not influence GL traffic. That is, the GL latency is low and
constant over an increasing BE load.
With the allowance of LP blocking (BC > 0), BE traffic can interfere with
GL traffic, where a higher BC value leads to a higher possible interference.
However, the interference is upper bounded and thus from a certain BE load
onwards, the GL latency is not further increasing. In all cases, the observed
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Figure 4.5: Measured (solid) and analyzed (dashed) worst-case packet la-
tency of GL for synthetic BE loads and various blockage values.
upper bound is below the analysis results. The results also show that for
small loads the observed latency for GL is similar for different BC values.
This is due to the fact that the possibility for GL and BE flits to compete in
a router for resources depends on the load in the system. With a low load,
the flits rarely compete in the routers, and hence the worst-case might not
be observed in simulation. For high loads, however, the flits compete more
often, leading to a higher interference and thus latency, especially for higher
values of BC.
In a second experiment, we investigate the influence of GL on BE traffic.
For this, we compare the classic prioritization of GL traffic against our
approach for a BE load of 20 %. Figure 4.6 shows the average latency results
of this experiment for the BE tasks τ2 and τ5. For classic prioritization of
GL (denoted as HP), the latency for both best-effort tasks behaves the same.
With an increasing GL load, the latency increases, due to the higher priority
of GL. The latency of BE tasks thus depends significantly on the load of GL
traffic. For the new approach, the experiment shows a better performance for
BE tasks and loosens the dependency on GL load.
Additionally, the experiment shows that the value of the allowed dynamic
priority blocking and the distance to the GL sender influence the performance
98 Chapter 4. Quality of Service in NoCs
 
✁
✂
 
✁
✄
 
✁
☎
 
✁
✆
 
✁
✝
 
✁
✞
 
✁
✟
 
✁
✠
✡☛☞✌✍✎☞ ✏✑ ✒✓✍✔ ✕✖✒✗✘✙✚✛✜✛✒☞✚✢✓✔☞✣
✤
✥
✦✤
✦✥
✧✤
✧✥
★✤
★✥
✩✤
✩✥
✪
✫
✬
✭
✮
✯
✬
✰
✮
✱
✬
✲
✳
✴
✵
✳
✴
✳
✶
✬
✷
✸
✹
✺
✻✼
✹
✽
✻✼
✹
✺
✾✿❀❁
✹
✽
✾✿❀❁
✹
✺
✾✿❀❂❃
✹
✽
✾✿❀❂❃
Figure 4.6: Average BE latency for synthetic GL loads.
benefit of BE tasks. Here the task τ2 has a better performance than τ5. This
results from the fact that for τ2 the allowed dynamic priority blocking of
the GL flits is still at its initial value. Thus, flits from τ2 can pass the router
with a higher priority than GL, even for increased loads. With an increasing
distance, the remaining allowed dynamic priority blocking tends to be lower.
Thus, the task τ5 has a higher probability to be blocked by GL flits and to
experience a higher latency.
With the allowance of blocking through BE, the GL packets also stay
longer in the router, which can increase the backlog. Figure 4.7 shows the
backlog derived from the analysis for the different configurations for the
same experiment. As can be seen, the backlog depends on the GL load and
BC value. Especially for high loads and high values of BC the backlog can
increase drastically. To prevent this, rate limiters at the source can be used,
which are available in many existing NoCs, or the analysed backlog is used
to make the buffers big enough.
Benchmark Workloads
In the second set of experiments we use realistic workloads to evaluate the
performance of the proposed mechanism. For the experiments we obtained
traces from the CHStone benchmark suite [91]. The traces were extracted
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Figure 4.7: Worst-case backlog of GL derived from the analysis.
using the Gem5 simulator and an ARMv7-a core with a 32 kB L1 cache.
Each trace contained 100000 accesses to the network, where each access
can be a direct memory access, communication, or a cache access. The
compilation was performed using a standard gcc compiler (ver. 4.7.3). For a
simulation run, the different traces were randomly assigned to nodes in a 4×4
mesh network as shown in Figure 4.8 to obtain different traffic distributions,
while the nodes and the network were running with the same clock frequency.
In the network, we assign fixed QoS classes to certain nodes. There are five
nodes initiating GL traffic and eleven nodes for BE traffic. Additionally,
there is one memory with a single interface to the network. For the routing
policy we use an XY-routing. Thus, when regarding the highlighted BE node,
all GL flits accessing the memory will compete with flits of this node. This
scenario is compact enough to be comprehensively displayed but shows all
relevant effects of the mechanism. Based on this scenario, we conduct two
series of experiments. In the first series we use the memory as a hot-module.
That is, all traffic generated by the nodes is sent to the memory, leading to
higher interference on links near the memory. In the second series we use
pseudo random destinations for the traffic of all nodes.
100 Chapter 4. Quality of Service in NoCs
GL BE
GL
GL
BE
BE
BE
BE
BE BE
BE BE
BE GL
BE GL
DRAM
Figure 4.8: Communication scenario for benchmark applications.
Figure 4.9 presents the results of the first experiment, with the memory
as the hot-module. It shows a box plot of the measured latencies for eight
different applications mapped to the highlighted node. For each run, the box
covers 50 % of the latencies, with its lower and upper borders giving the
25 % and 75 % quartiles. The whiskers indicate the measured minimum and
maximum observed latency. The median and average among the measured
latencies are respectively marked by a black bar and a black dot. For each of
these applications, we generated 1000 different sets of interfering workloads
for the other nodes (i.e. random mappings of the benchmarks to the network
nodes). The results are presented for three different prioritization approaches
of the GL nodes: the classic prioritization (HP) and the new approach with
two different values for the allowed dynamic priority blocking on flit level
(BC=4) and BC=8).
The results show that the new approach reduces the average latency for
both configurations compared to classic prioritization by up to 36 % for a
blockage value of four and up to 43 % for eight. The minimum and maximum
latencies are similar for all schemes. For a single hot-module, the different
GL flits experience high interference on the way to the hot-module. Hence, it
is likely that the maximum allowed blocking can be consumed, leading to a
worst-case blocking for BE. On the other hand, the dynamic behaviour of the
applications also leads to cases, where flits pass the network with nearly no
interference, leading to the best-case latency. In this experiment, our approach
increased the backlog of GL from 16 flits using classic prioritization to up
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Figure 4.9: Performance of CHStone benchmarks as BE traffic with memory
as hot-module.
to 20 flits with BC = 8. Compared to the synthetic workloads, the backlog
of GL is higher even for classic prioritization, as multiple GL senders now
share a virtual channel.
Figure 4.10 shows the normalized latencies as box plots for the system
using pseudo random destinations for the traffic. We generated for each
listed benchmark 1000 different sets of interfering workloads (i.e. random
assignment of applications to nodes) and a random destination for each
sender. We selected the destinations such that a traffic stream has to pass at
least three routers (i.e. no traffic to direct neighbours). During a single run,
an application was always sending data to the same node. This simulates
scenarios, where applications exchange data or multiple memories exist. For
the figure, we normalized for each run the latency to the average latency
when using classic prioritization for GL (HP).
Again, the results show that our approach leads to a performance increase
for the BE applications compared to classic prioritization of GL traffic. If we
allow four blockages through the best-effort class, we can reduce the average
BE latency by up to 30 %. And when we increase the allowed blockage
to eight, we can reach a latency reduction by up to 45 %. However, the
achievable reduction of the latency depends on the application behaviour. At
the same time, the approach also increases the variability in the occurring
latencies and backlog. With an allowed blockage of BC = 8 the backlog
increases from 11 to 14 flits compared to classic prioritization. This increase
is smaller than for the case of the hot module, as with random traffic less GL
senders compete for the same buffer.
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Figure 4.10: Performance of CHStone benchmarks as BE traffic for random
destinations normalized to average latency at classic prioritization.
Synthesis Results
In this section we briefly present synthesis results for our approach. For
this we implemented and synthesized a 2×2 NoC on a Virtex-6 LX760
FPGA using Xilinx ISE 14.6 with default optimization settings and no special
optimizations for the VHDL implementation. The device utilization data
were collected from the Module Level Utilization Summary Report produced
by ISE. As this NoC is not fully connected, each of the four routers has
only three input ports fully instantiated. The results for the whole NoC are
summarized in Table 4.1. The table compares the used registers, LUTs, and
achievable clock frequency for four different implementations. The baseline
implementation corresponds to a basic round-robin router with five virtual
channels (VCs) and a buffer depth of six packets for each VC. This was
extended in FP to provide one prioritized VC, e.g., VC0. In the DP design
the priority of VC0 can be changed via a configuration flag from the highest
to the lowest priority during run-time. And finally, the BC implementation
denotes our approach, where the priority of VC0 is dynamically changed by
the router based on the current blocking counter value in the flit header.
We used 4 bit to store the blocking counter in the header that were pre-
viously unused. If no spare bits are available in the header, the header, and
possibly the signal width between the routers, must also be extended, re-
sulting in additional overhead. The synthesis shows that the new approach
introduces less than 5 % overhead for the used 2×2 NoC. This corresponds to
an approximate increase of 1.67 % of a router per instantiated port. However,
if no source rate limiters are used, our approach can increase the worst-case
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Table 4.1: Synthesis results of a 2×2 NoC on Virtex-6 LX760 FPGA.
Unit Baseline FP DP BC
#Registers 5749 5767 5764 5980
#LUTs 7391 7425 7422 7719
Frequency (MHz) 210 210 210 210
backlog (e.g. from 11 to 14 flits in the benchmark example) and hence might
require bigger buffers (if no backpressure aware analysis is used or the prop-
agation of blocking leads adverse interdependencies) and further increasing
the overhead. The achievable clock frequency was the same for all designs,
showing that the extensions did not influence the critical timing path. The
frequency was restricted by the minimum achievable period, caused by a
data path delay of 4.75 ns, consisting of 1.31 ns for logic and 3.44 ns route
delay.
4.4 Providing Efficient Throughput Guarantees
This section describes a new approach providing throughput guarantees
while reducing adverse effects of state-of-the-art QoS mechanisms on non
safety-critical applications. The goal is to exploit the throughput and latency
slack of safety-critical guaranteed-throughput (GT) traffic to increase the
performance for best-effort (BE) traffic. For this, we give priority to BE
traffic for optimal latency and at the same time monitor the progress of GT
traffic, to change priorities if needed. Although the proposed mechanism is
not specific to a certain network architecture, we restrict the explanations to
the same basic and commonly used architecture as discussed in Section 4.3.
The key idea of our approach is to prioritize BE traffic for optimal latency
and at the same time monitor the progress of GT traffic, to increase the
priority of GT if needed. For this, the proposed mechanism comprises up to
four elements:
1. a progress monitor supervising GT,
2. a selective priority arbiter that uses the progress monitor for GT (i.e.
the current flit buffer levels) as a decision criterion in the input stages
of each network switch,
3. an entity at the source that tags the last packet of a GT connection, and
4. a rate limiter at the source.
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If a GT sender is guaranteed to behave as specified (e.g. through the design
process), the rate limiters for GT are not needed.
4.4.1 Progress Monitor and Selective Priority Arbiter
The arbitration logic is located at each output port (cf. Section 2.1). It
processes the requests from all input ports according to their class signal
and the current state of GT. Figure 4.11 shows a simplified block diagram
of the arbitration logic for our approach. In the figure, tn denotes whether
an input port with GT traffic needs a higher priority. Based on this signal,
a request of a GT stream is forwarded to the corresponding GT arbiter (i.e.
critical when above the threshold or norm when beneath). And the class
signal decides, whether the request results from a BE or GT stream. The
static priority arbiter then selects the highest priority signal that has requests
pending. If tn is not asserted, the arbiter prioritizes BE, while GT can use
empty slots (i.e. not used by BE).
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Figure 4.11: Selective priority arbiter for guaranteed throughput traffic.
The priority signal tn is derived by the progress monitor. The progress
monitor checks the buffer fill level or the presence of a special tail flit, named
end of transmission (EoT) flit. For this, the routers have a (configurable)
threshold value. When the buffer fill level is above the threshold or the EoT
flit is in the buffer, the priority signal is asserted. Routers typically already
have a measure for the fill level for the buffers for flow control. We only
extend it by an additional threshold, which is then used to construct a priority
feedback signal. This threshold can be configurable or static.
In summary, the proposed arbiter selects BE traffic, as long as all (request-
ing) GT channels are beneath their threshold and there is no EoT flit pending,
and a GT request otherwise. If there are no requests of a specific priority,
requests from a lower priority are selected. This means that GT is allowed to
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send if the link is otherwise idle, but also enables BE traffic to use unused
reserved GT throughput, avoiding waste of over-allocated throughput.
Contrary to [58], this scheme allows multiple GT streams to share the
same VC, as the priority signal must not be forwarded upstream, but is
derived locally in each router. However, this also allows for possible head
of line blocking between GT streams. Hence, only streams where the sink
is known to accept traffic should be allowed to share a VC, which can be
guaranteed by design or the use of a control layer (cf. Section 4.5) [125; 223].
4.4.2 Sender Extensions
For the proper work of the arbitration in the routers, the senders must be
equipped with the possibility to tag the end of a GT transmission with the
EoT flit. Additionally, if the behaviour of GT senders cannot be guaranteed
by design, rate limiters are needed. The EoT flit is needed to enable the raise
of the priority even when the buffer has not reached the threshold. This is
needed, as when a GT streams sends its last packet and there are no other GT
stream sending data on the shared path, there will be no flits accumulating in
the buffer. Booth mechanisms can be implemented in software or as hardware
extensions in the network interface (NI). As backpressure might occur at
the injecting interface and router, the source needs sufficiently sized buffers
or a stateful rate-limiter. This is needed to catch up a possible backlog at
the sender with a temporary higher rate than requested. A simple example
for a stateful rate-limiter, in this sense, is a token bucket shaper, where the
bucket size covers the worst case backlog [138; 147; 209]. The bucket size
then allows a burst, where the sender obtains more throughput than initially
requested, to catch up an initial too low accepted throughput. This enables a
Super-GT [146] like service, where a GT stream can obtain more traffic than
initially requested in the long term, to recover from blocking.
4.4.3 Analysis of the Approach
In this section we show that our GT approach can guarantee a minimum
accepted traffic rate for a sender. For this, we derive a lower bound on
the minimum service and an upper bound on the backlog at the sender. In
general, these values can be obtained using any analysis framework, such
as [111; 134; 177; 220]. In the following, we will utilize the approach from
Section 3.4, as it can handle backpressure for arbitrary sized buffers, to obtain
the minimum accepted throughput for a sender and its backlog. To improve
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readability, we restrict the analysis to the case where all GT streams share a
single VC and only present the equations that will change.
To derive the worst-case accepted traffic of a sender, we need to obtain
the worst-case waiting time Bˆ+p of a sender at each router. As the waiting
time depends on the traffic models of other streams, we also need to derive
the response times and thus the multiple activation processing time of each
stream. To conservatively capture all possible worst-case scenarios, we need
to extend the multiple activation processing time from Section 3.4 by the
additional interference introduced by the mechanism similar to the case for
the GL approach in Section 4.3.5. We denote this as dynamic priority
blocking Bdyni,q , covering the amount of time stream i is blocked being in the
normal state.
With this we can adapt the inequality from Equation 3.3. As all GT
senders share a single channel, we can remove some bocking factors. Ad-
ditionally, the new arbitration scheme for GT introduces a new one (Bdyn).
Hence, the upper bound for the multiple activation processing time can be
derived as:
B+i (q,a
q
i )≤q ·C+Bout,epi (B+i (q,aqi )−C+ ε,q)
+Bfifoi (B
+
i (q,a
q
i ),a
q
i )
+BbpP(i),VC(i)(q)+B
dyn
i,q +B
l p . (4.6)
For the worst-case, we assume full blocking while being in the normal state
(Bdyn), followed by the maximum blocking from other GT streams on the
router (Bout +Bfifo) and backpressure (Bbp) as defined in Definition 3.4.5.
As all GT senders share a single channel and Bdyn accounts for all blocking
while being in the normal state, there can be no blocking through any higher
priority streams. Hence, there is no input, indirect output blocking, or higher
priority output blocking. To derive the multiple activation processing time
on a single router, we now derive the individual sources of blocking.
Theorem 4.4.1 The output blocking Bout,epi that a GT stream i experiences
in the considered example in any time window consists of the blocking
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through other GT streams from other input ports. It can be bounded by:
Bout,epi (∆t,q)≤ ∑
p∈OutPi
(
C · χˆp +BbpP(i),VC(i)(χˆp)
)
with χˆp = min
{(⌈q
n
⌉
+1
)
·n,n · ρˆ (∆t, p,OUT(i),VC(i))
}
,
(4.7)
where n is the packet size, VC(i) and OUT(i) denote the virtual channel
and output of stream i, and OutPi is the set of other input ports.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof for Lemma 3.4.3. With the
definition of the arbitration and output blocking and as the additional delay
while being in the low priority state is already covered in Equation 4.6, there
can only be blocking of other GT streams on the same VC.
Due to wormhole switching, once the scheduler grants access to an output
port VC, no other input port can access this output port VC until it is released,
i.e., the packet is fully transmitted. This is captured by ρˆ , which considers
that after a head flit arrives within the time interval ∆t, the whole packet will
be served before stream i. Additionally, due to the round-robin arbitration,
each head flit belonging to stream i may only be blocked once by each other
input port. But as the state of the GT sender, and hence also the arbiter
state, might have changed, an additional round-robin cycle can occur. This is
addressed with the min-function, where
⌈ q
n
⌉
is an upper bound on the number
of head flits and the plus one denotes the additional round-robin cycle. Each
of these head flits can be blocked at most for n flits from each other input
port. Moreover, each of the interfering flits then will block stream i for the
flit transfer time C and the backpressure blocking these flits experience. 
Theorem 4.4.2 The FIFO blocking Bfifoi of a GT stream i in the considered
example in any time window consists of the blocking of other GT streams
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that share the same input port (and VC). It can be bounded by:
Bfifoi (∆t,a
q
i ) = m ·C+ max
θ∈Θk
{Aθ}+ max
θ∈Θ1
{
BbpP(θ),VC(θ)(m− k ·n)
}
with m = min
{⌈
aqi
n
⌉
·n, ∑
j∈Buf i
{
ρ+j (a
q
i )
}}
k =
⌊m
n
⌋
Aθ = ∑
j∈θ
{
Bout,epj (∆t−C,n)+BbpP( j,VC( j))(n)
}
, (4.8)
where Buf i denotes the set of all streams sharing the buffer of stream i;
and k denotes the maximum number of whole packets of other streams.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof for Lemma 3.4.4. The blocking
caused by other streams at the same input queue consists of the transmission
time of the flits that arrived before the q-th flit of stream i and the interference
those flits observe. As the GT stream waits until the threshold value is
reached (covered by Bdyni,q in Equation 4.6), all flits in the queue have the
highest priority. The first term accounts for the transmission of these flits.
For this, only flits that arrived before the arrival of the q-th flit can be in the
buffer. Thus, m provides the maximum number of flits of other packets that
can be before the q-th flit of stream i in the buffer.
Then, these flits may also observe blocking that influences the q-th flit of
stream i. The interfering flits can be grouped into flits of whole packets as
well as a packet partially transmitted at the front of the queue. The second
term accounts for the worst-case blocking whole packets can observe. It
considers for the k packets all possible mappings to output ports and takes the
maximum blocking. This blocking consists of the output and backpressure
blocking each packet will experience. And the third term accounts for the
blocking of a partial packet. As the header of this packet has already been
sent, we only need to account for backpressure blocking.
As stream i and j share the same interferer set at the input port, all FIFO
blocking of stream j is accounted for in the FIFO blocking of stream i and
must not be accounted here again. 
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Theorem 4.4.3 The blocking while being in the normal (i.e. low priority)
state Bdyni,q of the q-th flit of a stream i can be derived from the threshold
value and the event models. It can be denoted as:
Bdyni,q ≤min
tEoT ,min
∆t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∑j∈BufP(i)
{
η−j (∆t)
}
≥ Qt

 (4.9)
with
tEoT = max
{
δ−First(p)(q), Bˆ
+
P(First(p)),VC(First(p)) (q)
}
+Op + ∑
j∈Tasks(p,k)
R∗j ,
where Qt denotes the threshold value; η−j (∆t) denotes the minimum
number of flits of stream j that can arrive in any time interval ∆T ; BufP(i)
denotes the set of streams sharing the same buffer with stream i including
i; First(p) defines the first task of the chain (i.e. network path); Tasks(p,k)
denotes the set of all tasks of path p until the router k under consideration
(i.e. the first k routers of the path); Op denotes the constant de/packetization
overhead; R∗j denotes the worst-case single hop latency assuming no
additional blocking through the low priority state; δ−First(p)(q) denotes the
time the sender needs to inject q flits; and Bˆ+1 (q+bi−Qb) denotes the
overhead induced by backpressure until the q-th flit can be injected to the
first router.
Proof. Proven directly. With the definition of the dynamic arbitration, in the
worst case, a GT stream has to wait until the threshold value is reached or
the EoT flit arrives before it can be selected by the arbiter.
For the former, we need to find the smallest time window in which
sufficient events arrive. For this, we need to account for all streams that
must share the queue. Streams that might share the buffer, are not accounted
for. All considered streams then arrive with their slowest speed (covered by
η−j (∆t)). This is covered by the inner min-function.
For the latter, tmathitEoT derives the maximum time until the EoT flit
arrives at a router k. It assumes the maximum time needed to inject the EoT
flit followed by the worst-case latency to the router under consideration. As
the EoT flit is not experiencing any additional delay through the mechanisms,
we do not need to account for it when deriving the latency.
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As the router prioritized the GT traffic as soon as one of the conditions
is fulfilled, we can take the minimum of both values. Covered by the outer
min-function. 
Lemma 4.4.4 — Waiting. The worst-case waiting time Bˆ+p (q) of a port
(i.e. buffer) p used by a GT stream denotes the time until the port is ready
to receive the q-th flit. For a router it can be bounded by:
Bˆ+p (q) =
{
q ·C+maxθ∈Θk {Aθ} , if bp > Qb
0, otherwise
with Aθ = ∑
j∈θ
{
Bout,epi (Bˆ
+
p (q)−Ci + ε,n)+BbpP( j),VC( j)(n)
}
, (4.10)
where bp denotes the worst-case backlog of the port and k is a bound on
the number of packets q flits form (k = d qne).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof for Lemma 3.4.9. The port waiting
time (and hence backpressure) can only occur, if the worst-case backlog of
the port exceeds the buffer size (i.e. bp > Qb). In this case, it also exceeds the
threshold value for GT and thus the GT stream (e.g. the whole queue) has the
highest priority. If backpressure occurs, the port is conservatively assumed
to be fully backlogged (i.e. buffer full). Hence, to receive q flits, the port
must transmit q flits to any output. For these flits we must account for their
transmission time (q ·C) and the worst-case interference they suffer. For this,
the term maxθ∈Θl {Aθ} obtains the worst-case blocking from each possible
mapping of flits to output ports. As the queue has the highest priority, we
only need to acccount for output blocking and the waiting time at the next
router port. 
With all sources of blocking defined, the multiple activation processing
time from Equation 4.6 for a single router is fully defined. Based on this we
can derive an upper limit for the worst-case single hop latency and end-to-
end metrics for the whole network as discussed in Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.3.
Additionally, the worst-case waiting time allows to derive the minimum
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accepted throughput for a sender at each router port and thus for the whole
network according to Equation 3.16 as:
βˆ−p (∆t) = min
{b∆t−Cc ,max{m∣∣Bˆ+p (max(0,m−Qb))< ∆t}} (4.11)
with ∆t ∈ N+ .
The max-function selects the highest number of events that can be accepted
during a time interval ∆t based on the waiting time. For this, only events that
can arrive before ∆t can be accepted. As the first Qb flits can be accepted
immediately, we only have to account for the waiting time of m−Qb flits.
Additionally, the port cannot accept more flits than can be physically be
transmitted (e.g. one flit every C time units), covered by the first term of the
min-function. The minimum accepted traffic for a sender then corresponds
to the minimum accepted throughput at the first router port on the path of the
sender. If this service is equal or higher the requested throughput in the long
term, the stream is schedulable (w.r.t. to throughput requirements).
With the known minimum service, we can also derive the backlog bp
based on the minimum service at each port p and hence sender as:
bp = max
{
∑
i∈Bufp
{
η+i (∆t)
}− βˆ−p (∆t)
}
, (4.12)
where Bufp denotes the set of streams sharing port p. The equation compares
the minimum service of the port (βˆ−p ) with the requested service (η+i ) of all
streams. The difference then shows the maximum number of flits that can
have arrived but not be transferred. This equation can be used to derive the
size of the buffer at the sender or the bucket size of the shaper, to be able to
recover from backlog. For this, the buffer or bucket size must be at least the
maximum possible backlog at the sender.
4.4.4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the GT mechanism and compare it against the
classic and widely used prioritization scheme [39], and the backsuction
scheme [58]. We divide the evaluation into two parts. In the first part, we use
synthetic workloads to evaluate the basic functioning and certain properties
of our mechanism, such as isolation between BE and GT and the influence
of different transmission sizes. In the second part, we use memory access
and communication traces of general purpose applications, to investigate
the performance of the mechanism on realistic workloads. All experiments
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were carried out with the OMNeT++ simulation framework and the HNOCS
library [32] (cf. Section 2.3) using routers with a four-stage pipeline, four
virtual channels (VCs), buffers to store 16 flits in each VC, and a packet size
of four flits.
As a test scenario, we use a 8×8 mesh NoC with XY-routing, in which we
denote the corner node on the north-west as node (0,0) and the corner node
on the south-east as node (7,7) based on their XY coordinates as sketched in
Figure 4.12. In the network we have two GT streams, one from node (1,0)
to (4,6) requiring 30 % of the link throughput and one from (2,0) to (4,5)
requiring 20 %. Hence, both GT streams overlap with a total requirement of
50 % of the link throughput on the shared links. This example is compact
enough to be comprehensively displayed but shows all relevant effects.
4,5
4,6
4,4
7,7
1,0 2,00,0 3,0
Figure 4.12: Simple communication scenario for GT.
Performance
In the first set of experiments we use synthetic workloads, generated based on
average link loads. We use a BE stream sending from node (3,0) to node (4,4),
hence its whole path is overlapped by the two GT streams. All other nodes
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inject BE traffic to random destinations. We then investigate different mecha-
nisms: round-robin (RR), prioritization of GT (SP), backsuction (BS) and
the new approach (FP). As backsuction does not allow to share a virtual
channel between multiple GT streams, the stream from node (1,0) uses VC0
and the one from node (2,0) VC1, leaving two VCs for BE traffic. For the
other mechanisms, both GT streams share VC0. Hence, we additionally
differentiate between the case where we allow BE to use two or three VCs,
denoted respectively as FP2 and FP3 for FP. In the former case, only three
VCs are used, which corresponds to a smaller router design than in the case
for BS that uses four VCs (cf. Table 4.2) for the same set of streams.
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show the achieved throughput for all approaches
over increasing BE load for the streams GT1 and GT2, where all nodes are
periodically injecting single packets. As can be seen, all QoS mechanisms
provide the GT streams with the required throughput. Only in the round-robin
(RR) case (i.e. no QoS), the GT1 stream drops below the required throughput
when the BE load increases, which states the RR approach unsuitable for
safety-critical designs.
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Figure 4.13: Achieved throughput for GT1 using periodic packets with four
flits.
For the same scenario, Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show the latency for BE
node (3,0) sending to node (4,4) when the GT streams are sending single
packets and bursts of four packets. As expected, the prioritization leads to a
higher latency for BE compared to the RR case. BS and our approach achieve
similar latencies as round robin (RR) for low loads, and hence improve the
latency for BE up to 17 % compared to SP. Along with this, the saturation
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Figure 4.14: Achieved throughput for GT2 using periodic packets with four
flits.
point of BE, at which the latency for BE traffic goes to infinity, can be shifted
to higher workloads enabling a higher system utilization when compared
to SP. Here, BS and FP2 achieve a similar performance (while FP2 needs
only three VCs). And FP3 (with the same number of VCs as BS) achieves a
better performance for BE traffic than BS. Additionally, with an increasing
burst size, the latency of BE traffic increases for the simple prioritization. For
BS and FP the latency increase for BE traffic is less. Hence, for increased
burst sizes, BS and FP can lead to a higher performance improvement for BE
traffic.
In the second set of experiments we use benchmark workloads to eval-
uate the performance of the proposed mechanism. For the experiments we
obtained traces from the CHStone benchmark suite [91]. The traces were
extracted using the Gem5 simulator and an ARMv7-a core with a 32 kB
L1 cache. Each trace contained 100000 accesses to the network, where each
access can be a direct memory access, communication, or a cache access.
The compilation was performed using a standard gcc compiler (ver. 4.7.3).
For a simulation run, we assigned the benchmark under consideration to
node (3,0) and then generated several random mappings of the benchmarks
to the other nodes with random destinations for their traffic. We selected the
destinations such that a traffic stream has to pass at least three routers (i.e. no
traffic to direct neighbours).
Figure 4.17 shows the normalized latencies for this scenario. We gener-
ated for each listed benchmark 25 different sets of interfering workloads (i.e.
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Figure 4.15: BE Latency periodically sending a single packet.
random assignment of application to nodes) and a random destination for
each sender. We then normalized the latency of the BE sender from node (3,0)
to (4,4) to the case of simple prioritization and two VCs for BE (i.e. to SP2).
As can be seen, the results comply with the synthetic results, showing that the
dynamic prioritization of our approach can improve the BE performance by
up to 16 %. Again, our approach leads to similar performance improvements
as BS when using less virtual channels or better improvements when using
the same number of VCs. Additionally, the experiments show a dependency
on the BE traffic patterns. For example, in the case of the motion benchmark,
there are higher improvements than for the case of adpcm.
Synthesis Results
In this section we summarize synthesis results for our approach. We imple-
mented and synthesized a 2×2 NoC on a Virtex-6 LX760 FPGA using Xilinx
ISE 14.6 with default optimization settings and no special optimizations for
the VHDL implementation. The device utilization data were collected from
the Module Level Utilization Summary Report produced by ISE. As this NoC
is not fully connected, each of the four routers has only three input ports fully
instantiated. The results for the whole NoC are summarized in Table 4.2. The
table compares the used registers and LUTs for six different implementations.
The RR3 implementation corresponds to a basic round-robin router with
four virtual channels (i.e. three VCs for BE and one for GT) and a buffer
depth of four packets for each VC. This was extended in SP3 to provide one
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Figure 4.16: BE Latency periodically sending a burst of four packets.
prioritized VC for GT (i.e. VC0). In the DP design the priority of VC0 can be
changed via a configuration flag from the highest to the lowest priority during
run-time. This was extended in BS to account for the backsuction signal.
And finally, the FP3 and FP2 implementations denote the new approach (cf.
Section 4.4), where the priority of VC0 is dynamically changed by the router
based on the current fill level of the input buffer and the presence of an EoT
flit, with respectively four and three VCs.
The synthesis shows that our approach introduces less than 10 % overhead
for the used 2×2 NoC compared to a baseline router (RR3) and less than
0.5 % compared to the SP3 design when using the same number of VCs.
However, if throughput guarantees are required, the baseline approach (RR3)
cannot be used. Here, we need an additional round-robin arbiter at an output
port (one for BE and one for GT requests) when going from RR3 to SP3,
leading to a higher overhead. When extending SP3 to dynamic priorities,
only smaller changes are needed. In comparison to BS, our approach enables
to share VCs between different GT streams and hence to lower the number of
needed VCs (e.g. FP2) while achieving the same performance improvements
(cf. Section 4.4.4) and thus also the overhead.
The achievable clock frequency was 210 MHz for all designs, showing
that the extensions did not influence the critical timing path of a router. The
frequency was restricted by the minimum achievable period, caused by a
data path delay of 4.75 ns, consisting of 1.31 ns for logic and 3.44 ns route
delay.
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Figure 4.17: Normalized BE Latency for various benchmarks from node (3,0)
to node (4,4).
Table 4.2: Synthesis results for 2×2 NoC on Virtex-6 LX760 FPGA.
Unit RR3 SP3 DP BS FP3 FP2
#Registers 5294 5885 5900 5906 5908 4695
#LUTs 6813 7505 75302 7549 7560 6115
Frequency (MHz) 210 210 210 210 210 210
4.5 NoC Software-control
The presented approaches from Sections 4.3 and 4.4 can improve the per-
formance of the system, especially for BE traffic. However, such hardware
based approaches add hardware overhead to the system, which requires to
extensively adapt existing NoC designs, and are partly fixed after the design.
That is, for example, the number of channels that use these approaches to
provide QoS are fixed. Next to the additional control logic overhead of the
mechanisms, they might also require a certain minimum buffer size and thus
increase the needed buffer space. This is, for example, the case for the GT
approach, which benefits from deeper buffers. However, deep buffers require
more area and power. And with the fixed design, flexibility and utilization
become an issue.
The presented approaches so far work well for a certain traffic class (i.e.
either GT or GL) but provide limited or no benefits when applied for the
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other. Hence, there are basically two different options for a design to use
these approaches. First, a static design (e.g. based on a use case) can be
derived. Such a design has a fixed number of GL, GT, and BE channels as
well as static priority assignments for these. To allow some flexibility, the
nodes or network interfaces can decide, which channel will be used by a
transmission. However, this still can lead to over- or underutilized channels
(e.g. when there is only low or no GT traffic). Hence, the flexibility is limited.
Secondly, a runtime configurable design is possible. Here each channel
can be configured during runtime to use any of the presented mechanisms.
That is, for example, for each channel the GL, GT, and BE mechanisms are
implemented and the system can switch between the used mechanism for
each channel during run time. While this allows full flexibility, it also has a
high hardware overhead.
Another problem, besides the direct hardware and power overhead, is
blocking propagation. Sharing of links or virtual channels in a network on
chip by several applications may lead to blocking and accumulation of flits of
blocked packets in the network. In consequence, these flits may block other
streams sharing some links in the network, what is commonly known as a
head-of-line (HoL) blocking (cf. Section 4.5.1). This can drastically degrade
the performance and increase the power consumption. The typical solution
to this problem are deeper buffers that prevent blocked flits to be spread
over multiple routers. This is only partly mitigated by the presented HW
approaches. While the improved performance for BE reduces the blocking
propagation for BE (when the system has low utilization), the blocking for
GL/GT increases due to the additional dynamic priority blocking. And, for
highly loaded systems, where the approaches might always trigger and thus
prioritize GL or GT, BE observes blocking propagation again.
One possible solution to these problems is the use of a software control-
layer for resource management of NoC resources [122; 125; 223]. Such
NoC resource management (NoC-RM) describes a supervised sharing of
network resources (or resources in general), such as the virtual channels
(VCs), between applications, using a global arbitration scheme. Network
senders synchronize their transmissions through the exchange of special
control messages before entering the network. That permits moving blocking
from the network switches to the network interfaces or the software stack (e.g.
to a higher logical level). In such a way the approach allows to avoid head-
of-line blocking in the network and to provide QoS. This can significantly
increase the utilization of the interconnect and reduce buffer needs while still
allowing flexibility. The approach can be implemented in a centralized as
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well as a decentralized form as an extension of the network interfaces (NIs)
of processing nodes connected to the network [122; 125; 223].
4.5.1 Problem of Blocking Propagation
Modern Networks-on-Chip (NoCs) must not only provide a scalable infras-
tructure but also deliver high performance at the minimum possible cost and
provide flexibility, as discussed in Chapter 1. The efficient co-execution
of multiple applications in a system with a NoC requires mechanisms for
the allocation of resources to different packets traversing the network. The
commonly used wormhole switching offers low-buffer requirements and low
average-latencies even at high load [54; 69]. At the same time, wormhole
switching results in spreading of packets over routers on their network path,
making it sensitive to blocking. To traverse an end-to-end path through a
NoC, a packet has to acquire an output port in each router on its way. Because
routers are equipped with independent arbiters, this results in an acquisition
of a group of resources with local arbitrations. This independent arbitration
can lead to problems resulting from a coupled resource allocation. A blocked
packet is blocking other packets, even if they are heading towards other
destinations due to shared buffers in intermediate router ports. Additionally,
the distribution of packets between routers, accelerates the propagation of
blocking. This phenomenon is commonly known as head-of-line (HoL)
blocking [176].
In a result, wormhole switching works well as long as all system mod-
ules are capable of receiving and processing packets as they arrive and the
congestion time in network routers is short. This is not always possible as
many of today’s architectures use bandwidth-limited modules, which, due to
their cost and complexity, must be intensively shared between applications.
Examples are memory modules (e.g. external DRAM) or specialized modules
(cache controllers, arithmetic units, special purpose intellectual properties, or
SRAM controllers). In the following we will refer to them as hot-spot (HS)
modules.
If a HS module is not capable to process packets as they arrive the flits
of these packets accumulate in buffers of adjacent routers and block other
packets causing a domino-like effect. In this manner a saturation tree will
form affecting distant parts of the network. For instance, lets consider the
example in Figure 4.18. In the example there are eleven IP modules (IP1–11)
and a DRAM, which acts as a HS module. It is assumed, that due to the
hardware limitations of the system all applications must share the same set of
buffers in a NoC, i.e., the same virtual channel. If the DRAM is not capable
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Figure 4.18: External memory (DRAM) acting as a hot-spot module and
causing a saturation tree as well as source unfairness.
of processing all requests as soon as they arrive, in the worst case, blocked
transmissions from IP5 may block the transmission from IP10, which will
later block IP9.
Moreover, the propagation of blocking will also affect other communi-
cation, which is not directed towards a HS module, i.e., all transmissions
sharing the same buffers and links with the senders accessing the HS module.
As an example, in Figure 4.18 transmissions from IP8 will be blocked by
IP9 and transmissions from IP4 will be blocked by IP5. In consequence,
the whole communication in a NoC may be slowed down or even blocked
because of a single fully or over-loaded HS module. This results in a drastic
decrease of the system performance.
Additionally, the propagation of blocking can cause an unfair distribution
of the bandwidth of the HS module between senders. Modules that are close
to the HS module will gain access much faster than distant ones. The local
arbiters in the network routers usually utilize a round-robin based arbitration
between packets from different input ports using the same virtual channel
(VC) that compete for the same output port. Hence, they equally divide
the bandwidth between the requesters from these inputs. Consequently, in
the worst-case the bandwidth available for a particular module decreases
exponentially with the number of routers, which its transmission has to
pass. In case of a system with HS modules, which are causing frequent
blocking, the distance between modules can cause significant differences in
transmission latencies, e.g., spatially distant modules may experience long
blocking times due to higher probability of blocking. These problems can
drastically decrease the NoC performance even in highly over-provisioned
networks because even the highest link bandwidth will not prevent blocking
propagation resulting from shared buffers. Hence, the problems resulting
from hot-spot modules may affect systems with a NoC independently of the
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link width or available bandwidth as the blocking can originate from the
limited processing rate of the particular modules and not only from the NoC
itself.
The virtual-channel (VC) flow control allows to mitigate these prob-
lems through decoupling of the allocation of buffers from the allocation of
bandwidth of a single physical link [54; 69]. However, if there are more
applications than available VCs, applications mapped to the same VC will
still be able to block each other. Due to buffer limitations (e.g. to save hard-
ware cost) in most architectures multiple applications will share a single
(virtual) channel [65; 214; 233]. Hence, other solutions for this problem are
necessary.
4.5.2 Control Layer for Resource Management
In real-time systems using NoCs, synchronization between interfering trans-
missions can help to run the network with significantly less resources and
still be able to guarantee temporal properties and safety of a system. Hence,
we propose to use a control-layer for resource management of the NoC [122;
125; 223]. The approach provides a global admission control that regulates
accesses from different applications to shared resources, such as hot-spot
modules and the interconnect. This includes handling the effects of backpres-
sure and head-of-line blocking in routers, where switch arbitration between
traffic streams is performed. At the same time, the online control provides
flexibility to adapt the system to changes. It allows to simultaneously sat-
isfy performance and safety requirements of modern MPSoCs also in the
presence of highly dynamic workloads. Therefore, it allows to overcome
the shortcomings of other existing methods requiring modifications of the
network routers. The proposed solution is based on a global arbitration and
synchronization of accesses to shared resources. It uses the global, current
state of the system to online adapt the (local) admission control in NIs and
the QoS mechanisms in the used resources (e.g. arbiters in NoC routers).
The base functionality is delivered through a global arbitration layer using
key elements of Software Defined Networking (SDN) [129] and adapting
them for the requirements of real-time NoCs. The scheme decouples the
QoS control from traffic arbitration in routers (packet switching and flow
control) and separates the NoC in a (virtual) QoS control layer and a data
layer as shown in Figure 4.19. This is realized using a protocol-based
negotiation between senders, i.e., providing a validation method to check if
the currently available NoC resources are sufficient before the application is
granted access to the NoC. This also permits adjustments of QoS schemes
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during the negotiation phase, e.g., different traffic rates depending on the
system load. The synchronization can follow through a central scheduling
unit or distributed. In both scenarios, the approach can help to relieve the
NoC routers from QoS functions, e.g., admission control or maintaining QoS
states whether per transmission or aggregate.
Figure 4.19: Illustration of the QoS control plane and its operations in the
NoC domain.
Such a decoupling is appealing in several aspects. The major advantage of
the proposed approach comes from the fact that the routers can be oblivious
of the QoS functions. Therefore, there is no need for custom QoS-oriented
NoC extensions, which limit flexibility and can be costly in terms of area
and power [81; 174]. The approach allows the deployment of a contract-
based QoS provisioning (e.g. round-robin, priority-based arbitration) without
introducing complex and hard to maintain schemes, known from hardware
arbiters in real-time routers. It can even be applied to commercially available,
NoC-based architectures, e.g., Kalray MPPA-256 [42; 65] or Tile64 [214;
233] in real-time domains. Otherwise, these architectures introduce com-
plex interdependences between senders leading to pessimistic worst-case
guarantees or lack of formally guaranteed safety [122; 125]. Furthermore,
the resource management can be done globally using the knowledge about
the current state of the system, e.g., which applications are active, which
resources are occupied, and other system and sensor information. Hence, it
allows to efficiently incorporate the dynamics of the behaviour of senders and
can offer service guarantees by applying temporal-analysis frameworks, such
as compositional performance analysis (CPA) [99] or network calculus [134],
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which allow to capture the dynamics of the system. Additionally, the global
resource management, applied in both performance optimized and real-time
architectures, allows to improve the utilization of locally and globally shared
resources [122; 125; 223]. For instance, the designer may isolate full trans-
missions, constructed of multiple packets, for ensuring locality of accesses
to shared memories or further efficiency improvement [238]. The approach
also allows using different resource allocation policies in different regions to
improve the overall communication performance of the system [94; 95]. It
is also possible to provide feedback about the state of the NoC for effective
preemption based on-core schedulers. Consequently, the proposed control
layer offers joint benefits integrating features from standard NoCs and real-
time NoCs on top of an existing infrastructure. Such approach offers easy
implementation, high flexibility, and efficient guarantees even in systems
with dynamic workloads.
4.5.3 Principle of Operation of the NoC-RM
To provide service guarantees, an architecture must allow bounding direct
and indirect interference between interfering transmissions, i.e., transmis-
sions that overlap in at least one link on their path from source to destination
and thus are sharing NoC resources. For doing so, the NoC resource man-
agement (NoC-RM) groups applications in synchronization scenarios, i.e.,
sets of senders that may mutually influence their execution times through,
for example, concurrent accesses to shared interconnect resources. Ensuring
temporal guarantees for synchronization scenarios, i.e., offering a predictable
NoC, requires reserving sufficient resources such that the traffic requirements
from all senders are met. To achieve this goal, the NoC-RM decouples the
admission control and QoS configuration from the system execution and
data transport. Hence, the architecture differentiates a control layer and
a data layer. The NoC-RM uses the control layer to provide a validation
process performed at runtime before a communication (on the data layer) is
established. The validation process checks if current resources are sufficient
for the particular transmission and if a reconfiguration is needed and if it is
possible. Additionally, it supervises ongoing transmissions and the system
state to adapt to (unexpected) changes. Consequently, the main functionality
of the NoC-RM encompasses model-based analysis methods, which are used
to establish the settings for monitoring and QoS mechanisms. Both layers,
the control and data layer, are coupled through a protocol based synchroniza-
tion, i.e., contracts, allowing resource reservations for senders. For a NoC (or
switch-based interconnects in general), the resource reservations can include
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all routers and links on the end-to-end path. Hence, a reservation can include
multiple resources for a single request with selected parameters. Such param-
eters, for example, describe the QoS or performance requirements, such as
the needed throughput on a network path.
The connections for each synchronized sender are negotiated and estab-
lished dynamically at runtime. The negotiation is based on the global state of
the system and specified protocols. The global state of the system is defined
by, for example, the number of currently running applications including their
requirements w.r.t. shared resources. These factors can change during the
runtime depending on the dynamics of the system or applications, as well
as the physical environment (e.g. situation on the road for driver assistance
systems). Figure 4.20 shows an exemplary design for a model based adapta-
tion. In the example, the control layer comprises multiple analysis engines
responsible for different aspects of resource allocation and admission control.
The analysis can be done for optimizing different system goals (e.g. safety, se-
curity, or performance) and provides an initial input to the model exploration
module. Moreover, the analysis engines can assign resources according to
pre-defined and static allocation schemes (e.g. time-division multiplexing,
TDM) as well as dynamic and work conserving schedulers (e.g. round-robin,
static or dynamic priority based policies). The model exploration component
is optional and used to perform design-space exploration within the system
model to find a feasible solution whenever the requested contract cannot be
established as well to adjust system to unexpected events, e.g., robustness
against faults of the components. Consequently, it introduces adaptivity and
self awareness.
As the main goal of this work is to introduce a predictable and runtime-
adaptable NoC, the focus lies on predictable resource allocation schemes that
are defined during the system design phase and controlled by the resource
management. Consequently, the main goals of the arbitration enforced by
the NoC-RM in this work can be defined as follows:
• avoiding contention in (NoC) buffers;
• dividing bandwidth between interfering senders according to their
requirements;
• adjusting the settings during runtime to cope with dynamics in the
behaviour.
The NoC-RM opens multiple implementation possibilities. A comprehensive
overview of different protocols is presented in [122; 125; 223]. In this
work we will focus on the low level (e.g. hardware) architecture needed to
efficiently support the resource management.
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Figure 4.20: Model domain architecture for adaptive arbitration in a NoC.
4.5.4 Synchronization in NoC-RM
The synchronization process of the global resource management can be
divided into the following phases: (1) initialization/requesting, (2) reserva-
tion/negotiation, (3) usage, (4) release. Figure 4.21 provides a generalized
version of the synchronization workflow. The actual steps and their details
may vary according the selected protocol and implementation [125; 223].
To start a communication an initialization procedure (phases 1 and 2)
must be performed. First, a sender, willing to communicate with a particular
receiver, tries to access the communication path and thus certain resources in
the network. The NoC-RM then checks if the access needs a synchronization
based on the current state of the system. For this, the NoC-RM uses the state
of the system and available communication scenarios The communication
scenario is defined through the communication between all different senders
and receivers that may happen simultaneously in the network. Based on
these scenarios the NoC-RM decides if a new access can be granted or if
the request must be serialized and thus has to wait for another state in the
network. After receiving a confirmation, the sender can access the network of
resource. The fourth communication phase happens when a sender finishes
using a communication path. The end of the communication is recognized
by the NoC-RM (or announced by the sender). Based on this information,
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Figure 4.21: Generalized workflow of the NoC-RM.
the NoC-RM releases the resources and enables the changes to another
(communication) scenario. All four stages of the resource management
mechanism can be transparent to the sender. Because of that, no modifications
of the applications running in the system are necessary.
With the NoC-RM, a decision is made, whether an access can be per-
mitted or not before (data) packets are sent to the network. This allows
delaying packets, which could not be served, before they enter the NoC. As
the blocking happens outside the NoC infrastructure, buffers in the routers
are free and thus blocking propagation can be avoided. In a result, other
ongoing transmissions in the NoC are unaffected and the overall utilization
increases drastically during the congestion periods. To illustrate that lets
consider once again the example depicted in Figure 4.18. In a worst-case
scenario, if IP7 accessing the DRAM HS module will get blocked due to
saturation then it will also block IP8, although IP8 is communicating with
a different module, assuming a standard NoC with wormhole switching. If
resource managements is applied the transmission from IP7 is blocked and
thus will be delayed by the NoC-RM before the packets will physically enter
the interconnect. This permits IP8 to use the released resources and possibly
to conduct multiple transmissions. Figure 4.22 shows the effect of this.
However, such a resource management also introduces a set of new
challenges that must be considered during the system design phase. The
protocol based synchronization is done at the cost of an additional temporal
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Figure 4.22: Effects of local arbitration (left) and decentralized resource
management (right) on temporal behaviour of IP7 and IP8 from scenario in
Figure 4.18.
overhead. Consequently, the scalability of the architecture and its ability
to manage a high number of requesters and many complex scenarios plays
a critical role for future industrial deployments. To efficiently conduct the
different steps, the underlying (hardware) architecture needs to provide
support for the control layer of the NoC-RM (cf. Section 5).
4.5.5 High-level Architecture of the NoC-RM
The dynamic resource management requires a safe modification of resource
allocation at runtime for adjusting the QoS settings of the NoC to the chang-
ing, global state of the system. This requires the consideration of the local
state of the core (e.g. the number and execution profiles of currently active
applications defining the requirements w.r.t. the NoC) as well as to the global
state of the NoC (e.g. the number and profiles of active interfering senders
defining possible interference from interconnect). Although the evaluation of
the former on-core factors can be done locally on the same node, information
about the latter off-core factors requires further, global synchronization done
by the NoC-RM.
For the NoC resource management, each network node is controlled
by a supervisor (client) monitoring and controlling all transmissions from
running senders. These are used to control the network interface (e.g. to
configure rate limiters and to delay a network access until it is allowed by
the NoC-RM) and to negotiate the network access. For the negotiation, we
distinguish a centralized and a distributed approach for the control layer of
the NoC-RM. In the distributed approach clients exchange control messages
with each other containing information about the desired resource usages and
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requirements. In the centralized approach, clients send a request to a central
scheduling unit (the resource manager).
Centralized Control Layer
Figure 4.23 presents a high level abstraction of a centralized implementation
of the control layer. It uses a resource manager (RM), which is responsible
for decision-making, and clients at the networks nodes, which are responsible
for negotiation resource accesses with the RM. Hence, the clients and the
RM provide connection oriented network services to provide a predictable
and safe behaviour. To use a connection-oriented network service, the com-
munication participant (e.g. IP) must first establish a connection, as discussed
in the previous section, then use the resources, and release it at the end.
Figure 4.23: Modules and architecture of the centralized resource manage-
ment.
For this, we introduce clients at each node monitoring and controlling all
transmissions from running senders. Clients are responsible for:
• establishing connections with the RM (issuing correct messages to the
RM for appropriate actions of senders and processing node);
• preventing non-authorized accesses to the NoC;
• adjusting local admission setting in NI, e.g., rate settings for rate
limiters or MMU/MPU address translation tables, based on the config-
uration messages from RM;
• preventing too frequent accesses;
• releasing the NoC resources (i.e. inform the RM whenever an applica-
tion terminates); and
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• preventing unbounded NoC accesses, e.g., release the NoC resources
(inform the RM whenever a connection takes to long or end too long
connections).
The workflow of the mechanisms involves four stages as mentioned
above: (1) initialization/requesting a transmission, (2) reservation/negotia-
tion of resource/network access, (3) the transmission itself, and (4) releasing
the resources.
For the initialization procedure (stages 1 and 2) the client traps the access
of the sender to the network to prevent unauthorized transmissions. The
client has information about the current state of all connections allowed from
the particular node. Depending on the current state of the resources a request
to the resource manager is generated or the access is directly forwarded to
the resource (i.e. when the access was already granted and is still allowed).
During the second stage, the resource manager processes the request from the
client. This includes checking the global state of the network and available
communication scenarios. The communication scenario is defined through
the communication between all different senders and receivers that may
happen simultaneously in the network. Based on these scenarios the RM
decides if a new access can be granted or if the request must be serialized and
thus has to wait for another state in the network. Later the resource manager
sends a response to the client with information about the acceptance or
rejection of the request. After receiving the confirmation, the client forwards
the access, transparently from the sender, to the network. Starting from that
moment the sender may use the resource. After granting the access, the
client monitors the transmission from the sender. The fourth communication
phase happens when a sender finishes using a communication path. The
client recognizes the end of the transmission and informs the RM that the
communication is over. After receiving the notification, the RM has to release
the resources and to enable the change to another (communication) scenario.
All four stages of the resource management mechanism can be transparent to
the sender. Because of that, no modifications of the applications running in
the system are necessary.
The client modules can be implemented as hardware extensions of the NI
for high performance or as software modules running on the IP core (however
also in this case some extension of the NI could be necessary). Similarly,
the RM can be realized fully in hardware, i.e., as an independent HW IP
connected to the NoC, or as a software IP running on one of the nodes. The
main advantages of the software realization is flexibility. The complexity of
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both units depends on the selected synchronization protocol. More details on
this can be found in [122; 125].
Separating the clients and RMs from the software running on the process-
ing nodes is especially important in safety-critical systems where the NoC
is treated as a shared resource. Recall, that in such systems it is necessary
to either certify the whole system (including all applications) to the highest
relevant safety level or decouple the resource arbitration from senders to pro-
vide sufficient independence (cf. Section 1.2) [7; 15]. As ensuring adherence
to standards is a costly and demanding process, the latter is the preferred
solution for most systems. This can be achieved through the clients and RM,
which can be designed (and certified) independently to the highest relevant
safety level.
Distributed Control Layer
Figure 4.24 presents a high level abstraction of a distributed implementation
of the control layer. In the distributed approach, there is no central resource
manager. It uses clients at the networks nodes, which are responsible for
negotiation resource accesses in a distributed manner. Hence, these clients
are a more complex component compared to the ones of the centralized
approach. That way, they provide connection oriented network services
to provide a predictable and safe behaviour. To use a connection-oriented
network service, the communication participant (e.g. IP) must first establish
a connection, as discussed in the previous section, then use the resources and
release it at the end.
Figure 4.24: Modules and architecture of the distributed resource manage-
ment.
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The synchronization is done through the clients, controlling the state of
the transmissions. In a system utilizing the decentralized resource manage-
ment there is one client per network node. An offline analysis defines all
possible communication scenarios. Basing on these scenarios it is necessary
to decide which resources can be used without supervision and which require
synchronization of the accesses. A synchronization scenario then defines
all the applications sharing the same resources which are not allowed to
access it simultaneously or appropriate rate limitation when accessing them
simultaneously. Each of these applications will be later classified as a sender
and supervised by a client.
The workflow is similar to the centralized approach and also involves four
stages: 1) initialization/requesting a transmission, (2) reservation/negotiation
of resource/network access, (3) the transmission itself, and (4) releasing the
resources. However, there is a difference in the second stage now. Similar
as before, a sender tries to access the network (or a resource) to start a
communication. This access is trapped by the client, which checks if the
access can be allowed directly or if a negotiation or re-configuration is needed.
If a negotiation is needed, the client sends requests to the all corresponding
clients for the selected scenario. The scenario is defined by the requested
resources and includes a list of involved clients. During the second stage, the
clients use a distributed decision-making protocol, to decide if the request
can be granted and if a re-configuration is needed. If the access is granted,
the transmission can start using the decided parameters. When a sender
finishes using the resources, another negotiation is initiated to inform the
other clients, that the resources are released. Again, all four stages of the
resource management mechanism can be transparent to the sender.
4.6 Summary
QoS support plays a crucial role for safety-critical real-time systems. Without
QoS platforms cannot provide guarantees on the timing behaviour or only
very pessimistic estimations rendering many design unfeasible. At the same
time, the efficiency (e.g. high performance, low area and power overhead) and
flexibility are of high importance to reduce the costs of the overall system.
Hardware based QoS mechanisms can only solve some of these chal-
lenges. While a HW mechanism can be very efficient for a certain use case
(e.g. when the design is optimized for the use case), its flexibility is limited.
As soon as the use case exhibits dynamics or the system should be used for
a different scenario (e.g. system update, new functions added, different use
132 Chapter 4. Quality of Service in NoCs
case), the benefits are mitigated. That is, the system cannot be fully utilized
and might waste performance or power.
Software based mechanisms, on the other hand, can provide efficient
QoS and flexibility at the same time. Additionally, they can be applied
to existing systems without the need for extensive adaptations of existing
hardware components, further reducing (development) costs. The NoC-RM
provides a QoS abstraction of the underlying NoC (data plane) allowing a
path oriented approach in which the per-hop behaviours of routers and the
end-to-end properties of communication can be unified. This allows safe
and efficient resource reservations but requires knowledge about the global
state of the system, i.e., the number of simultaneously running senders, their
current state and the QoS requirements, which may change during runtime.
Therefore, for establishing and adaptively managing connections, clients are
used to negotiate reservations and resource accesses. This is done through
the exchange of messages between nodes with interfering senders or with a
centralized control unit. This communication is forming a synchronization
protocol allowing to propagate information about the state of a connection
as well as the current QoS requirements for a particular sender. The latter
parameter can change dynamically during runtime and a contract based
negotiation allows to safely adjust the QoS of the platform.
The main advantage of the NoC resource management is that it makes
the QoS functions in the routers oblivious for achieving real-time and safety
guarantees. The admission control and adaptive management of the NoC
state is fully controlled by the introduced control layer making the system
potentially more efficient. This allows to adaptively optimize the arbitration
to the changing global state of the system for accommodating arriving work-
loads as well as reacting to possible errors and changes in the environmental
conditions.
The NoC-RM can apply different isolation techniques to achieve the
aforementioned goals [122; 125; 223]. This flexibility allows the designer
to extend the capabilities of a selected NoC-based platform without the
need for modifications of the routers. For instance, the introduced solution
permits the implementation of a TDM-based arbitration on top of a NoC with
performance oriented arbiters in routers such as round-robin based iSLIP
arbiters. Consequently, the NoC-RM permits increasing the spectrum of
system applications, e.g., adjusting it for providing guarantees in real-time
domains, without need for re-design or costly hardware extensions.
However, the benefits of the NoC-RM strongly depend on the (hardware)
platform support for the control layer. Hence, to fully utilize the performance
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and flexibility, the control layer also requires some hardware extensions
in the system. Some of the needed hardware extensions might already be
present in an existing architecture. Still, the adaptability and reuse-ability
make such a software based QoS mechanisms a reasonable choice. Hence,
the next chapter derives an exemplary architecture supporting the control
layer to fully utilize the benefits of the presented resource management.

5. NoC Architecture Supporting a Control-layer
Today’s and future safety-critical real-time systems require performance
isolation and adaptability at the same time. The network-on-chip (NoC)
resource management (NoC-RM) with its control layer can reach similar
isolation properties as complex QoS-aware router designs (cf. Section 4.5).
At the same time, it offers an adaptability, while requiring less hardware,
allowing the use of COTS networks, and achieving better performance in
the average case. This chapter presents an architecture efficiently supporting
the NoC-RM to improve its benefits and simplify the data layer network
architecture (e.g. hardware complexity).
The chapter is partially based on the work published in [216; 223].
5.1 Introduction
Today’s and future safety-critical real-time systems and thus their intercon-
nects must face new challenges (cf. Chapter 1). NoCs must efficiently host
new sets of highly dynamic workloads and the behaviour of the system may
be influenced by external factors. Tasks, for example, may modify their trans-
mission profiles at run-time depending on the arriving sensor data. Moreover,
sets of applications may be initiated dynamically during the runtime of the
system, introducing modes with changing traffic patterns and mapping or
workload profiles, e.g., convolution of a neural network used for decision-
making. Similarly, sensor fusion and data crunching bring up data-dependent
execution, resulting in a highly dynamic task behaviour and large jitters.
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While classic hardware based quality of service (QoS) mechanisms (e.g.
complex routers) can provide the needed performance isolation (cf. Sec-
tions 4.3 and 4.4), they cannot efficiently handle such dynamic workloads
or adapt to a changing system behaviour. Software control can reach similar
isolation properties as complex QoS-aware router designs (cf. Section 4.5).
Additionally, a software approach allows an online adaptable design, the use
of simple commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) routers, and can even achieve
better average case performance [125; 223]. Hence, an optimised architecture
supporting a control layer for the NoC-RM for providing QoS and improving
the performance of the control layer is needed for its full benefits.
Using the NoC-RM and a control layer has multiple impacts on the
architecture design. First, the architecture needs to provide support for the
control layer to increase its benefits. The latency of control messages directly
influences the synchronisation overhead [120; 122; 125; 223]. Hence, an
architecture needs to minimize it. Secondly, if a control layer is available,
the hardware for the data layer can be simplified. That is, we can use less
complex QoS mechanisms, less virtual channels, and smaller buffers in
the routers. This can drastically reduce the hardware costs of the system.
Hence, the additional goals of an architecture supporting the control layer are:
decreasing the latency of control messages and improving the performance
to hardware cost ratio. At the same time, it should not challenge the safety
and performance of the system or control layer.
Besides the performance and hardware overhead, a control layer can
also influence other parts of a NoC architecture. The control layer can, for
example, also be applied for power or reliability management. That is, the
control layer can be used to adapt the voltage and frequency settings of the
data layer components, power off/on the data layer components completely,
or configure redundant/alternate routes in case of errors [123].
This chapter presents an architecture supporting the NoC resource man-
agement, as described in Section 4.5, to simplify the network architecture
(e.g. hardware complexity) and providing support for the control layer to
increase its efficiency. The architecture allows an efficient integration of the
control layer and uses it so save cost (i.e. allow the use of simple routers and
avoid head of line blocking in the network). Thus, it reduces the complexity
of the NoC (routers) and the negative effects of the control messages as well
as improves the performance of the control layer. As NoCs are often applica-
tion specific and several parameters, such as topology, routing, packet (flit,
phit), and link size, may vary, the presented architecture is only an example
showing the general idea of supporting the control layer. The control layer
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can be applied to any data layer architecture and thus help to simplify the data
layer (e.g. move QoS support from routers to the network boarder and reduce
the needed buffer space in the network). Following the definition of [132],
the proposed NoC resource management influences mainly the transaction or
transport layer, others (i.e. physical, data link, network layer) are technology
and use case dependent and, thus, may vary between different designs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 pro-
vides an overview on the general design requirements. And Section 5.3
presents the proposed architecture. Chapter 6 will then evaluate the design.
5.2 Requirements
For the design of an architecture utilizing a NoC-RM, as introduced in
Section 4.5, several aspects and requirements play a role. First, the general
requirements of safety-critical real-time systems and their different traffic
classes must be accounted. These limit the set of possible implementations
for the control layer. And secondly, the requirements of the NoC-RM directly
influence the design.
The general requirements of safety-critical real-time systems were already
introduced in Section 1.4. In a nut shell, embedded systems in this domain
host applications with different traffic characteristics and requirements. We
can differentiate at least three different traffic classes: guaranteed latency
(GL), guaranteed throughput (GT), and best-effort (BE). GL requires a
limited upper bound for the latency (e.g. to stay below a deadline) and
possibly also a comparatively low latency. This limit can be on flit or
packet level as well as for bursts of packets. GT, on the other hand, does
not have strict latency requirements for single packets, but requires the
system to guarantee a minimum accepted throughput. And BE does not
have any requirements that must be guaranteed by the system. However,
the performance of BE can be of interest to increase the user experience
or provide additional, non safety-critical functions. Hence, as long as the
requirements of GL and GT can be satisfied, the system should optimize the
performance of BE traffic [217].
Next to this, we have the requirements and properties of the NoC-RM.
The actual requirements depend on the used protocol and variant of the
NoC-RM [122; 125; 223]. But a few requirements are common between
them. Hence, we will focus on the general requirements and design con-
siderations for the underlying network. The requirements of the NoC-RM
can be divided into the requirements resulting from the control protocol
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and needed modules, such as the client interfaces and the control unit RM
for the centralized approach or the advanced client interfaces (including
the functionality of the RM) for the distributed approach. Independently of
the selected protocol variant the client interfaces must fulfil the following
functional requirements [122; 125; 223]:
• intercepting and distinguishing between different transmissions;
• generating and sending of request messages;
• processing of acknowledge messages;
• processing of configuration messages and, for example, changing the
rate control (including delaying the access to the resource);
• detecting the end of a transmission and releasing resources (e.g. gener-
ating and sending of release messages).
These actions of the client interfaces can be implemented transparently to the
running applications, ensuring compatibility with existing legacy software,
or as an additional resource (hardware or software library) that must be
actively used by the running software (e.g. application or OS). The decision
on this will directly influence the low-level implementation of the clients.
Kostrzewa [122] presents details on different implementation variants. From
the view point of the network, these possible client implementations do not
have an influence on the architecture of the network and only influence the
details of the network interface (NI) implementation.
Additionally, it is important to decide the granularity level of the syn-
chronisation, i.e. the amount of data on which the client interfaces negotiate
transmissions and the information included in a synchronisation scenario.
Client interfaces may conduct the synchronisation depending on various
factors, including for instance [122; 223]:
• each initiated transmission from the processing node;
• transmissions using a particular set of resources (VC or path);
• transmissions targeting a particular receiver;
• transmissions initialized by a particular task/application or module
within the processing node, e.g., DMA engine or a specific task running
within an OS;
• using monitoring information, e.g., continuous synchronisation de-
pending on the frequency of initiated transmissions.
• each based on:
– single packets;
– full transmissions (i.e. multiple/many packets); or
– modes of the application.
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The decision on these parameters influences the implementation details of
the client interfaces (such as the needed local information stored at the client)
and the needed information in the control messages and thus the size of
the control messages and the implementation of the RM (or other receiving
nodes). Hence, these can influence the hardware and temporal overhead
of the control layer and its effect on the network architecture. The design
must ensure that the processing time and the consumed chip area stay within
reasonable bounds.
Besides the implementation decisions, the RM control unit (centralized
approach) or clients (decentralized approach) must fulfil certain functional
requirements:
• receiving and qualifying control messages (type and sender);
• distinguishing between different synchronization scenarios;
• switching between scenarios according to the predefined set of rules
(scheduling method);
• ensuring safe transition between system states (preventing sporadic
overloads); and
• generating control messages.
Next to these general requirements, the protocol and clients or RM
can be enhanced with more advanced mechanisms and features. This will
extend the set of requirements and also may increase the hardware and
temporal overhead. The hardware overhead additionally depends directly
on the complexity of the introduced arbitration (e.g. dynamic switching
between off-line defined scenarios or full online resource allocation and
reconfiguration), verification methods as well as availability of existing
infrastructure for a particular configuration of a chip. In many systems this
cost can be amortized by the reusability of existing system components,
e.g., monitoring infrastructure. Kostrzewa [122] investigated this trade-off
between design complexity and functionality. However, as it does not directly
influence the under-laying network architecture, we will not handle it in this
work.
Breaking all the requirements down to the level of the network-on-chip,
we can formulate three main design goals of the control layer for the support
of the NoC-RM:
1. low latency of control messages, which will reduce the temporal over-
head of the control layer;
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2. low interference of the control messages on existing traffic to minimize
additional interference and blocking in the network induced by the
control messages itself; and
3. low hardware overhead (of the overall design), especially regarding
the network routers.
The latter is important, as NoCs are already complex systems with a multitude
of design parameters and already consume a significant proportion of the
die area and system power [40; 41]. For example, the network of Intel’s
80-Core Teraflops Research Chip consumes 17 % of die area and 28 % of
system power [101; 225]. And the network buffers of the Intel’s Teraflops
Research Chip consume 22 % of the communication power [225]. The iMesh
NoC of the TILE64 many-core system dedicates 60 % of the NoC’s die area
to buffering [233]. Similarly, in the TRIPS chip, the input buffers occupy
75 % of the router’s die area [85]. Consequently, reducing the needed buffers
or the needed additional overhead can help to reduce the area and power
requirements of NoCs.
5.3 Architecture Details
In this section we derive an architecture of the control layer for supporting
the NoC-RM introduced in Section 4.5. We focus on the support for the
NoC-RM to provide QoS. As the NoC-RM allows different implementation
and protocol variants, we show how the general properties influence the
design decisions of the NoC and only present an exemplary architecture.
Hence, for certain use cases or protocols this architecture must be adapted.
We will differentiate a data layer and a control layer and highlight the general
interaction between the layers. Additionally, we outline concepts extending
the control layer beyond its admission control capabilities. Figure 5.1 shows
a high level representation of the architecture. It consists of a transaction
layer, a transport layer, and the interconnected IP cores. The transaction layer
handles the end-to-end transmission of messages as well as network admis-
sion control. Its main components are the network interfaces, connecting
the IPs/nodes to the network. The transport layer is responsible for moving
the messages from one IP to another. These messages can be on the data
or control layer. And the IPs represent the processing units, memories, and
other on-chip resources as well as off-chip interfaces.
Using the NoC-RM, we can distinguish at least four different traffic
classes in the network: control traffic (CT), guaranteed latency (GL), guar-
anteed throughput (GT), and best-effort (BE). For GL and GT, the network
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Figure 5.1: Logical layers of the proposed NoC architecture.
must provide upper bounds on the latency and lower bounds on the minimum
throughput available for the streams. Control traffic (CT) is similar to GL
traffic, as an upper bound on the latency is needed to provide a predictable
NoC-RM. However, as the performance of the NoC-RM directly influences
the performance of the (controlled) system, CT must also achieve a low
latency (while for GL traffic it is sufficient to reach a destination by the
deadline and not as fast as possible [201; 217]).
To provide sufficient isolation between the different classes (e.g. avoid
head of line blocking), several network channels can be used, i.e., one channel
per class. If head of line blocking can be avoided, it is also possible to map
certain classes on the same channel. When four different channels are used,
these can be implemented as virtual or physical channels. Hence, the four
traffic classes can be implemented on four different virtual channels, four
physical channels (e.g. independent networks), or any hybrid solution, as for
example two physical channels with virtual channels on each. Additionally,
it is possible to provide multiple channels for a class, as for example, four
independent networks (for each traffic class one) with virtual channels on
each.
5.3.1 Virtual or Physical Control Layer
The latency of control messages has direct influence on the performance of
the NoC-RM. A higher latency will increase the synchronisation overhead
and thus can limit the performance benefits or even render the synchronisation
as infeasible for some safety-critical applications. There are two different
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possibilities for implementing the control layer: using the existing data layer
or implementing a dedicated control interconnect.
Using the existing data layer is straightforward and often needs no adap-
tations of the existing interconnect. The only requirement is that the inter-
connect can provide latency guarantees for the control messages. While
a performance oriented architecture, e.g., with round-robin arbitration, is
possible, it decreases the performance and predictability of the control layer.
Hence, the control layer should be prioritized, e.g., using a high priority vir-
tual channel. This approach can reduce the hardware overhead of the control
layer and avoid any modifications to the interconnect. However, when there
is no free virtual channel (and the existing traffic of the individual VCs should
not be merged), an additional virtual channel must be implemented, which
in turn requires additional buffer space in the network routers. Additionally,
as the control and data messages share the same hardware, the control mes-
sages interfere with the data messages. That is, the control layer induces an
additional (high priority) interference to the network, possibly increasing the
latencies of the data layer (cf. Chapter 3). To reduce the overhead in this case,
the control layer should use the shortest message size (e.g. single flits) to
minimize the induced blocking. Simulation and analysis can be used to verify
if the introduced benefits of the control layer will outweigh the overhead.
To avoid the additional interference, a dedicated control NoC can be used.
Similar approaches are already used by existing architectures to avoid inter-
ference between different kinds of traffic, as for example in the Tile64 [214;
233] or MPPA [42; 65]. Such an approach can improve the performance
and energy-delay product of a system, especially for regular traffic where
collisions are less frequent [26; 46; 237]. As the control traffic follows a
well-defined protocol and, for the case of the centralized approached, has a
limited set of possible destinations for the packets, it is regular and allows
to deploy shorter queues in the routers [122]. In this approach, the control
interconnect can be an additional network-on-chip, a bus, dedicated signal
wires, or any other interconnect.
Using a dedicated control interconnect allows to use a simple architecture
for the data layer and to reduce the depths of the buffers (e.g. as there is less
interference compared to the approach with high priority control messages).
Hence, the additional hardware overhead of a dedicated control interconnect
compared to an additional virtual channel is small. Additionally, as the
control layer sends fewer data, the interconnect can be optimized to the
control protocol (e.g. smaller message sizes, lower frequency of routers).
Hence, a dedicated physical channel might induce less overhead compared
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to an additional virtual channel that uses the same packet and flit format as
the data layer.
From the design perspective, a dedicated control interconnect also offers
some other advantages. With a dedicated interconnect, the control layer can
easily be re-used in different designs, without costly adaptations. This allows
to re-use a well-tested architecture without the need for costly verifications
in each new platform. The additional control interconnect can then be used
to monitor and supervise an existing data layer and ease the verification of
it. This allows the control layer to gather monitoring information of the
data layer during runtime, enabling an online supervision and control of the
communication architecture.
Overall, an additional physical control interconnect seems a reasonable
choice. This leads to an architecture as shown in Figure 5.2, where we use
a dedicated NoC for each interconnect. In the example, the control layer is
a small optimized NoC, e.g., without virtual channels and only single flit
buffers (cf. Section 5.3.3). The control routers can have a monitoring and
control module directly connected to the routers of the data layer. The data
layer uses virtual channels to distinguish between different traffic classes and
a priority based arbitration between the VCs (cf. Section 5.3.2). As the flits
inside the data layer typically experience less contention due to the NoC-RM,
the data layer uses only small buffers to hide link/control flow latency.
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Figure 5.2: High level NoC architecture using a dedicated control layer.
5.3.2 Data Transport Layer
The data layer of the architecture is based on the IDAMC architecture and
using a priority based arbitration (cf. Section 2.2) [128; 186; 206; 216]. We
use a 16×16 2D mesh topology as the baseline NoC architecture. The focus
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in this chapter is on QoS and the control layer. Other aspects, such as the
NoC size, packet format of the data layer, or the routing and its encoding,
are just examples and have no effect on the general working of the QoS
provisioning of the control layer.
The network routers use wormhole switching, input buffering of incom-
ing data, and implement up to four virtual channels (VC), i.e., separate
buffers that share the same link. Figure 5.3 shows an example for the router
architecture with n ports. The number of virtual channels and ports are
based on the decisions for the size of the header and the used encoding of
the routing. If the number of channels or ports is reduced, the header and
possibly the link width can also be reduced.
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Flow Control
Monitor/
Configuration
Interface
Input 1
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..
.
..
.
Output 1
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Figure 5.3: Proposed router architecture of the data layer
Switching and Flow Control
The NoC transfers data in packets and uses wormhole switching. Duato
et al. [69] showed that wormhole switching outperforms virtual cut through
(VCT) and store and forward (S&F) switching. VCT and wormhole switch-
ing can achieve better latencies than S&F switching. At the same time,
virtual-channel based wormhole-switching has similar buffer capacity than
VCT. However, VC-based wormhole switching can achieve higher through-
put. While VCT with virtual channels can achieve similar throughput, the
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buffer requirements are typically higher. From the design perspective, an
architecture with a low number of VCs is preferable to save cost and power,
whereas a higher number of VCs can improve performance. Pande et al. [166]
reported that the optimum number of VCs is four, as a further increase of the
number shows only marginal performance improvements while increasing
power and area overhead. Hence, the data layer uses four virtual channels
in the basic configuration, while other designs are possible. While this is
one channel more than needed for the three traffic classes of the data layer,
the control layer (or designer) can use the additional channel for traffic
distribution or a more fine granular differentiation of traffic.
The VCs are assigned to a priority level and a priority based scheduling
is used between different VCs, whereas round-robin is used between VCs
with the same priority [206]. That is, the data layer supports four priority
levels. QoS is based on reservation of virtual channels for individual traffic
streams. There are two possibilities. First, during design time, sets of VC
buffers are reserved for certain guaranteed service (GS) streams. Sharing of
VCs of different streams or traffic classes can be allowed, when, for example,
source rate limiting limits the interference. Second, the NoC-RM can assign
streams to VCs during runtime, based on the current state of the system (cf.
Section 4.5). The network interfaces (NIs) then map the traffic streams to the
selected VCs. Hence, the traffic is not allowed to change the VC on its path
through the network. Doing this, the VC allocation step inside the routers
can be avoided. This enables to implement virtual networks similar to the
work of Heisswolf et al. [95]. For both cases, the control layer can be used
to decide which traffic streams are allowed to use the NoC concurrently, at
what time, and the allowed traffic rate.
The size of the input buffers is two flits. However, there is the possibility
to use different buffer sizes for the VCs [206]. This buffer size is smaller than
for a typical NoC switch as shown in Section 2.1.6. As we use the NoC-RM
to prevent complex blocking situations and blocking propagation, we do not
need deep buffers to mitigate HoL blocking as would be needed for VCT. To
avoid buffer overflow between routers, the network uses a credit based flow
control scheme allowing backpressure to occur. For this, the flow control
keeps track of available buffer space at the down stream routers using credits.
Each time a flit is sent downstream, the credit counter for this particular port
and virtual channel is decreased. When the switch allocator selects an input
port and the flit is sent through the output port, the flow control unit issues
a credit signal to the upstream router together with the used VC to inform
the preceding router that a flit was removed from the input buffer. If the flow
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control unit receives such a credit signal, it increases the credit counter of
the corresponding output port and VC again. If all credits are depleted for a
particular port and virtual channel, no further flits are sent this port and VC
until credits are available.
Routing
The NoC uses a table-based source routing scheme, offering a flexible but
deterministic and simple re-routing capability. In the baseline version, the
routing supports eight ports at each router to support different topologies, like
mesh, ring, star, tree, and any other topology that can be created of routers
with up to eight ports. In a 2D mesh topology, four ports can be used to
connect peer routers, while the remaining ports can be used to connect nodes
(e.g. processors, memories, off-chip interfaces). It is possible to use more or
less ports. When using less ports, the encoding of the route might require
fewer bits in the header and thus allow to decrease the link width.
The re-routing capability can be used for load balancing, adaptation to
errors (e.g. take alternative path), or to avoid interference (e.g. dynamic
re-routing by the control layer). For this, the routing table can be modified
by the control layer. Source routing is selected, as it allows a simple per
source re-configuration of the used paths. For distributed routing schemes,
the routers have a table or algorithm to derive the output port based on the
destination address. To re-route the path from a sender to a destination, one
would have to change the table in all routers on the new and old path. This
would increase the time needed to re-route a path and, hence, also increase
the load and power consumption, as multiple re-configuration packets are
needed (e.g. one for each router on the new and old path). Additionally,
there are three variants for deriving the output port when using a distributed
routing scheme: (1) only using the destination address, (2) using destination
address and incoming port, or (3) using destination and source address. For
the first two options, only a small table is needed inside the routers. However,
route reconfiguration can only be done for all streams sharing the output or
input and output. For the third options, the size of the router is increased, but,
similar to source routing, the re-configuration can be done per sender. Hence,
source routing is the most promising solution.
In the baseline version, the route is stored in 30 bit using a run-length
encoding as shown in Figure 5.4 (cf. Section 2.1.2). Each run is composed
of a port number (pi) and a count (ci). Together, they represent a sequence
of hops during which the packet takes the same output port. The individual
fields of the route are:
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• hcnt: number of hops remaining in current run (3 bit)
• pi: port for run i (3 bit)
• ci: number of hops −1 of run i (3 bit)
• Ud: destination port (3 bit)
01234567891011121314151617181920212223242526272829
Ud c3 p3 c2 p2 c1 p1 c0 p0 hcnt
3b 3b 3b 3b 3b 3b 3b 3b 3b 3b
run3 run2 run1 run0
Figure 5.4: Route encoding of the data layer.
The route field is dynamic and changed by the switches as the packet
is forwarded. In the switches, the route is processed as follows: At each
hop, the next port is found at p0 and hcnt is decremented by one. If hcnt
becomes 0, there will be a turn in the next switch. When a turn occurs, the
route fields (p0c0 through Ud) will be rotated by six bits to the left, where
hcnt is replaced by c1 before the rotation. This way, the next switch will
see the next port in the p0 position. Additionally, as the current output port
is at p0 and the switch calculates the output for the next switch, the route
computation step can be in parallel to the switch allocation of the router
pipeline (cf. Section 2.1.6).
This encoding allows addressing different nodes in a 16×16 NoC with up
to six possible paths to a destination. As a single hop count can only achieve
up to eight hops, up to two runs are needed to cross a single NoC dimension.
For a NoC with a smaller diameter (e.g. 8×8) more possibilities exist or the
size of the hop count fields (and thus of the route) can be decreased. Similar,
for a 2D mesh with up to five ports per router, the directions and destination
ports can be encoded in two bits (using a 2-bit clockwise router port address
encoding [154; 155]), thus reducing the route field to 25 bit.
To identify the sender of a message, there is an additional field in the first
flit of a packet denoting the source port (Us). When a packet is processed at
the destination and, for example, a reply is to be sent back, the sender can be
identified by the following approach:
1. swap Ud and Us
2. mirror the port in each run (e.g. E⇔W, N⇔S)
3. reverse the route field
4. set hcnt to c0 (after rotation)
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For this to work with shorter routes (less than four runs), the original sender
has to put Us into the corresponding port field (p1–p3). Hence, the source of
a packet can be derived from the route and no additional source address field
is needed (cf. Section 2.1.2).
Error checking
The data layer supports only basic error checking mechanisms to highlight
the interaction with the control layer. However, further error checking can
be implemented on the software level (cf. Section 1.4) or through additional
hardware extensions [34; 80; 181; 182; 184; 185; 186; 240].
We use header extensions and router extensions for error detection and
handling. In each flit header there is a parity bit protecting the flit header. The
parity bit protects the header information needed for the routing. This allows
a quick and simple verification in the routers to handle corrupted flits early.
That way it prevents erroneous flits from disturbing the router functioning
(e.g. prevent a miss-routed tail flit, closing the wrong channel and leaving the
corresponding one unusable) [181; 186]. Additionally, there is support for a
CRC checksum for each flit, which can be enabled on a per flit basis via a
flag in the header. The current implementation offers a CRC-8, allowing a
hamming distance of three for up to 247 bit assuming low, constant random
independent bit error rate (BER) [116]. However, as the current network
packet format has some spare bit available, higher order CRCs are possible.
The CRC covers the whole flit, including payload and header. The CRC is
only used at the destination NI to support a simple automatic repeat request
(ARQ) scheme [197]. That way, the routers do not have to re-calculate the
CRC when the route is shifted.
In addition to the data and header protection, there is a 4 bit counter in
each flit. This is increased by the sending network interface for each packet
(i.e. all flits of a packet have the same value). When the counter reaches the
maximum value, the NI restarts it with zero for the next request. The counter
is used (at the receiving NI) to detect packet loss, data duplication, and if a
tail belongs to a header flit (cf. Section 1.4).
In addition to the additional header information, the routers have some
basic support for health checks and an interface, which can be accessed by
the control layer. Through the interface, the data layer routers can report
errors (e.g. detected through the parity bit). So far only rudimentary health
checks are supported, while more sophisticated solutions are possible. The
control layer uses this information to decide if a link might be corrupted and
re-routing is needed. As a health check, the switch uses simple progress
5.3 Architecture Details 149
monitors and sanity checks for the input queues. That is, if there is only a
single input queue requesting for an output (and there is credit available),
but the switch allocator is not selecting this port (e.g. no port at all or a port
without any request), an error is reported. Similarly, if a buffer with flits
pending is not generating any requests for output ports, there is an error. In
addition, if there are requests pending but there is no progress due to missing
credits, a (permanently) blocked channel can be identified.
Besides the monitoring and reporting, the interface can be used to flush
the queues and the state of routers (e.g. VC-, port-, or router-level reset)
and, if applicable, re-configure parameters of the router. This allows to fully
control the behaviour of the network routers through the control layer.
Network Packet Format
Messages in the NoC are transferred as packets. The logical entity of packets
are flits with a size of 160 bit whereas the physical transmitting occurs over
phits. In the baseline version a flit consists of four phits with a phit size of
40 bit, which are sent in a chain through the network. We differentiate four
types of flits: single, head, body, and tail, with the encoding as shown in
Table 5.1. This leads to the packet format shown in Figure 5.5. It allows
three types of packets: a single flit packet (only a single flit), a two flit packet
(head and tail flit), and a packet with an arbitrary length (head flit, multiple
body flits, and a tail flit). However, in the baseline version the NoC only
supports packets with a single or with four flits. For arbitrary length packets
an additional length field or flit level counter would be needed in the packet
or flit header to detect the loss of a body flit.
Table 5.1: Encoding of the flit types (FT) of the data layer.
Flit Type (FT) Code
Single-FLIT “10”
HEAD_FLIT “11”
BODY_FLIT “00”
TAIL_FLIT “01”
Based on this and the descriptions above, Figure 5.6 shows the format
of the head flit and thus of a single flit packet. And 5.7 shows the format of
the body and tail flits. In the figures, the flits are split into four phits. The
phits can be used to hide the flit arbitration latency. For this, the link width
is adapted to the size of a phit and the phits of a flit are sent in a pipelined
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Head Flit n Body flits (n≥ 0) Tail flit (opt. for n = 0)
160 bit n · 160 bit 160 bit
Figure 5.5: Data layer packet format.
manner. For efficient forwarding, it is required that the first phit of the head
flit contains the information necessary to select the destination output port
for the next hop (i.e. that the complete route must gits into the first phit).
However, other serialisation schemes are possible too, as for example using
smaller link widths and transmitting a phit in multiple cycles or transmitting
the whole flit at once.
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Figure 5.6: Single and head flit format.
The goal was to support a packet with 64 B payload. This is a typical
size to transmit cache lines for a multi processor interconnect. For a packet
with four flits the sum of all payload bits is 538 bit or 67 B. Hence, three
additional bytes are available to attach data related information like cache
line status or local process id. Additionally, if no error checking is needed,
the CRC check can be disabled (by setting the ERR-field in the head flit
to zero), allowing 570 bit or 71 B of payload data. For a single flit packet
the packet format allows 109 bit with error checking or 117 bit without error
checking of payload data.
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Figure 5.7: Body and tail flit format.
5.3.3 Control Transport Layer
The control transport layer is used for the QoS control protocol. In gen-
eral, the control layer consists of three components: the clients, the RM
(which might be included in the clients for a decentralized approach), and
the transport of the control messages (cf. Section 4.5). The clients and the
RM are implemented in the NIs or nodes (cf. Section 5.3.4) [122; 125; 223].
This section focuses on the transport of the control messages. While the
control messages can be sent on a (high priority) virtual channel, we use a
dedicated control layer (cf. Section 5.3.1). However, the assumptions for the
dedicated layer can also be used to simplify the virtual channel approach (e.g.
decreasing the buffer sizes). From the QoS perspective, the control layer
has two main functions: admission control (e.g. allowing or denying access
to the NoC) and online reconfiguration (e.g. adapt rate-limiters and routes
based on the system state) as described in Section 4.5.
Compared to the data layer, the load on the control layer is low. Typically,
a sending node will issue a single request (i.e. packet) on the control layer
and then send many packets on the data layer. The online reconfiguration,
based on, for example, monitoring informations or errors, also occurs slowly.
The details on the protocol are presented in [122; 125; 223]. The lower
performance requirements of the control layer can be used to simplify the
architecture of the control layer and enable a more power efficient imple-
mentation compared to the data layer. This leads to a trade-off between low
power and low latency during the design time of the control layer.
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The frequency of control messages also depends on whether a central-
ized or decentralized approach will be used. Additionally, this decision
can influence the complexity of the used interconnect. For example, for a
centralized approach, all requests go to the same, predefined destination (the
RM). Hence, the routing and arbitration stages in (request) network routers
can be simplified, thus saving area and pipeline stages in the router logic.
In the following, we will develop an exemplary, NoC-based architecture
for the control transport layer also supporting the distributed control layer. It
bases on the data layer shown in Section 5.3.2, but using some simplifications,
as, for example, using no virtual channels.
Message and Packet Format
To optimize the architecture for the control messages, we first define the con-
tent and requirements of these messages. As the control messages depend on
the selected protocol variant, we make some exemplary assumptions on these.
We can distinguish five different message kinds at the control layer: request,
acknowledge, information/status, configuration, and handshaking [122; 125;
223]. The request and acknowledge messages are short messages, mainly
for admission control. A sender asks the RM for access to the network and
the RM responds with a yes or no. For this, the RM needs to know which
sender is issuing the request and what the sender wants to do. The latter is
only important, if a sender can take different actions. If there is just a single
scenario for a sender, e.g., a sender only uses the control layer to obtain
access to a single shared resource, the latter can be omitted. For informa-
tion/status and configuration messages we need more data, as they transport
measurements or configurations. Next to these NoC-RM protocol dependent
messages, the handshaking messages can be used for end-to-end message
acknowledgement and error handling of control messages. The receiver of
a message checks the CRC and parity bit to verify the message. Based on
the result an acknowledge or error is sent back to the sender enabling an
end-to-end verification of the transmission following a stop-and-go ARQ
scheme [197; 207]. To reduce the number of needed wires (e.g. to limit the
sizes of a flit and phit), we use single flit messages for request/acknowledge
and two flit messages for the other. Together with some general packaging
overhead, we can come up with the flit format as shown in Figure 5.8.
This figure shows that the packet and flit format allows serialising a flit as
multiple phits. For a router with a multiple stage pipeline, this serialisation
induces no or only a low additional latency for single flit packets when
the number of phits is smaller than the number of pipeline stages, as the
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subsequent phits can be transmitted while the head phit goes through the
pipeline stages (i.e. pipelining of phit transfer and processing in routers).
In general, the phit size could be selected even smaller. However, as soon
as the first phit does not contain all information needed for the routing, the
processing and transmission of phits cannot be fully pipelined. Hence, this
will lead to an additional delay.
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Figure 5.8: Control layer flit format.
The figure also shows the different data fields of a flit/phit. The NET and
FT (flit type) fields denote the flit and message kind. Together they distinguish
eight different message kinds as shown in Table 5.2. The meaning of certain
fields and the content depend on the message kind.
FT NET=0 NET=1
00 Request (single flit) ACK/NACK (single flit)
01 Handshake (single flit) Handshake (single flit)
10 Info (head flit) Config (head flit)
11 Info (tail flit) Config (tail flit)
Table 5.2: Control layer flit and message types.
The route is similar as for the data layer and stored in the hcnt, p1, c1, p0,
c0, and D fields. In contrast to the data layer, the control layer uses only two
runs and thus longer hop count fields (i.e. four instead of three bit). Hence,
there are only two possible paths between a sender and destination (i.e. XY
and YX routing). Additionally, to the route, we have a NI field, denoting
whether the message is from/to the network interface (e.g. node) or the router
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itself. As soon as the destination is reached (e.g. the port/direction field
points to a local port), the NI field is checked.
The PAR field is a parity bit for simple error checking of the header (or
of the flit type for tail flits) similar as for the data layer (cf. Section 5.3.2).
Next to the simple check of the header, an additional CRC is used for end-to-
end flit-level error checking. The control layer provides 6 bit for a CRC-6
covering header and payload. The CRC-6 allows a hamming distance of
three for the 52 bit of data assuming low, constant random independent bit
error rate (BER) [116].
The TYP field denotes for a response packet, if its an ACK or NACK. For
a request packet it denotes whether the request is a write or read access.
The payload then carries the additional information needed for the various
protocol steps/messages. The actual payload varies based on the selected
protocol [122; 125; 223]. In a single flit packet there is a 16 bit payload,
accounting, for example, for a 12 bit bit destination address and the remainder
for additional information (e.g. the requested load) or a scenario id [122; 125;
223]. For handshaking and error handling of the control messages (FT = 01)
the payload contains the destination address of the received message (as an
identifier of the message) and a bit denoting if the messages was received
correctly or not. Due to the route encoding, the sender of a request can
be identified by the source port field (S) and the route (cf. Section 5.3.2).
However, if the header of a control message is erroneous, the sender cannot
be identified correctly. In this case, the receiving interface must notify a
higher level protocol or the sender must implement a timeout to recognize a
lost request or response.
Router and Link Design
The control layer needs no virtual channels, uses small packets (i.e. one or
two flits per packet), and has a low load. These properties allow to use a less
complex router compared to the data layer.
As there are no virtual channels, the router has only a two stage pipeline
with a combined route computation (RC) and switch access (SA) stage and a
switch traversal (ST) stage. Additionally, there are no multiplexers between
the input and the crossbar, but the input buffers are directly connected to
it, simplifying the arbitration. Similar as for the data layer, the port for the
current router of a flit was already computed at the previous router or the
sending NI. During the RC stage, the router adapts the hop count field and,
if necessary, rotates the route fields for the next hop. As the control layer has
no virtual channels there is the possibility for a protocol deadlock for certain
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protocols [122; 125; 223]. An example for such a deadlock is a cooperative,
exclusive access protocol, where a sender has to release the resource before
the next sender can get access. In such a design, it must be guaranteed
that release messages will always arrive at the resource manager (or other
clients). Hence, the requests and releases should not experience high backlog
at the resource manager (or clients), such that the blocking propagates to the
network. For this, the backlog of requests can be formally derived and the
buffer sizes (at the RM or clients) set accordingly (e.g. using the analysis
from Section 3.4). To prevent such unfavourable designed systems, the
control might supply additional virtual channels or bypass channels/buffers
for certain message kinds.
To save area and power, the router uses single flit buffers. While this can
potentially lead to the case where a packet is split across multiple routers
when contention occurs, the low load of the control layer makes this scenario
rare and diminishes the problem of blocking propagation. The link width
equals the phit width, where each flit has two phits as already shown in
Figure 5.8.
Next to the mentioned basic router parts, the control router has an addi-
tional interface to the routers of the data layer. This interface helps to monitor
and control the data layer routers (cf. Section 5.3.2). Through this interface,
the control layer can access and modify all configuration parameters of a
router and also remove flits from the queues (e.g. flushing blocked ports).
Additional, the NoC-RM or higher level software can collect monitoring
information on the occurred errors, load of a port, and potentially blocked
queues through this interface. This information can then be used by the
NoC-RM to adapt routes (e.g. for load balancing or fault tolerance).
5.3.4 Network Interface
The network interface (NI) connects the computing blocks or nodes to the
network routers. It is responsible for packaging of any requests into a NoC
compatible format and sending it over the NoC. It also isolates the nodes
from the network and provides admission and rate control and, thus, provides
the client interfaces for the control layer. Figure 5.10 shows a high level
block diagram of the NI of the proposed architecture. In the figure, red
blocks denote parts that are added or extended to a typical NI to support the
control layer. In the NI we can differentiate between up to three layers. The
first layer translates the local node protocol to the internal NI protocol. That
way the NI internals are independent of the actual implementation of the
node. The second layer comprises the functions of the NI, which includes the
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Figure 5.9: Router architecture of the control layer.
packaging of messages in packets and flits, as well as control and monitoring
functions. And the third layer is the output stage to the network on chip. For
a simple NI it only contains buffers for the communication with the NoC. In
more complex designs, it might also contain components for clock domain
crossing and an additional protocol translation if the NoC and NI format
differ (e.g. to adapt different link widths).
Between the different architectures of the control layer the NI mainly
differs in the number of physical output channels, i.e., if the control layer is
connected to an own physical channel or a virtual channel of the data layer.
In the following we provide details on the individual components of the NI.
Packetization
The packetization and routing converts the messages of a node to packets
and flits. For this, there is an address translation and routing based on an
address translation table. Figure 5.11 shows an example for such a table. A
local (physical) address is converted into a remote address (e.g. on another
processing core) using a pre-defined route through the network. The route
includes the path and virtual channel. Additionally, the table has control
fields denoting if the node has write or read access to the accessed address.
This basic table is extended by entries for the control layer. For each entry,
there are fields denoting if the requests needs to be synchronized by the
control layer (Sync?) and if it was already granted (Ack?). This can be further
extended by a throughput field (BW) denoting the required throughput. To
achieve a low overhead for the control messages, an ID field is added for
the control layer. This ID can be used by the control unit to distinguish
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certain scenarios the sending node belongs to. It can be used, for example, to
only transmit the ID to the resource manager (or other clients) instead of the
destination address and other requirements. Basically, it compresses the local
address, route, remote address and optionally the throughput requirement
to identify a request. Additionally, the settings for the rate control can be
stored in the table. That way, the NI can locally reprogram the rate control
for already acknowledged destinations. These fields can be merged with the
control unit or global state. In such a case, only an identifier needs to be
stored to index the other tables. In simple scenarios this identifier might just
be the route, remote address, and potentially the local address. Hence, no
extensions to the basic address translation would be needed.
The table can be modified by the control unit. This can be done based on
received control messages (e.g. from a supervisor node, resource manager, or
software running on the node) or on monitoring events. These modifications
can be done during the run-time, allowing the system to adapt to changes (e.g.
new applications, faulty network paths). During design time, the designer
decides which components are allowed to issue such (re-) configuration
messages to the control module and if this list can be changed during run-
time and by whom.
If there is an access to an address, which is not present in the table, the
access is reported and the control unit can directly block or drop the access
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Figure 5.11: Address translation table of the NI.
or send a message to a supervisor node or the resource manager to request
the entry or desired action.
Depacketization
The depacketization translates the (incoming) network packets to the NI
protocol and forwards the data to the corresponding module. This module
also contains simple error checking and firewall mechanisms.
The error checking is done on flit level, e.g., by parity bits and a CRC
check (cf. Section 5.3.2). The parity bit is a simple check for the packet
header and is also used by the router for a quick detection of 1-bit errors.
The CRC check covers the whole flits, including header and payload. That
way it can detect misrouted or corrupted flits. It also includes a check for
the (sequence) counter in the flits, verifying if the counter was incremented
correctly. That way, the NI can check, for example, for the correct sequence
of data or flit loss.
Additionally, the depacketization module contains a table containing a list
of possible senders and their access rights (similar to the address translation
table). If an access is not allowed by the table (e.g. wrong access type or
unknown sender), an error is reported to the control unit (via the monitoring).
Based on the decision of the control unit, the erroneous packet can be dropped
(silently), rejected (non-silently), or forwarded to the local node. The content
of this table can be modified through the control unit, similar as for the
address translation table.
Rate Limiter
The rate limiter can enforce a maximum rate with which the local node can
emit traffic to the network. In the baseline design it is a simple token bucket
shaper [153; 216]. However, other design are also possible as, for example,
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dynamic counters or l-repetitive functions [133; 160; 161; 217]. Note, if
more complex rate limiting mechanisms are used, the tables containing the
allowed rates and the control messages might need to be extended. The rate
limiter can be modified by the control unit during run-time. That way, the
system can adapt to changed conditions and enforce the assumed rates for
the scenario selected by the control layer.
NoC-RM Client
The NoC-RM client comprises the different modules needed for the control
layer. It consists of two modules: a monitoring module to collect local
information and a control module implementing the NoC-RM protocol and
controlling the other modules in the network interface.
The monitoring module enables the control unit to monitor the actions
of the other modules. For the NoC-RM, its main function is to monitor the
packetization module and recognize accesses of the node to the NoC. When
the node accesses the address translation table with a local address and the
requests requires a synchronization (Sync? = 1) and is not acknowledged
(Ack? = 0), the request is intercepted and forwarded to the control module.
This information is then used by the control module to detect outgoing
transmissions and, if necessary, conduct the global resource management.
Next to this basic functioning, the monitoring module was extended to
provide further information to the control module and the NoC-RM. For this,
the configuration messages of the control layer can be used to configure a
trigger value in the monitoring module or to request the current state of a
certain value. While the latter corresponds to a simple read of the state, the
former can be used to automatically generate information messages when
a threshold is reached. In the current design, three monitors are supported.
First, the monitor can be used to check the fill level of the output buffer.
With this information, the NoC-RM protocol can check if the NoC accepts
sufficient throughput. For this, the monitor can generate a notification when
buffer overflow occurs to inform the higher level protocol (e.g. the resource
manager). Similarly, the monitor can be enabled to send a notification when
the depacketization and error checking module observes an erroneous flits.
This way, the NoC-RM can use the end-to-end flit level CRC to detect
corrupted links. And finally, the monitor can check for buffer overflow of
the input buffer. If the input buffer overflows a notification can be generated.
This information can be used to detect a malfunctioning node that no longer
accepts incoming messages. In such a case, the NoC-RM protocol might
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decide to exclude the malfunctioning node from the network by denying
futures accesses to it.
The control module is responsible for basic control functions (e.g. config-
uring the address translation tables) and the logic for the control layer. This
includes the negotiation of access through the control layer, re-configuring of
the local parameters (e.g. rate-limiting), and notifying the resource manager
(or other senders) when a transmission has finished. Based on accesses to the
network by the node, the control unit emits request messages via the control
layer. For example, it asks the resource manager or other clients, if a new
connection is allowed, what setting for the rate limiter should be used, and
which route should be selected [122; 125; 223].
The working of the control module depends on the selected architecture
(i.e. centralized or decentralized approach) and the protocol. When a sender
tries to access the NoC (i.e. access to the packetization module / address trans-
lation table), the NoC-RM client will detect and intercept the request. Based
on the accessed destination and an optional identifier the client identifies the
request (i.e. transmission). For each transmission requiring synchronization
the current state of the needed resources is stored in a table at the client (or
in the address translation table). For a centralized approach this is only be
a allowed or not allowed (i.e. the ACK field in Figure 5.11) together with a
value for the rate limiter. For the decentralized approach, the tables stores the
state of each required resources (e.g. current reserved load of each router on
the path). Hence, the amount of information stored strongly depends on the
version of the implemented protocol. The size of the table depends directly
on the number of different connections and their parameters (connection
settings and system modes) as well as the number of senders that require
synchronization. Hence, there is a trade-off between a fine-grained control
for improving performance and the necessary resources for the control layer
(e.g. size of the state tables).
If a negotiation (with a RM or other clients) is necessary, the control
module generates the corresponding protocol messages and delays the inter-
cepted network access until the negotiation is finished. Additionally, due to
changes of the system state, re-configuration or status update messages can
arrive at the control module. These are used to update the local state table
and possibly to change the settings of the rate limiter, monitoring module, or
delaying of further accesses.
Figures 5.12 to 5.14 show block diagrams for the architecture of the
resource manager module, the client for the centralized approach, and the
client for the decentralized approach.
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Figure 5.12 shows the resource manager (RM) module for the centralized
approach. If the RM is implemented as a dedicated node, this figure amplifies
the control modules of the network interface (for the RM). The RM mainly
consists of three modules and some memory to store requests and the system
state. The pre-processing and validation module checks if a request is valid.
Additionally, it can be used to filter out requests of a sender. That is, if the
control layer protocol supports to gradually increase the requested load of a
network node, it can remove unnecessary requests from the request queue.
For example, if a node first requests 10 % of link load followed by a request
for 20 % load (before the first one is selected), the RM can safely switch
to the 20 % case without reconfiguring the system for the 10 % case. This
filtering of messages strongly depends on the used protocol and might not be
allowed for all cases. The decision on this is made by the system designer
during the design of the protocol. Valid requests are then stored in a request
queue. This also includes release messages of resources. From the request
queue, the request scheduling selects the next mode for the system account-
ing for the current global state. For this, different scheduling mechanisms
and other constraints can be implemented as discussed in [122; 125; 230].
If the next mode is selected, it is forwarded to the configuration message
generator. This module generates the needed configuration messages for the
whole system and emits them. All modules can be implemented in software,
hardware, or a co-design. However, a reasonable choice seems to be to im-
plement the configuration message generator as a hardware accelerator and
the other modules as software on a basic processor or specialized processing
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core. That way, the configuration message generator can generate the config-
uration messages without high timing overhead (e.g. one message per cycle),
while the other modules allow an easy adaptation by the system designer or
programmer. Additionally, this design allows the request scheduling to derive
the next state while the configuration messages are generated in parallel.
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Figure 5.13: Client (centralized approach).
Figure 5.13 shows the client module for the centralized approach. The
figure amplifies the control modules of the network interface for a client
node using the centralized control layer. As the main logic is handled by the
resource manager, the client module is simple. The client mainly consists of
three modules and some memory to store the state. There are three events
that can trigger the client module: a local monitoring event, an arriving
configuration message, and an access (including releases of the local node).
If a monitoring event arrives, it is processed together with the current state.
The processing unit decides, if the monitoring event needs to be reported to
the resource manager. If so, it generates a request message. Otherwise only
the state is updated. When the client receives a configuration messages, it
triggers a reconfiguration of the local network interface and updates the state.
If the local node is doing an access that needs synchronisation, the client
traps the access (e.g. the address translation table delays it) and generates a
request to the resource manager. After the resource manager has processed
the request, it replies with an acknowledge or configuration messages. As
soon as these arrive (as a configuration message) at the client, it reconfigures
the NI, i.e., it unblocks the access in the address translation table and, if
necessary, programs the rate limiter.
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Figure 5.14 shows the client module for the decentralized approach. The
figure amplifies the control modules of the network interface for a client node
using the decentralized control layer. As there is no centralized unit, multiple
clients have to conduct a distributed scheduling and decision-making protocol
to select the next valid state. The client mainly consists of three modules
and some memory to store requests and the state. There are three events that
can trigger the client module: a local monitoring event, an arriving remotes
request or configuration message, and a local access (including releases
of the local node). All events are stored in the request queue and the state
module. For remote requests there is a validation to check if a request is valid.
Based on the request queue and the state, the client conducts a distributed
scheduling and decision-making protocol with other involved clients. For
this, it possibly exchanges multiple messages with other clients. As soon as
all clients agree on a new state, all needed clients reconfigure their NI [122;
125; 223].
The presented control modules are examples for the general architecture
of these modules. The actual protocol and working, and thus the needed
messages and actions by the control layer are defined by the designer [122;
125; 223]. Hence, the actions (e.g. number of messages exchanged between
the clients or between a client and the RM) can vary between different
designs. However, the presented designs cover a broad range of different
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protocols, e.g., all protocols presented in [122; 125; 223], as the main logic
is done through the (SW) protocol and not fixed hardware components.
Buffers
The input and output buffer of the NI mainly buffer NoC packets (e.g. flits)
to relief the other NI modules from low level and physical layer NoC access
handling. Additionally, they can be used for clock domain crossing and
protocol translation, when the NI internal communication uses a different
(physical or logical) protocol than the NoC. The buffers have an interface to
the monitoring module and the output buffer has an additional interface to
the control unit. Using this interface, the control unit can delete data from
the output buffer and inject own data packets.
Protocol Adapter
For the connection to the local node, the NI has two protocol adapters (NI
to X and X to NI). These translate between the node protocol (e.g. AMBA)
and the NI internal protocol. That way, the NI internals can be designed
independent from the actual node design. If the node, or more precisely
its communication protocol, changes, only the protocol adapters need to be
adapted.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter we presented a NoC architecture that provides support for
the NoC-RM. It provides two networks, one for the data layer and one for
the control layer. For the data layer it uses a NoC with virtual channels
supporting up to four priorities. The virtual channel assignment is fixed from
sender to destination, i.e., the virtual channel (VC) is not changed in the
network routers. The control layer can be used to adapt the VC used by a
network node or traffic stream during run-time. For this, the control layer
can adapt the address translation table (e.g. routing table) insides the network
interfaces. The architecture uses a dedicated interconnect for the control
layer to isolate the control and data messages from each other. This way, the
control messages do not contribute additional interference to the data layer,
which might limit the benefits of the NoC-RM. The control interconnect uses
a NoC that is optimized to the control layer protocol. Hence, the size of
the routers and the link width is smaller than for the data layer. With this,
the proposed architecture for the control layer solves the requirements from
Section 5.2. That is, the dedicated interconnect provides a low latency for
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the control messages and avoids direct interference with the traffic on the
data layer.
Besides the transmission of the control messages, the control layer ar-
chitecture supports additional interfaces to the data layer. These are used
to monitor and supervise the data layer routers. With this information, the
control layer can efficiently adapt the system to changes and errors.

 6. Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the network-on-chip (NoC) architecture supporting
the NoC-RM from Chapter 5 against other architectures. For this, we first
evaluate the performance of the presented architecture using different control
protocols against a classic prioritization scheme and a virtual channel based
control layer using a network simulation. This is followed by an overview on
the estimated hardware overhead of the control layer. The chapter is partially
based on the work published in [223].
6.1 Simulation Framework
The simulation based evaluation is carried out with the OMNeT++ event-
based simulation framework and the HNOCS library [12; 32; 226; 227]. In
the experiments we compare a standard priority based NoC with a 2D mesh
topology and virtual channels (VCs) against the proposed architecture for
a decentralized NoC-RM approach from Section 5.3. An evaluation of a
centralized architecture can be found in [122; 230]. The standard network
uses wormhole switching where a data packet consists of eight flits. The
network routers support a two stage priority-based arbitration and use a
4-cycle pipeline. For all architectures, we use a XY source routing scheme
as a baseline for the path allocation. The buffer depth for each input VC
corresponds to two flits. Additionally, we assume a 1-cycle link traversal.
The interconnect frequency is set to 500 MHz. For the network traffic, we
use memory transfers since memories are frequently a common hot spot
module in MPSoCs [171; 172].
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6.1.1 QoS Schemes
For the evaluation, we consider different distributed protocols of the control
layer: an exclusive access protocol for temporal isolation (TIS), adaptive
load distribution (ALD) of BE senders [121], and three extensions of ALD.
These extensions also allow throttling of BE (SALDT and FALDT) as well
as to adapt the path of safety critical senders (selective congestion control,
SCC) [223]. The protocols are compared against each other and against
prioritization done locally in routers (SP), see Section 2.2. The SP approach
uses two different priorities in routers and hence two virtual channels. In
general the SP scheme allows as many priorities as virtual channels exist. On
the contrary, the approaches applying the control layer support more priorities
than available VCs. Therefore, the control layer can decrease production
costs and power consumption for system that need multiple priority levels.
An evaluation of centralized protocols for the control layer was presented by
Kostrzewa [122].
Exclusive Access (TIS)
Temporal isolation (TIS) is realized using a work-conserving scheduling
based on priorities as proposed by Kostrzewa et al. [119]. For this, each
synchronisation scenario has a unique token assigned. Tokens are control
messages deciding about who may currently use a resource. To achieve
that, they are constantly circulating between all clients controlling which
senders are active in the particular synchronisation scenario. Hence, in a
typical design, the clients form a logical token ring, but other topologies
such as a star topology are possible. To forward the token, a client knows
the address of the next sender in the synchronization scenario. The order
as well as the mapping of the senders on the network nodes is prepared and
calculated offline and given by the synchronisation scenario. It is static at
runtime to preserve safety and predictability of the mechanism. During the
platform boot-up, one specially delegated client per token is starting the
token exchange. Only the sender running on the node with the client who
currently possesses the token may actively use the supervised resource. If
the sender will issue an access to the resource and the token is not present,
the access will be blocked and stored by the client. As soon as the token will
arrive the access will be resumed and the communication granted. If a client
will receive the token and there is no request from the sender, it forwards it
to the next candidate. In a situation where no sender has to transmit data, a
monitoring mechanism should prevent the clients from forwarding the token
too frequently or the design must ensure that this situation cannot occur.
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Adaptive Load Distribution for BE (ALD)
Adaptive load distribution (ALD), i.e., the detouring of BE, was introduced
by Kostrzewa et al. [121]. In this scheme, we apply a static path allocation to
SC traffic, whereas BE traffic can choose from multiple paths to improve its
latency. Whenever the network is free, BE traffic is allowed to use the optimal
(e.g. shortest) path to its destination, even if it overlaps with links used by
critical (SC) senders. Upon activation of a SC sender, we release the needed
network resources by redirecting the BE transmissions to an alternative route.
Hence, BE senders use detoured paths (e.g. possibly non-optimal routes)
only when critical senders are actively using shared network resources.
To arbitrate predictably within sets of interfering senders, we statically
assign a set of paths for each BE application with any available allocation
method (e.g. [16; 72]). The set of possible paths for a BE sender does not
change during runtime. In principle there are no limitations in the selection
of alternative routes, besides the rule that, if a link in the path is shared with
a SC sender, this sender must be capable of accepting the additional protocol
overhead. However, if all paths of a BE sender are shared with SCs and all
SCs are active then the BE sender will be blocked by the client similarly to
the temporal isolation protocol. Additionally, a detoured path should not
induce more overhead to BE transmissions than the (full) blocking during a
SC transmission will. Otherwise, waiting for the SC transmission to finish
(e.g. temporal isolation) is more efficient, than using the detoured path.
Each sender is equipped with a client interface supervising the accesses
to the network (cf. Section 5.3.4, Figure 5.14). The client stores a table
containing the current state, similar to the example in Table 6.1. It contains for
each set of interfering SC senders a list with senders that are currently active
(left) describing the state of the system. Upon beginning and termination of
a transmission, the client of a SC sender sends control messages to all clients
of interfering BE senders: actMsg (SC activation), relMsg (SC release).
These messages propagate the NoC state defined by the currently active
SC applications and determine the most suitable paths for the BE senders.
After receiving these messages, the corresponding paths (used by SC) are
blocked or released for BE transmissions. After each mode change, the BE
sender will use the best (e.g. shortest) path available, i.e., a path without any
active SC sender. In the example from Table 6.1 this is realized with a bit
vector (array) where the position of the bit identifies a specific sender and
its value the sender’s state (active or disabled). This state then defines the
routes that the BE sender must take (right) or if it is not allowed to send in
the current state (e.g. none for the route). This table is stored in the system
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Table 6.1: Scenarios stored at each BE sender for ALD.
Dest / ID Active SCs Used Route
0xAC1234 000 Route_1
0xAC1234 001 Route_2
. . . . . . . . .
0xAC1234 111 none
state table of the network interface (NI) and used to update the route of the
address translation table (cf. Section 5.3.4). On the reception of a actMsg or
relMsg message, the client updates the state. Figure 6.1 presents a simplified
workflow of this protocol (used also for the mechanisms in the following
sections). Actions are divided w.r.t. the criticality of the sender (SC and BE)
along with messages causing mode transitions.
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Figure 6.1: Simplified state update protocol.
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Finally, to preserve predictability (i.e. provide sufficient isolation) of
safety-critical (SC) senders, we must account for the delay resulting from
time necessary to deliver control messages to BE senders and for the packets
from BE transmissions to leave the interconnect on the selected path (i.e. the
mode change delay). That is, for example, if a SC sender requires exclusive
access, its client will send a message to all interfering BE nodes. The clients
of the BE nodes will then adapt the routing table of the network interface
and re-route the BE traffic or delay further network accesses. However, there
can still be networks packets of such a sender inside the network using the
old route. Hence, to avoid head of line blocking between BE and SC traffic
or an overload, the SC sender has to wait until the BE packets have left the
shared path. For the error free case this mode change delay tmodeChange can
be upper bounded by:
tmodeChange =Injctrl (|BE(h)|)+ max∀ j∈BE(h)
(
∑
k∈Tasks(Pc(i→ j))
R+,ctrlk
)
+max
(
max
∀ j∈BE(h)
(
∑
k∈Tasks(Pc( j→i))
R+,ctrlk
)
,
treconfigure + max∀ j∈BE(h)
(
∑
k∈Tasks(P( j))
R+,pktk
))
, (6.1)
where BE(h) is the set of BE senders sharing same path with the SC sender;
|BE(h)| denotes the number of BE senders sharing same path with the SC
sender; treconfigure denotes the time of the client to reconfigure the network
interface; C+j,ctrl denotes the maximum latency of the control message to the
BE sender j; C+i,pkt denotes the maximum latency of a single packet belonging
to the BE sender j; Injctrl(m) is the time to inject m control messages including
de/packetization overhead; Tasks(p) denotes the set of all tasks of path p (i.e.
one per hop); P( j) denotes the path of a stream j; and Pc(i→ j) denotes the
path of control messages from node i to node j. In the equation the first term
accounts for the time to inject the control messages. This is followed by the
maximum worst-case response time of the control message to any BE sender
using the shared path (derived by the analysis of Section 3.4). After receiving
a control message, the client of the BE node sends an acknowledge to the
SC node. In parallel, the client of the BE node reconfigures the network
interface (treconfigure). After the reconfiguration, we need to account for the
maximum worst-case latency of the BE senders (derived by the analysis of
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Section 3.4), such that all traffic of the BE nodes must have left the network.
As the acknowledge happens in parallel to the reconfiguration and depletion
of the BE packets, we only need to account for maximum of both.
Such overhead is often acceptable as SC senders have available time
budget between the worst-case transmission latency and the deadline of a
transmission (cf. Chapter 4). Safety critical senders usually have no advan-
tage in finishing earlier than the deadline [119; 201; 217]. This allows a
trade-off analysis for providing estimation of the overhead resulting from the
global arbitration [223].
Adding Throttling of BE Senders
While the simple detouring of BE traffic can increase the performance for BE
senders (cf. [121]), it does not account for the actual workload in the network.
In many applications, the amount data, which needs to be transmitted, may
vary during runtime and the state of the system, e.g., video processing as
used in automated driving systems. Hence, the inter-arrival time between
packets and the resulting load on the shared links can vary, such that it is not
always necessary to fully avoid the interference between SC and BE. This
enables to divide the behaviour of SC senders in different modes [44; 103;
157; 158; 159; 238]. For each mode, we can derive different upper bounds
on the amount of traffic a BE sender is allowed to induce to shared links,
without jeopardizing the requirements of SC senders. This value can be also
equal to zero, effectively detouring or blocking BE senders, leading to the
same behaviour as for ALD. Additionally, as the SC sender has slack and
allows some interference (e.g. by the introduced protocol or BE traffic), it
might share a path with BE traffic, as long as the BE senders are not inducing
too much traffic (high interference). Hence, instead of detouring BE traffic
every time a SC sender uses a path, a more suitable solution is to detour BE
traffic only, if the interference on the shared links is too high. For doing this,
we do not remove the shared path from the set of allowed paths for a BE
sender as soon as an SC sender accesses it, but instead provide the clients of
the BE senders with information about the maximum allowed (BE) load on
the path. Then, the client of a BE sender can decide, if a detoured or throttled
path will lead to a better performance and select the appropriate path.
For this mechanism, we differentiate two approaches on finding the cur-
rent optimal path for a BE sender: a semi-adaptive approach, reducing the
overhead of the needed synchronization, and a fully adaptive approach, opti-
mizing the performance while at the same time increasing the synchronization
overhead.
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Table 6.2: Scenarios stored at each BE sender for SALDT.
Dest / ID State of SCs Used Route Rate Limit
0xAC1234 000 Route_1 100%
0xAC1234 00A Route_1 60%
0xAC1234 00B Route_2 100%
0xAC1234 0A0 Route_2 100%
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0xAC1234 AA0 Route_2 40%
0xAC1234 AAA none 0%
For the semi-adaptive approach (SALDT) we extend the synchronization
scenario from ALD with a performance indicator, based on the allowed load.
Table 6.2 shows an example for this. Based on the different modes (i.e.
requirements) of the SC senders in a synchronization scenario, we define
the optimal assignment for BE senders. That is, instead of detouring all BE
senders, we define which BE sender will use the throttled path (shared with
SC traffic) and which must use a detoured path. This is done offline, based
on the known worst-case requirements of SC senders in the different modes
and the mapping. However, if BE and SC senders concurrently share the
same link, it must be guaranteed that BE traffic never exceeds the allowed
load. For this, the table contains the maximum allowed load for the sender
in each mode. The traffic shapers will then be adapted by the client to the
currently maximum allowed value (e.g. the rate limit). Alternatively, the
worst-case behaviour of BE senders must be known beforehand (assessed
offline) and known to be feasible. In that case, no rate limiters are needed.
With the known assignments, we then extend the control message of SC
senders to either detour or throttle a BE sender. That is, instead of sending
a simple activation notification, SC now informs BE senders on the actual
required throughput. Consequently, a BE sender must store the allowed
route and maximum allowed throughput of this route for each state of the
synchronization scenario. The state is now not only defined by a set of active
senders but also in which mode the senders are (denoted by A, B, . . . in the
table). The BE sender (i.e. its client) then can check if there is a path with
sufficient available throughput and if not, whether it is more beneficial to
take a rate limited path or to be blocked. However, the table shows that this
additional information increases the size of the data stored in the NI.
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Table 6.3: Scenarios stored at each BE sender for FALDT.
Dest / ID Route Available Throughput
0xAC1234 Route_1 90%
0xAC1234 Route_2 35%
0xAC1234 Route_3 70%
. . . . . . . . .
The fully adaptive approach (FALDT) enables to also account for the
actual behaviour of the BE senders in the system at runtime. For this, we
extend the synchronization protocol by adding two messages between BE
senders: a release message relMsg, which is the same as for SC senders
but now denotes that a BE sender is not using a path any more, and an
information message infMsg announcing the currently used path and the
requested load on this path (cf. Table 6.4). With this additional information, a
client knows the maximum BE load the SC senders allow in a synchronization
scenario (from actMsg) and how much load of this is used by other BE
senders (from infMsg). This allows the client to choose the path with the
current optimal performance for BE senders. Hence, BE traffic will only be
detoured or slowed down when necessary, improving its overall performance.
Additionally, as now only the state of the allowed paths has to be stored
(instead of each possible combination of active senders and their modes), the
size of the stored information can be reduced (cf. Table 6.3).
Detouring of SC
So far a safety-critical (SC) sender was constrained to use a single static
path. However, in a system there can exist multiple possible paths for safety-
critical senders. The approaches, introduced before, solely use the available
time budget of SC senders to conduct the synchronization, i.e., throttling
or detouring of BE senders, between SC and BE senders on shared paths.
Another option is, to also assign alternative, possibly not optimal, paths to
SC senders. In such a scenario, a SC sender will use the shortest path when
it is free (similar to the case of BE traffic in the ALD approach). This is
done, to reduce the time SC traffic spends inside the network and to reduce
the possibility for interference with other senders. If a BE or SC sender tries
to access the shared path, the client of the SC sender will check if it can
use a detoured path on which still all requirements of the SC sender can be
satisfied. If such a path exists, the client of the SC sender will configure
6.1 Simulation Framework 175
the SC sender to use the detoured path to allow BE traffic to use its shortest
path and improve its performance. Otherwise, it will perform a detouring or
throttling of BE senders as before. Hence, the client of a SC sender now also
stores the system state. However, instead of being blocked, when no path
with sufficient throughput is available, it will free a path, i.e., detour or block
BE traffic (cf. Figure 6.1).
For this mechanism we further extend the synchronization protocol,
leading to a selective congestion control (SCC) combining the previous
mechanisms and detouring of SC traffic. The clients of the BE senders
inform the clients of the SC senders in a synchronization scenario about
their current state (i.e. network usage) via the infMsg. Hence, based on the
received messages the client of a SC sender knows about the current state
of the shared paths. If a SC sender wants to initiate a transmission, the
client first checks for the optimal path. In this sense, an optimal path is a
path, on which all requirements of the SC sender can be satisfied and all BE
senders in the synchronization scenario achieve the best performance. For
simplicity, we define the performance of BE traffic based on the maximum
link utilization. Hence, the SC sender will take the path that minimizes the
maximum link load (for the BE senders). The decision of the SC client
can also include a detouring or throttling of one or multiple BE senders, as
introduced before.
On the other hand, if a BE sender wants to start a transmission or changes
its requirements (e.g. requested throughput), its client will select the appro-
priate path based on the current state. At the same time, the client releases a
infMsg to the other nodes in the synchronization scenario. Upon receiving
this message, a SC client might then re-evaluate the best path assignments
and send new actMsg/infMsg messages to all involved BE clients. This leads
to a re-configuration of the current state based on the pre-defined paths to
optimize the performance of BE senders.
With this, we can summarize the different protocol messages for the ap-
proaches as shown in Table 6.4. The table shows for the different approaches
(left) which client (BE or SC) is issuing the control messages (top) and to
whom. The table shows that with an increased amount of information the
approaches use to optimize the performance, the protocol overhead (e.g. the
number of messages that must be exchanged) also increases. Depending on
the implementation of the control layer, these protocol messages may also
introduce temporal overhead (e.g. synchronization time and possibly addi-
tional interference in the network). To reduce the overhead of the infMsgs of
all BE senders, BE senders might only emit control messages, when there
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Table 6.4: Overview on the control layer protocol messages.
actMsg relMsg infMsg
content active inactive requestedthroughput
ALD SC to BE SC to BE —
SALDT — SC to BE SC to BE
FALDT — SC to BEBE to BE
SC to BE
BE to BE
SCC —
SC to BE
BE to BE
SC to SC
SC to BE
SC to SC
BE to BE
BE to SC
is a significant change in its requirements. That is, it will not emit synchro-
nization messages for each packet but, for example, only for mode changes
or DMA transfers which lead to temporary different requirements towards
the network. For a general purpose application, which is fully unknown,
this might lead to the case, that this application might only send a protocol
message if it is activated or not send any at all to reduce the overhead.
6.1.2 Use case
For the experiments, we modelled the safety-critical (SC) traffic after the
real-time multimedia application performing video noise reduction as shown
in Figure 6.2 [47]. This functionality is decomposed into three communi-
cating tasks (T1–T3). We assume the input data to arrive via an Ethernet
port (ETH0). The use case is mapped to a 4×4 NoC with the data-flow
and mapping presented in Figure 6.3 and Table 6.5. In this use case, new
data (i.e. frames) will arrive at the Ethernet port and must be forwarded
immediately to the memory, to prevent a buffer overflow at the Ethernet port,
i.e., package dropping. Each SC module is modelled with a traffic generator
conducting 8 kB long DMA transfers, allowing to maximize the benefit from
DDRAM3 2133N [9]. Transmissions are performed periodically and periods
are calculated based solely on the required bandwidth including some jitter
(15 % of the period) due to the data-dependent execution (video frames).
We distribute the SC traffic between the DRAM ports due to the conflicting
temporal (throughput) requirements and pipelining of the data processing.
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Figure 6.2: Example real-time video noise reduction application [47].
Additionally, to the SC traffic, several best-effort (BE) tasks are mapped
on the remaining nodes in the system. These BE senders are modelled with
the CHSTONE benchmark. The traces of the benchmarks are extracted
using the Gem5 simulator on an ARMv7-a core with a 32 kB L1 cache and
64 B long cache-line, standard GCC compiler (v4.7.3). For each trace we
identified up to two different modes of the application, based on the distance
of memory accesses (cf. Figures 6.10 and 6.11).
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BE BE BEBE
Figure 6.3: Experimental setup with communication demands of SC tasks in
MB/s for 1080p resolution and 40 fps (left) and mapping (right).
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Table 6.5: DDR port mapping for the use case.
Port Reader Writer
0 T1, T2, BE11, BE12 ETH0, BE11, BE12
1
BE2, BE7, BE8,
BE9, BE13
BE2, BE7, BE8,
BE9, BE13
2 T3, BE4, BE14 T2, T3, BE4, BE14
For the different approaches we followed baseline configuration schemes,
without any optimizations. The overhead against the time budget was con-
firmed with the formal analysis from Section 3.4 done in the PyCPA frame-
work [62] and hence permitted the usage of the control layer. In the case of
the priority based (SP) approach, we always provide the SC traffic with a
higher priority than BE traffic, so that BE traffic is preempted in the routers,
as soon as there is any pending SC data stream. Following this scheme, the
TIS approach avoids concurrent accesses of SC and BE senders to shared
parts of the network. Hence, on an activation of a SC sender, its client will
send a control message to all interfering BE nodes, blocking their network
access. This is relaxed by the ALD approach. Consequently, instead of
directly blocking BE senders, they are allowed to take the YX route to its
destination, if this path is free. The SALDT approach accounts for different
possible behaviours (runtime characteristics) of BE senders and allows a
single BE sender (randomly selected during design time for the experiments)
to concurrently share a path with SC traffic, as long as it stays below a certain
threshold. For this, the client of a SC sender sends the requested through-
put to each interfering BE node, which then calculates the remaining link
bandwidth for obtaining the threshold value. With FALDT, the clients of
the BE senders also exchange control messages with data about the current
link usages (occupancy). This information is used for dynamic selection of
BE senders, instead of static BE allocation as it was done in aforementioned
approaches. This allows an improved load distribution for BE traffic and,
therefore, higher utilization of the available network resources at runtime.
Consequently, multiple BE senders are allowed to concurrently share the
same path with SC traffic, as long as the accumulated interference stays
below a threshold. And finally, for the SCC approach, the SC senders also
receive the usage information of BE senders and dynamically decide, whether
to use the XY or YX route.
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6.2 Performance Results
Figure 6.4 presents the achieved results for a setup in which we use only
two virtual channels (VCs) of the priority based NoC (cf. Section 5.3.2).
The number of available VCs is restricted to two to increase the interference
between the different traffic streams. For the static prioritzation (SP), the
SC traffic was allocated on the high priority VC, whereas for the other
approaches, SC and BE senders were sharing the low priority VC and the
control layer was using the high priority VC. Hence, no additional hardware
in the network is needed for the control layer as it uses the existing data layer
to transmit the control messages. The figure shows Tukey boxplots of the
normalized latencies for the different nodes in the network for accesses to
the memory. For each run, the box covers 50 % of the latencies, with its
lower and upper borders giving the 25 % and 75 % quartiles. The whiskers
show the lowest (highest) value still within 1.5 of the inter-quartile range of
the lower (upper) quartile. The median and average among the measured
latencies are marked by a black bar and a red brick. For each of the nodes,
we generated 100 random sets of interfering workloads and normalized the
latency to the average latency when using SP.
It is visible, that TIS offers safety at the cost of decreased BE perfor-
mance (i.e. an increased latency) compared to the simple prioritization of SC
traffic. Only in a few cases (e.g. BE2 and BE8) it can slightly increase the
performance of BE senders. However, TIS can be used to implement more
priorities than available VCs. Hence, for systems with a restricted number
of virtual channels, the prioritization approach (SP) might not be possible.
With the allowance of alternate paths for BE traffic (ALD) we can reduce
the negative impact of the control layer in most cases (e.g. BE9 and BE7),
which strongly interfere with SC traffic. However, these alternate paths for
BE traffic also lead to an increase of the latency for other BE senders, as for
example BE4. This shows that the interdependencies between the different
streams and the control layer must be better accounted for when configuring
the approaches. As soon as we also account for the actual behaviour of BE
traffic, we can further decrease the latencies for BE senders. For some nodes,
e.g., BE2 and BE8, the additional information exchanged by BE senders that
is used for the optimization of the accesses to the network can even lead to
better results than the simple prioritization scheme.
For the same experiments, Figure 6.5 shows the results, when using two
dedicated physical channels as described in Section 5.3. In this case, the con-
trol messages are sent on an own physical channel and thus induce no (high
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priority) interference in the network to the other traffic (cf. Section 5.3.3).
Additionally, the data layer is only using a single (virtual) channel. In the
figure latencies are normalized to the case of using SP and virtual channels
and hence are in the same range as the results before. Compared to the
case when using virtual channels, we see a similar behaviour. The simple
approaches TIS and ALD increase the latency for BE traffic, while the other
can decrease it. Consequently, the improvement in the performance of BE
senders directly depends on the amount of information used by control layer
while making decisions. We can also see, that the latencies of BE senders are
a lower than in the previous case. This is due to the interference, which the
control messages are inducing into the network, when using virtual channels
and prioritization of control messages. Whenever these are sent on a VC
with a higher priority than BE traffic, they will additionally block BE traffic
and hence decrease the performance benefit in the designs using the control
layer. Figure 6.6 shows the average number of control messages exchanged
during the experiment. The figure presents the fraction of control messages
compared to the overall number of exchanged messages for the different
considered scenarios. In the figure, we can observe that the overhead is small
(5–6.5 %) and depends on the actually applied version of the protocol. As
expected, the control layer implementing FALDT and SCC protocols induce
higher number of control messages. This is due to the fact, that in these
approaches the BE nodes are also emitting control messages.
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Figure 6.4: Normalized end-to-end latencies using virtual channels.
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the normalized latencies (including queuing
delay at the source interface) for the BE senders BE7 and BE8 for various
configurations of the network architecture for a single experiment (e.g. a sin-
6.2 Performance Results 181
  
	








	















    
	

  
	

 ! "#$ !"#$ %"#$ !&&
Figure 6.5: Normalized end-to-end latencies using physical channels.
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Figure 6.6: Overhead of the control messages: percentage of control mes-
sages.
gle random set of interfering workload). In the figures, the upper part (write)
shows the latency from the computation node to the memory accounting
for write and read requests. The bottom part (read) denotes the latency of
the response (i.e. from the memory to the computation node). The figure
compares different network configurations using static priority (SP) and the
control layer with the temporal isolation (TIS) protocol and the selective
congestion control (SCC). For the SP case, the SC senders use their own
(higher priority) virtual channels whereas all BE traffic can use one, two or
four VCs. Additionally, different sizes for the input queues of the routers are
used with one, two, and eight flits as the buffer depth (denoted by Q in the
figure). For the control layer approaches, a leading V denotes the use of a
virtual control layer (i.e. sending the control messages on the highest priority
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VC) and P denotes the use of a dedicated control NoC. For the control layer
approaches, we differentiate the case where SC and BE senders use their
own virtual channels or are sharing the same set of VCs. The former case is
denoted as “x VC for BE” in the figure where x is the number of VCs that
BE traffic can use. The latter is denoted as “x shared VCs” where SC and
BE share x VCs.
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Figure 6.7: Normalized end-to-end latencies for BE7 for a single experiment
and different network configurations.
The figures confirm the results shown before. With an increased allowed
dynamic, the approaches can improve the performance of the best-effort
traffic. Another interesting observation is, that deeper buffers in the network
routers are more effective (for the BE performance) than increasing the
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Figure 6.8: Normalized end-to-end latencies for BE8 for a single experiment
and different network configurations.
number of virtual channels in the experiments. This effect results from the
number of BE senders and interference at the traffic sources (e.g. the memory
sending to different destinations). While an increased number of VCs can
compensate for some interference, the available channels are quickly used up.
As soon as no other channels are available, the flits of the packets get blocked.
With small input buffers this blocking propagates from the congestion point
up to the sender. Hence, the blocked packets blocks other traffic on multiple
routers. With an increased buffer depth, it is more likely that a blocked
packet fits into the network, such that not the whole path from the congestion
point to the sender is blocked. This effect is especially important for the
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memory. If the memory tries to emit data to the network but the network
channel is blocked, no further data can be emitted. The reason for this is, that
the memory only has a single send queue. Thus, if a packet is blocked on a
certain VC even traffic using another VC cannot be emitted. If the buffers in
the network are sufficiently deep to buffer a packet that gets blocked in the
network, the memory can still emit further packets using another VC.
Similar as shown before, TIS can lead to an increased latency for BE
traffic. For the BE7 node, TIS increases in the write latency in all cases
and the read latency in some cases. However, for BE8 TIS can decreases
the write latency and for some cases also the read latency. This shows that
even the conservative approach can help to improve the performance of the
system in some cases. Still, the effect strongly depends on the behaviour of
the network senders. The control layer protocols use the same configuration
for all random sets of interfering workload. Hence, the protocols are not
optimized towards the system including the BE workload. For a real system,
the behaviour of the BE senders will influence the control protocol and the
protocol (and the behaviour) will also affect the mapping of the BE senders.
Following this, SCC shows a better performance than TIS and a similar or
better performance than the static prioritization (SP). This is due to the fact,
that SCC partly accounts for the actual behaviour of the network traffic. Even
for cases where BE and SC senders are sharing a single virtual channel, the
performance is comparable to the SP case, where SC and BE senders are
using separate virtual channels. This shows that a global arbitration can help
to efficiently share a virtual channel and thus to reduce the number of needed
VCs. Still, the protocol and mapping are not optimized for the BE behaviour.
Comparing the different implementations of the control layer, we see that
using a dedicated control NoC can achieve a better performance than using
a high priority VC for the control messages. Together with the ability to
efficiently share a VC (e.g. to provide multiple priority levels and isolation
on a single VC) and the increased adaptability of the system when using the
control layer, a dedicated control NoC seems to be a reasonable choice.
Figure 6.9 presents the achieved results, where values consider both core
execution and network communication. The figure shows the overall time
of different benchmarks mapped to node BE8. This node is not sharing the
memory port with any SC traffic but can experience indirect blocking. Again,
the results are normalized to the case when using the prioritization scheme
(SP). The results show that the TIS and ALD approaches decrease the perfor-
mance for all benchmarks. This is due to the fact, that the control layer uses
some safety margins when controlling BE traffic. Additionally, the control
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messages have some latency when traversing the network. Hence, instead
of only being blocked by the transmissions of SC senders, some additional
blocking through the protocol overhead occurs. When accounting for the
actual load of the BE senders, the approaches can in average outperform the
protocol overhead. However, the achieved performance depends on the use
case and a few cases exists, where using the control layer is slower compared
to the prioritization scheme. Only the SCC approach allows to improve the
performance for all benchmarks. It allows to decrease the overall execution
time by up to 30 %. The improvements of the adaptive approaches, compared
for example to TIS, results from the different behaviour of the BE senders
(e.g. varying network load) that can be accounted for. Figures 6.10 and 6.11
show such behaviour for two exemplary benchmarks. The figures show the
distance between accesses to the network for 5000 accesses (read or write)
to the memory. As can be seen, there are areas where several consecutive
accesses have a high distance between each other (e.g. low load) and areas
where only a low distance (e.g. high load) exists. For static approaches, the
worst-case behaviour (e.g. assuming always the high load) must be accounted
for, leading to pessimism and, thus, reduced performance. Dynamic ap-
proaches, on the other hand, can account for the low load durations and allow
consecutive accesses of a (low load) BE sender and safety-critical traffic.
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Figure 6.9: Normalized execution time for various traces.
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Figure 6.10: Execution profile of the motion benchmark (distance between
consecutive accesses to the memory).
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Figure 6.11: Execution profile of the jpeg benchmark (distance between
consecutive accesses to the memory).
6.3 Synthesis Results
This section presents the hardware overhead of the control layer. The evalua-
tion of the hardware overhead was done using the IDAMC platform [216]
on a Virtex-6-LX760 Xilinx FPGA using Xilinx ISE 14.6 with default opti-
mization setting and no special optimizations for the VHDL implementation.
The device utilization data were collected from the Module Level Utilization
Summary Report produced by ISE. Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show the results. For
the synthesis, we assumed for all approaches the same size of the stored
tables (64 entries) and implemented the control logic in hardware. The first
table shows the overhead for the network interfaces when using a distributed
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control layer from Section 5.3.4. An evaluation of centralized control layer
are presented in [122; 230]. Table 6.6 shows that the simple approaches (TIS,
ALD, SALDT) introduces less than 5 % overhead to the area of the network
interface (NI) module. The more complex approaches (FALDT, SCC) intro-
duce slightly more overhead (5.5 %). The slight increase for FALDT and
SCC compared results from the additional information and control logic that
is needed to estimate the optimal path. However, the approaches also allow to
account for more priority levels than are available by the architecture. Hence,
when needing more than two priorities, the overhead for the approaches will
stay the same, where for the classic prioritization one will have to increase
the routers (e.g. add more buffer space for virtual channels). When using
a centralized approach, the network interface extensions show a similar in-
crease of the area (e.g. approximately 120 LUTs). Additionally, there is an
overhead due to the resource manager (RM). This varies between 230 and
1500 LUTs depending on the implementation [122; 230].
Table 6.6: Synthesis results of a network interface on a Virtex-6 LX760
FPGA.
Unit SP TIS ALD SALDT FALDT SCC
#Regs 2581 2702 2707 2715 2723 2723
#LUTs 4925 5160 5160 5162 5190 5192
Table 6.7 compares the area of different network routers. It compares
a basline NoC with four virtual channels against two approaches using the
control layer. For this, we implemented the control layer as a high priority
VC (5 VCs) and as a dedicated network (4 VCs+C-NoC) as introduced in
Section 5.3. Compared to the reference router (4 VCs) an additional virtual
channel (VC) (5 VCs) requires approximately 28 % more register and 30 %
more LUTs in the VHDL implementation. Whereas using a dedicated control
NoC for the control layer only requires 22 % more registers and 18 % more
LUTs. Hence, besides the performance and analysis benefits, a dedicated
network for the control layer seems to be reasonable. However, the table
focuses on the control logic of a network router. Hence, when using the
dedicated control NoC, there will be an additional area overhead due to the
increased wiring of the additional network routers. On the other hand, the
needed area for the memory might decrease, as the control layer allows using
smaller buffers (e.g. no additional interference through high priority control
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Table 6.7: Synthesis results of network routers on a Virtex-6 LX760 FPGA.
Unit 4 VCs 5 VCs 4 VCs+C-NoC
#Registers 1124 1433 1366
#LUTs 1416 1841 1661
messages and avoiding of blocking propagation through the control layer
instead of deep buffers).
6.4 Evaluation Against Requirements
Section 1.4 discussed the requirements of (future) safety-critical embedded
systems while Section 5.2 listed requirements for the implementation of the
control layer of the NoC-RM. In the following we discuss, how the proposed
architecture with the control layer satisfies these requirements.
The requirements from Section 1.4 can be broken down into three major
areas: efficient support of different traffic types, low cost, and flexibility.
However, these are tightly coupled and influence each other.
The efficient support of different traffic types covers several aspects. First,
the system shall allow an efficient co-hosting of applications with different
requirements. That is, for example, providing formal worst-case guarantees
for safety-critical (real-time) traffic, while at the same time high performance
for non safety-critical traffic. And secondly, the system needs to provide
sufficient means to prevent faults (cf. Table 1.1) to influence the functioning
of the system. This especially includes fault isolation between the non
safety-critical and safety-critical parts of the system. For NoCs, both can
be summarized as sufficient independence between traffic classes or streams.
All these aspects are solved by the proposed NoC architecture using the
NoC-RM. The NIs with the client/control extensions allow to isolate network
nodes and traffic streams from each other. This includes timing interference
(e.g. rate limiting) and access protection (e.g. address translation tables).
Interfering safety-critical and non safety-critical senders are synchronized
using the NoC-RM. This enables to isolate traffic streams and also to use a
work-conserving, dynamic arbitration and thus to give the BE senders access
to the NoC, whenever there is sufficient slack available for the safety-critical
senders. And hence, this allows to improve the performance of BE traffic as
shown in Section 6.2. The client extensions in the NI provide a fine-granular
support for different admission control mechanisms (rate limiters, address
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translation tables) and thus enable to efficiently handle different transmission
kinds (e.g. short cache-based messages and long DMA transfers). However,
not all transmissions are required to use the synchronization and, moreover,
the NoC-RM can completely be disabled, allowing to use the underlying
network as it is.
These general quality of service (QoS) related properties are extended
by standard means for error detection like a CRC check for flits, a header
parity check, a sender ID (implicitly encoded in the route), a firewalling
mechanism, and a sequence counter in the flit header. However, as the focus
of this work was on QoS, the error handling support is only rudimentary in
the current design. With these mechanisms, all errors from Table 1.1 can
be detected as indicated in Table 1.2. While no unique data ID is present,
the address translation, sender ID, and firewall can be used to prevent an
incorrect addressing. Additionally, the use of a dedicated control network
allows a fine-granular error detection and handling. As the NoC-RM can use
the control network to accumulate error reports from the network interfaces
and network routers, it enables a global error view and handling. This global
view helps to more efficiently route traffic around detected faulty network
parts and to provide the system software with more accurate error reports.
The costs cover two major areas: the hardware costs/overhead and the
design or development costs of a system. From the hardware cost perspective,
the NoC-RM provides some benefits. It can be implemented in software (if
NoC provides priorities). This can deliver better properties, such as safety,
performance, or flexibility while not needing additional hardware [122; 125].
Moreover, it can be used to decrease the needed buffer space (e.g. less VCs)
in the NoC as contention and thus blocking propagation can be avoided.
However, the use of a hardware extensions (e.g. client modules in the NI and
a hardware accelerated RM) and a dedicated network for the control messages
can improve the benefits (cf. Section 6.2). Hence, the proposed architecture
uses additional hardware components inducing some overhead. However,
most QoS mechanisms, especially when they also provide performance for
non safety-critical components, induce hardware overhead. In contrast to
other QoS extensions, the proposed architecture allows to mitigate the head-
of-line blocking and blocking propagation problems. Hence, the buffer sizes
and the number of virtual channels in the network can be reduced. In such a
way, the additional hardware of the NoC-RM helps to reduce the size of the
data layer, limiting the overall hardware overhead. Similar to this, the ability
of the NoC-RM, to provide more priorities than available virtual channels
helps to decrease buffer size.
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Another important cost aspect of a system are the design and verification
efforts. The proposed architecture uses the NI (with address translation,
firewall, and rate limters) to isolate nodes from the network and each other.
Additionally, the NoC-RM (together with the NI) offers full control on the
network traffic. This enables a contract/interface based design and helps
to analyse the system (as worst-case traffic behaviour is known/enforced).
Hence, it simplifies system design and verification. Furthermore, the use of a
dedicated control network allows to design and verify the control layer of the
NoC-RM independently of the data layer. Hence, it can be re-used without
costly re-design and re-verification (of the control layer). At the same time,
this allows to re-use existing data layers and there is no need to re-design the
whole interconnect. This is also the case, when a different resource allocation
scheme should be used. In that case, there is no need to adapt the network
hardware as the allocation is controlled by the NoC-RM.
The possibility to switch between different resource allocation schemes
also enables a high flexibility of the design. As discussed, switching between
different resource allocation schemes is relatively simple with the NoC-RM.
It requires only reprogramming of the central resource manager or the control
modules in the NIs. This even allows to use different schemes for different
parts of the system or groups of senders. For instance, for selected nodes
a static priority based scheduling can be applied, whereas for other regions
strict temporal isolation of senders with a TDM based scheduling can be
applied. Additionally, the switching between different schemes can be done
at run-time or offline. Hence, a running system can adapt to changes (e.g.
varying environmental conditions, different systems modes, or updates) or
the same design be applied in different use cases that need different resource
allocation schemes. That is, the application of different resource allocation
schemes does not require modifications of the (data layer) routers. Therefore,
it is possible to offer one chip with a generic network architecture and hence
offer safety and real-time as a feature for a specific design.
To efficiently achieve these properties, Section 5.2 required a low latency
of control messages, a low interference of the control messages on existing
traffic, and a low hardware overhead. This is solved by using a dedicated
control network. The control messages should not be blocked by any other
traffic to permit a low latency for the control layer. While this allows to
use a high priority virtual channel, this approach would induce additional
traffic to the network that interferes with the normal traffic (cf. Section 6.2).
Hence, the proposed architecture uses a dedicated network solely for the
control messages. As there is no other traffic in this network and the router
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architecture is optimized for the control messages, they achieve a low latency.
Additionally, they induce no additional interference to the data layer. This
approach introduces a second network to the system and hence hardware
overhead. However, all QoS mechanisms introduce additional hardware
overhead to the system. As the NoC-RM allows to better utilize the existing
hardware, as it, for example, avoids the propagation of blocking, and offers
the needed flexibility, it seems feasible to use the NoC-RM. Hence, we
can focus on the hardware overhead of the different implementations of
the control layer of the NoC-RM. Comparing the two main possibilities
(high priority virtual channel and dedicated network), the overhead is similar.
When using a high priority VC, additional buffers are needed but the router
itself can be re-used. However, as the data layer typically provides a bigger
payload and more features than needed, there is some over-provisioning
for the control messages. When using a dedicated control network, on the
contrary, the network can be optimized to the control messages. That is,
smaller packet and flit sizes and thus smaller buffers can be used.
With the discussion above, we can summarize the properties of different
QoS mechanisms and a basic performance oriented NoC using round-robin
(RR) arbitration as shown in Table 6.8. The table breaks down the require-
ments to eight different aspects. Performance indicates whether the network
provides a low latency for best-effort streams and if it is work-conserving.
The hardware overhead was discussed above. It summarizes how much
additional hardware is needed, compared to a simple round-robin network.
The design effort denotes, if the design is simple or if inter-dependencies
between components challenge the correct design. Scalability combines the
first three aspects and reasons on how they challenge the scalability. That is,
a bad scalability results is higher cost, lower performance or higher design
effort. Flexibility covers the re-useability and adaptability of the system as
discussed above. The verification overhead denotes the additional effort to
verify a system using the mechanisms. Typically, static approaches with
well-defined application behaviours can be verified more easily than highly
dynamic systems. Along with this, safety/predictability denotes the general
possibility to derive (tight) upper bounds on the behaviour. In general, it is
possible to derive upper bounds for all mechanisms. However, when no QoS
is used at all (e.g. in the case of a non-preemptive round-robin), the analysis
results get very pessimistic. And similar to this, analysis effort represents the
easiness to analyse the system. Typically, a lower number of dynamics and
well-defined traffic behaviours simplify the analysis.
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The NoC-RM approaches can satisfy the most requirements in the ta-
ble. For the NoC-RM just one to three requirements cannot fully be sat-
isfied. When using a virtual control layer, the whole control logic can be
implemented in software. That way, there is a very low hardware overhead.
However, if hardware extensions are used to improve the performance of the
control layer, it induces an additional overhead. Along with this, the design
effort changes. While a software design is still complex, it is a re-useable
software and can easily be adapted. When using hardware extensions, these
must be integrated into the design, leading to a higher effort. Additionally,
as the control messages are sent on a high priority VC, they interfere with
other traffic. Hence, this additional overhead must be accounted for, when
designing the system. The latter also challenges the verification overhead.
The chosen protocol, or more precisely the amount of sent control messages,
now induce an additional load to the system. This can lead to a dependency
during the analysis and the design, challenging the verification. Still, this
factor can be accounted for. When using a dedicated control layer, just
the hardware overhead is a slight drawback of the approach (as for many
other QoS approaches). This is due to the fact, that the network interfaces
must be extended and an additional interconnect is used. However, as this
interconnect is isolated from the remainder of the system, it helps to reduce
the design effort and verification overhead. Overall, a dedicated interconnect
for the control layer is a reasonable choice to build a system that provides
QoS for safety-critical traffic, high performance for non safety-critical traffic,
and flexibility at the same time.
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Table 6.8: Properties of Different QoS-Mechanisms (X : good; – : fair;
× : poor).
Performance
NoC (e.g.
RR)
Spatial
Isolation
Static
Temporal
Isolation
(e.g. TDM)
Dynamic
Temporal
Isolation
(e.g. SPP)
Virtual
Control
Layer
Physical
Control
Layer
Performance X X × X X X
Hardware
Overhead
X × X – X/ – –
Design Effort X X X X X/ – X
Scalability – × × × X X
Flexibility – × × – X X
Verification
Overhead
× X X × – X
Safety/
Predictability
× X X X X X
Analysis
Effort
× X X – X X
6.5 Summary
In this chapter we evaluated the architecture supporting the NoC-RM pre-
sented in Chapter 5. For this, we compared different protocols of the NoC-
RM against the commonly used prioritization of safety-critical traffic. This
comparison includes the implementation of the control layer of the NoC-RM
as a dedicated physical channel and on a high priority virtual channel.
Using the NoC-RM, we were able to increase the performance of non
safety-critical senders by up to 30 % using the SCC approach without endan-
gering the timing of safety-critical senders requiring real-time guarantees.
These findings were confirmed by experimental evaluation. Hence, the
NoC-RM allows similar performance benefits as the presented NoC router
extensions from Sections 4.3 and 4.4. At the same time, the NoC-RM ap-
proach induces less than 5.5 % hardware overhead at the network interfaces.
Using an additional physical interconnect for the control layer of the
NoC-RM achieved better performance results than using a high priority
virtual channel. This is due to the additional blocking the control messages
induce to the system, when using a virtual control layer and sending the
control messages on a high priority VC.
Moreover, the results showed a strong dependency on the configuration
of the individual approaches and the workload induced by the network nodes.
Hence, to further exploit the benefits of the NoC-RM, more sophisticated
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approaches to select the parameters should be used. Additionally, the system
design and mapping phases need to account for the NoC-RM to further
optimize the results.
In summary, the architecture satisfies the requirements of future mixed-
critical systems that execute safety-critical and non safety-critical real-time
application. Hence, an architecture using the NoC-RM for providing QoS and
a dedicated interconnect for the control layer provides a feasible and appeal-
ing alternative for the future embedded systems requiring high performance
and real-time guarantees.
7. Conclusion
The industry of safety-critical and dependable embedded systems calls for
even cheaper, high performance platforms that allow flexibility and an effi-
cient verification of safety and real-time requirements. In this sense, flexibil-
ity denotes the ability to (online) adapt a system to changes (e.g. changing
environment, application dynamics, errors) and the reuse-ability for differ-
ent use cases. To cope with the increasing complexity of interconnected
functions and to reduce the cost and power consumption of the system, mul-
ticore systems are used to efficiently integrate different processing units in
the same chip. Networks-on-chip (NoCs), as a modular interconnect, are
used as a promising solution for multiprocessor systems on chip (MPSoCs),
due to their scalability and performance. Hence, future NoC designs must
face these challenges. Traditional NoC concepts address only a sub-part
of the challenges—they focus on either performance or predictability. And
existing, predictable NoCs are deemed too expensive and inflexible to host a
variety of applications with opposing constraints. In this work we tackled
the challenges and developed a predictable and runtime-adaptable NoC archi-
tecture that efficiently integrates mixed-critical applications with opposing
constraints.
In the first part of this thesis, we presented design challenges in the
domain of future safety-critical and dependable embedded systems. One
major aspect for these systems is the verification of the timing behaviour. This
is tackled by the use of formal analysis frameworks. However, state-of-the-art
analysis frameworks for NoCs make some simplifications when analysing a
system. One is to assume that buffers never overflow (e.g. that backpressure
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does not occur). While this can be guaranteed by the use of large buffers in
the network or by using very restrictive rate limiters (i.e. allowing only a very
low load), these render such analysis approaches unfeasible for real-world
systems. In embedded systems the buffer size is strictly limited (to save
cost) and the application should use the network with the highest possible
performance in order so avoid over-provisiong of resources. To solve this
problem, we presented a new analysis approach based on the compositional
performance analysis (CPA) in Chapter 3 that can handle backpressure. With
this analysis, realistic embedded systems with limited buffer space can be
analysed. This enables to use smaller buffers when designing a system, as no
over-provisioning is necessary to render the analysis possible.
However, the results of the evaluation of the analysis (cf. Section 3.5)
demonstrated that backpressure and blocking propagation can lead to overly
pessimistic results, especially for systems with shared buffers. While quality
of service (QoS) mechanisms can be used to reduce the adverse impacts,
e.g. through limiting the conservatism used in the analysis, there is also the
possibility to improve the analysis. Hence, future work should focus on the
reduction of the conservatism used in the proposed analysis. One example
for this is the adaptation of the backpressure blocking. In the current analysis,
the backpressure blocking is used as an individual blocking factor that also
takes part in various other blocking factors. But, typically the backpressure
blocking on a port exhibits a sub-additive behaviour. That is, the backpressure
blocking accounting for four events is smaller compared to summing up the
backpressure blocking of three and a single event. Hence, in future work
a proof for this assumption can be derived and used to tighten the analysis
results. For this, the backpressure blocking could be calculated per port
instead of per stream, which would require to first derive the accumulated
event model to each port and then to derive the blocking.
In the second part of this thesis, we proposed and evaluated different
QoS mechanisms for modern NoC architectures for mixed-critical real-time
systems. For this, we started in Chapter 4 with an overview on existing
QoS mechanisms for NoCs. Most of the existing solutions are not capable
of solving the requirements of future mixed-critical system (cf. Chapter 1).
Typically, these solutions sacrifice system performance (especially for the
non safety-critical parts) to achieve a predictable behaviour for the safety-
critical applications. To solve this problem, we developed two hardware
based QoS extensions for NoC routers in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. We showed
that these can provide the required predictability and high performance for
the non safety-critical parts at the same time. However, as the use of hard-
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ware based router extensions limits the flexibility, we also investigated a
HW/SW co-design approach that uses an end-to-end synchronization of
resource accesses: the network-on-chip resource management (NoC-RM).
This solution uses a control layer to apply a global resource scheduling and
network admission control (cf. Section 4.5). The NoC-RM was rendered as a
feasible choice for future mixed-critical systems. Hence, we developed an
architecture that provides support for the control layer of the NoC-RM to
increase its benefits in Chapter 5. We first derived the requirements for a NoC
architecture that uses and supports the control layer. This resulted in two
main possibilities to implement the control layer: as a high priority virtual
channel or as a dedicated control network. In booth cases, the control layer
can be used to provide QoS while at the same time high performance for the
non safety-critical parts. Additionally, as the NoC-RM enables to mitigate
the problem of blocking propagation, it allows to decrease the buffer sizes of
the (data) network. To prove the benefits of the architecture, we conducted
an experimental evaluation and compared the two possibilites against the
commonly used prioritization of safety-critical traffic in Chapter 6. For this,
we used different protocols for the NoC-RM. The simulation showed that
using an additional physical interconnect for the control layer achieved better
performance results than using a high priority virtual channel. In both cases,
the dynamic arbitration of the NoC-RM can achieve better performance
that the classic prioritization. In summary, the evaluation showed that the
architecture satisfies the requirements of future mixed-critical systems that
execute safety-critical and non safety-critical real-time application. Hence,
an architecture using the NoC-RM for providing QoS and a dedicated in-
terconnect for the control layer provide a feasible and appealing alternative
for the future embedded systems requiring high performance and real-time
guarantees.
There are still multiple open questions that provide a direction for future
research regarding the NoC-RM and its implementation. First, the results
of the evaluation showed a strong dependency on the configuration of the
individual protocols of the NoC-RM and the workload induced by the net-
work nodes. Hence, to further exploit the benefits of the NoC-RM, more
sophisticated approaches to select the parameters should be used. Addition-
ally, the system design and mapping phases should account for the control
layer to further optimize the results. These topics need further investigation
to provide a proper design methodology for a system using the control layer.
Next to this, this thesis (and the work related to the NoC-RM [122; 125;
223]) focussed on QoS, e.g., on controlling the interference. However, using
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an additional interconnect to monitor and control the remainder of the system,
offers several other possibilities. Some concepts extending the presented
NoC-RM will be discussed in the following.
7.1 Concepts Extending the QoS Control Layer
This section presents some concepts extending the NoC-RM to enable a
sophisticated self-aware NoC/system control. These concepts can be used
as an extension to available architectural mechanisms (e.g. to increase the
benefits) or to replace them by an end-to-end approach and thus possibly
reduce the complexity of the interconnect (e.g. error handling through RM
not in each router). However, these topics were not in focus of the research
activities during this thesis and just highlight some possibilities on a high
level of abstraction for future research directions. And while it seems feasible
to extend the NoC-RM with certain features, this section does not imply
that the extended NoC-RM shall do this using the presented control layer
architecture. That is, when more features are added to the NoC-RM, its
complexity and possibly its timing/performance impact may increase. Hence,
if many features are needed that shall be not implemented in the data layer but
in the NoC-RM, an architecture supporting multiple control layers (virtual
or physical) might be the better choice. In such a design, each control layer
will implement a certain set of functionalities to support the data layer or the
system at all.
7.1.1 Quality of Service in the Data Layer
When developing the NoC-RM and its network architecture, the main goal
was to introduce QoS, performance, and flexibility to existing architectures
with only small changes to existing architectures. Hence, the NoC-RM
assumed a simple NoC with priority based arbitration for the data layer.
While such an architecture (together with the control layer) is already capable
of satisfying all requirements, it might not be the best solution for every use
case.
Chapter 4 presented QoS-aware router architectures, that are promis-
ing with respect to their isolation and performance properties. Their main
drawback was the flexibility. One possible future research direction is the
combination of a data layer based on such an architecture and the NoC-RM.
These mechanisms use parameters to configure the actual network behaviour.
Examples are the blocking counters, the threshold values for the buffers, or
the available (dynamic) priorities used. In general, the NoC-RM can be used
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to adapt these parameters during the run-time of the system according to the
global state of the system. This would introduce flexibility to the system
while possibly also increasing the benefits of these mechanisms. Addition-
ally, other mechanisms, such as Virtual Networks, which enables a region
based QoS approach, exist [95]. Hence, future research might focus on the
interaction of the NoC-RM with other QoS mechanisms to find an optimal
architecture.
7.1.2 Monitoring
So far the NoC-RM uses the client interfaces in the network interfaces (NIs)
to detect and manage accesses to the network, as well as simple error checks
in the routers and NIs. To increase the capabilities of the system to adapt to
unpredictable changes (cf. autonomic computing [112; 165]), this input to the
NoC-RM can be extended to use various monitoring information. One benefit
of doing such monitoring on an additional layer is that the monitoring data
itself does not interfere with the traffic on the data layer. Such interference
can distort the actual measurement of the data layer. Examples for additional
monitoring information that can be used are the current load/utilization
of a link/port or virtual channel, the temperature, the long term load, or
other ageing affecting factors. These would amplify the possibility of the
system to adapt to changes in the behaviour and environmental conditions.
For example, if the temperature of the environment or a network router
increases, the affected router can be slowed down or traffic re-routed to relieve
the router. Besides these simple monitors, even more advanced monitors
are possible, that observe the actual behaviour of an application or traffic
streams. With this, the NoC-RM could identify suspicious traffic patterns that
indicate side channel attacks. Extending the simple request-based protocol
by monitoring information thus enable a context-aware self-management
as sketched in Figure 7.1. In such a system, the designer (or programmer)
provides policies and specifications (e.g. for requirements and desired system
behaviour). The NoC-RM uses the available sensors (and arriving requests)
to collect the context information. Based on this and the informations from
a repository, which contains the context, policy, and requirements provided
by the designer or user, a view on the current system can be obtained. From
this, a new configuration (e.g. system state) is estimated, that adheres to the
given policies and requirements. And with the known new configuration, the
NoC-RM enforces the new behaviour (e.g. through re-configuration of rate
limiters or adapting traffic routes).
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Figure 7.1: Context-aware self-management of a NoC.
7.1.3 Power
The NoC-RM can be used to optimize the power consumption of the network.
Power saving techniques, as for example power gating of network routers,
use local information at a router to decide if it can be turned off. However,
as there is no knowledge about when new data will arrive, this approach
can lead to cases in which the router is switched off and on too frequently
diminishing the power saving (as there is power overhead for doing this)
or in which data has to wait at an offline router until it is turned on. In
state-of-the-art mechanisms, this is tackled by look-ahead mechanisms. Here,
additional logic and wires are used, to inform routers multiple hops ahead
about the arrival of new data. While this solves the problem of additional
waiting, it introduces hardware overhead. Other approaches dynamically
adapt the frequency of the network routers to keep the balance between
energy-saving and performance loss. Such approach, for example, use power
management units in the network routers that collect monitoring information
and intelligently control the power shutdown mechanisms and frequency [79].
The NoC-RM has a global knowledge about the traffic and is informed
about a new network connection, before a packet enters the network. Hence,
the NoC-RM can tun on routers in advance. That way, the data flits observe
no additional delay as the router are always online, when the flits arrive.
Additionally, the NoC-RM can be used to re-route traffic. This enables
to account for the power state of network paths to optimally distribute the
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packets for lower power consumptions. The same approach can be used to
guarantee that the thermal stress and ageing of the network routers is equally.
With an existing dedicated control layer it is also possible to completely
shutdown the routers of the data layer. In state-of-the-art solutions, some
parts of the routers (e.g. the logic to detect new data and the look-ahead
mechanisms to wake up routers early) need to stay online. This is not
necessary when using a dedicated control layer. However, the control layer
itself induces some (power) overhead and needs to stay online. While the
control layer itself can use power saving mechanisms, it will experience the
same drawbacks as the data layer. But as the complexity of the control layer
is typically lower than the data layer, it might still be more power efficient.
And while it is not clear whether it is feasible to introduce the control layer
solely for the power management, it seems feasible to re-use an existing
control layer for this purpose.
7.1.4 Errors
The additional network and the global knowledge of the control layer can be
used to optimize the error detection and handling. An example are transient
errors in the network. These can have permanent effects (e.g. reserving a
wrong port that is never released again). To solve this, routers need additional
logic to detect and prevent these errors [181; 182]. Instead of this additional
logic, the control layer can use its global view to detect such errors and reset
the affected routers. This global view also helps to identify corrupted paths of
the network or parts of the system and to re-route traffic around the affected
nodes. Hence, the error checks in the routers and the NI can be extended with
end-to-end checks, distributed invariance checkers similar to the ForEVeR
framework [167; 168] or NoCAlert [51]. The global management of the
communication resources also helps sending test packets or patterns without
endangering other ongoing traffic. Such test packets can be used to detect
faulty NoC regions [98]. However, these packets should not interfere with
safety-critical real-time traffic and hence only be sent when the network (or
the path under test) is free.
The global knowledge of the NoC-RM also helps to solve another chal-
lenge of local error handling methods, especially for safety-critical traffic.
Recovery (or reset or rollback) mechanisms typically induce timing overhead,
as traffic needs to be resent. This must be accounted for, when designing the
system, which typically leads to conservative assumptions and over provi-
sioning. That is, there is some additional load for each component resulting
from the error recovery that must be accounted for. The NoC-RM can be used
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to reduce the negative (timing) impact in such cases. This can be done by
applying the recovery only when there is no safety critical traffic (assuming
the error only affects BE senders so far), to re-route safety critical traffic to
minimize the performance impact of the rollback, or to re-configure the QoS
parameters.
7.1.5 Debug and Testing
The NoC-RM can be used to help in debugging and testing of a NoC based
system and of the NoC itself. A problem of debugging a system, especially
during post-silicon tests, is the restricted observability of internal signals and
the time of issuing test transactions and their coverage of possible NoC and
router states. As a result, it is difficult to detect and debug a failure when
a test fails. Additionally, when the test succeeds the verification engineer
has limited knowledge on whether the test really affected the desired parts of
the system. For example, if a NoC uses an adaptive routing to mitigate link
or router errors, the verification engineer needs to check all possible paths
and check if the system is triggering its online fault tolerance mechanisms
correctly. To help the verification engineer, systems typically add support to
the design of a chip (e.g. design for debug (DfD) [57]).
A control layer can be used to increase the observability of the network
and also to provide (and enable) a debug mode in a router. In such a case,
the control layer can monitor the actual behaviour of the router and network
links, as well as inject test patterns (or trigger their generation). Together
with the end-to-end monitoring of the NIs, this enables an in-deep view
of the system functioning. Similar approaches are already in the focus of
current research. For example, Vermeulen and Goossens [228] present a
monitoring infrastructure that can be used for performance analysis and
debug. Goossens et al. [82; 83] implement a debug architecture that is used
to supplement conventional computation-centric debug with communication-
centric debug methods. Tang and Xu [208] use debug probes between
nodes (e.g. cores) and the NIs that hep to debug the node and also support
inter-core transaction analysis. Friederich et al. [78] propose debug probes
within each network router and monitoring units to trace the activity of
each node. And Ste˛pniewska et al. [203] use real-time packet sniffing and
monitoring. This approach uses a dedicated debug mode in which each packet
is additionally sent to an off-chip control device. The mentioned approaches
can be combined with the NoC-RM. Hence, future research might focus on
an efficient design for debug support of the NoC-RM to ease the verification
of the system.
A. Appendix: Publications
A.1 Related Publications
The following papers, based on the work presented in this thesis, have been
published:
A.1.1 Reviewed
[216]: S. Tobuschat, P. Axer, R. Ernst, and J. Diemer. “IDAMC: A NoC for
mixed criticality systems”. In: 2013 IEEE 19th International Conference on
Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications. Aug. 2013,
pages 149–156. DOI: 10.1109/RTCSA.2013.6732214
This work explains initial Integrated Dependable Architecture for Many
Cores (IDAMC). The IDAMC provide spatial and temporal isolation and thus
sufficient independence. This is achieved with the use of different monitoring
and control mechanisms in the network interfaces and the network providing
guaranteed service through the Back Suction scheme. This architecture was
used as a baseline architecture and extended during this thesis to incorporate
the control layer. Chapter 5 is based on this work.
[217]: S. Tobuschat, M. Neukirchner, L. Ecco, and R. Ernst. “Workload-
aware shaping of shared resource accesses in mixed-criticality systems”. In:
Hardware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis (CODES+ISSS), 2014 In-
ternational Conference on. Oct. 2014, pages 1–10. DOI: 10.1145/2656075.
2656105
This work presents the general idea of a workload aware shaping that can be
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used in network interfaces or routers. Unlike many other existing approaches,
it prioritizes best-effort traffic whenever possible and use an accurate acqui-
sition of the workload. With this it achieves an improved performance for
general-purpose functions. At the same time it provides full guarantees to
safety critical real-time functions. Hence, this work explains the basic of
using the slack of safety-critical applications to improve the performance for
non safety-critical applications. Chapter 3 is partially based on this work.
[220]: S. Tobuschat and R. Ernst. “Real-time communication analysis for
Networks-on-Chip with backpressure”. In: Design, Automation Test in
Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), 2017. Mar. 2017, pages 590–595.
DOI: 10.23919/DATE.2017.7927055
This work introduces a real-time communication analysis for best-effort
networks-on-chip with finite sized buffers and backpressure. The analysis
allows exploiting the behaviour of individual traffic streams to determine
safe upper bounds on the latency of individual packets. It was the first safe
NoC analysis that can handle backpressure. Chapter 3 is based on this work.
[219]: S. Tobuschat and R. Ernst. “Efficient Latency Guarantees for Mixed-
Criticality Networks-on-Chip”. In: 2017 IEEE Real-Time and Embedded
Technology and Applications Symposium (RTAS). Apr. 2017, pages 113–122.
DOI: 10.1109/RTAS.2017.31
This work presents a novel arbitration scheme for NoC routers in mixed-
criticality systems. Unlike many other existing approaches, it prioritizes
best-effort traffic over safety-critical guaranteed-latency traffic whenever
possible. Thus, it exploits the latency slack of critical applications to improve
the performance for general purpose functions in mixed-criticality systems.
Chapter 4 is based on this work.
[221]: S. Tobuschat and R. Ernst. “Providing Throughput Guarantees in
Mixed-criticality Networks-on-Chip”. In: 2017 30th IEEE International
System-on-Chip Conference (SOCC) (SOCC 2017). Munich, Germany, Sept.
2017, pages 207–212—best paper award
This work presents a novel arbitration scheme for NoC routers in mixed-
criticality systems. Unlike many other existing approaches, it prioritizes
best-effort traffic over safety-critical guaranteed-throughput traffic whenever
possible. Thus, it exploits the latency slack of critical applications to improve
the performance for general purpose functions in mixed-criticality systems.
Chapter 4 is based on this work.
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[223]: S. Tobuschat, A. Kostrzewa, and R. Ernst. “Selective congestion
control for mixed-critical networks-on-chip”. In: Integration, the {VLSI}
Journal (2017), pages -. ISSN: 0167-9260. DOI: https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.vlsi.2017.12.003. URL: https://www.sciencedirect.
com/science/article/pii/S0167926017302341
This work presents an online management approach for NoC resource. For
this, it proposes a safe mechanism to exploit the multiple available paths
in a NoC for best-effort and safety-critical senders, improving the average
performance of BE. It couples the path selection process with temporal flow
control based on the current state of the NoC. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are based
on this work.
[117]: A. Kostrzewa, S. Tobuschat, P. Axer, and R. Ernst. “Supervised
sharing of virtual channels in Networks -on-Chip”. In: SIES. 2014. DOI:
10.1109/SIES.2014.6871197
This work presents the challenges and sketches solutions for global, dynamic
and work-conserving arbitration in Networks-on-Chip using a control layer.
Chapters 4 is partially based on this work.
[120]: A. Kostrzewa, S. Tobuschat, R. Ernst, and S. Saidi. “Safe and dynamic
traffic rate control for networks-on-chips”. In: 2016 Tenth IEEE/ACM Inter-
national Symposium on Networks-on-Chip (NOCS). Aug. 2016, pages 1–8.
DOI: 10.1109/NOCS.2016.7579321
This work presents a global and dynamic admission control that controls
the rates at which running applications can access the NoC. The mecha-
nism allows enforcing behavioural models for different data streams as well
as to dynamically adapt the rates values to the number of currently active
applications. Chapters 5 is partially based on this work.
[121]: A. Kostrzewa, S. Tobuschat, L. Ecco, and R. Ernst. “Adaptive load dis-
tribution in mixed-critical Networks-on-Chip”. In: 2017 22nd Asia and South
Pacific Design Automation Conference (ASP-DAC). Jan. 2017, pages 732–
737. DOI: 10.1109/ASPDAC.2017.7858411
This work presents a protocol-based adaptive load distribution, which, by
selectively de-touring BE traffic, allows to significantly improve the perfor-
mance of the NoC. Chapters 4 is partially based on this work.
[124]: A. Kostrzewa, S. Tobuschat, and R. Ernst. “Self-Aware Network-
On-Chip Control in Real-Time Systems”. In: IEEE Design & Test 35.5
(Oct. 2018), pages 19–27. ISSN: 2168-2356. DOI: 10.1109/MDAT.2017.
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2763598
This work discusses the application of the control layer in highly complex
embedded applications, e.g., autonomous driving, which require simultane-
ously high performance and safety in highly dynamic setups. Chapters 4 is
partially based on this work.
[162]: B. Nikolic´, S. Tobuschat, L. Soares Indrusiak, R. Ernst, and A. Burns.
“Real-time analysis of priority-preemptive NoCs with arbitrary buffer sizes
and router delays”. In: Real-Time Systems (June 2018). ISSN: 1573-1383.
DOI: 10.1007/s11241-018-9312-0. URL: https://doi.org/10.
1007/s11241-018-9312-0
This work presents an analysis method for computing the worst-case traversal
times (WCTTs) of communication traffic flows accounting for backpressure.
The approach is applicable to workloads deployed upon priority-preemptive
NoCs using wormhole switching and per-traffic flow dedicated virtual chan-
nels. Additionally, the experimental evaluation led to an interesting finding
that bigger virtual channel buffers do not necessarily yield better results, and
in many cases can be counter-productive.
A.1.2 Unreviewed
[125]: A. Kostrzewa, S. Tobuschat, and R. Ernst. Technical Report: Resource
Manager and Control Layer, Basic Concepts. Technical report. Institut für
Datentechnik und Kommunikationsnetze, Feb. 2018
This technical report presents the control layer and its application for safety-
critical real-time NoCs. Chapters 4 and 5 are based on this work.
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[70]: L. Ecco, S. Tobuschat, S. Saidi, and R. Ernst. “A mixed critical memory
controller using bank privatization and fixed priority scheduling”. In: 2014
IEEE 20th International Conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing
Systems and Applications. Aug. 2014, pages 1–10. DOI: 10.1109/RTCSA.
2014.6910550
This work presents a memory controller for mixed-critical workloads. The
memory controller allows a predetermined number of critical and non-critical
applications to coexist, while providing an interference-free memory for the
former.
[218]: S. Tobuschat, R. Ernst, A. Hamann, and D. Ziegenbein. “System-level
timing feasibility test for cyber-physical automotive systems”. In: 2016
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11th IEEE Symposium on Industrial Embedded Systems (SIES). May 2016,
pages 1–10. DOI: 10.1109/SIES.2016.7509419
This work presents a system-level timing feasibility test exploiting the robust-
ness of control applications. It extends the worst-case and typical worst-case
analysis (TWCA) to cope with to cope with periodic tasks that have varying
execution times. Using the cumulative execution time of a task, instead of
assuming the worst-case execution time for each activation, it improves the
tightness of the worst-case response-times, to lessen the gap between analysis
and extensive simulations. By taking robustness constraints into account for
the system feasibility, it further decreases this gap.
[222]: S. Tobuschat, A. Kostrzewa, F. K. Bapp, and C. Dropmann. “Online
monitoring for safety-critical multicore systems”. In: it - Information Tech-
nology (2017). URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/itit-2017-0028
This work is an outcome of the ARAMiS research project. The work dis-
cusses the usage and limitation of monitoring approaches for safety-critical
real-time system.
[195]: J. Schlatow, M. Mostl, S. Tobuschat, T. Ishigooka, and R. Ernst.
“Data-Age Analysis and Optimisation for Cause-Effect Chains in Automo-
tive Control Systems”. In: 2018 IEEE 13th International Symposium on
Industrial Embedded Systems (SIES). June 2018, pages 1–9. DOI: 10.1109/
SIES.2018.8442077
This work addresses the latency analysis for multi-rate distributed cause-
effect chains considering static-priority preemptive scheduling of offset-
synchronised periodic tasks. The main contribution is a Mixed Integer Linear
Program-based optimisation to select design parameters (priorities, task-to-
processor mapping, offsets) that minimise the data age.
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Glossary
adaptability see flexibility.
analysability The capability of a component or system to be diagnosed for
deficiencies or causes of failures in the component or system, or for the
parts to be modified to be identified. Analysability requires a formal
model of the component or system (and, if applicable, of the external
stimulus). See also Predictability.
availability The ability to be in a state to perform as required. Availability
depends upon the combined characteristics of the reliability, recover-
ability, and maintainability of the item, and the maintenance support
performance [52].
babbling idiot For interconnects, the babbling-idiot denotes a node that
busies the interconnect unduly [43; 212].
best-case responce time (BCRT) Minimum possible time between receiv-
ing a stimulus and delivering an appropriate response or reaction. In
scope of this thesis, the best-case response time of a flit at a network
router describes the minimum possible time between the arrival of the
flit at the router and its forwarding including blocking through other
flits.
best-effort (BE) Best-effort denotes the property to require no gurantees.
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) An entitiy (e.g. software or hardware
components) defined by market-driven needs, commercially available,
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and whose fitness for purpose has been demonstrated by a broad
spectrum of commercial users [52].
control traffic (CT) Control traffic sent by the resource manager of clients
using the resource management (e.g. control layer approacj [122; 125].
deadline The point in time when an execution of an entity must be fin-
ished [8].
dependability The ability to perform as and when required. Dependability
includes availability, reliability, recoverability, maintainability, and
maintenance support performance, and, in some cases, other charac-
teristics such as durability, safety and security. Dependability is used
as a collective term for the time-related quality characteristics of an
item [52].
dependable See dependability.
distributed traffic shaping (DTS) Distributed Traffic Shaping is a QoS
scheme for NoCs [59].
electronic control unit (ECU) Embedded computer system consisting out
of at least one CPU and corresponding periphery which is placed in
one housing [8].
flexibility Flexibility is related to the effort to adapt the entity/system to
system internal and external changing conditions as well to re-use the
entity/system for different use cases.
flow control digit (flit) The unit of buffer management and flow control for
wormhole flow control [54; 69].
globally asynchronous locally synchronous (GALS) Globally asynchro-
nous locally synchronous is a paradigm for designing modern ICs
that uses islands of clock synchronous logic (e.g. individual IP cores)
that are connected asynchronously (i.e. avoiding a global clock) [63].
guaranteed latency (GL) Guranteed latency denotes the property to require
an upper bound/limit on the latency or response time. An example is
network traffic where the network packets must arrive at the destination
before a certain deadline.
guaranteed throughput (GT) Guranteed throughput denotes the property
to require a lower bound/limit on the accepted throughput. An exam-
ple is network traffic where the network packets must arrive at the
destination with a certain rate.
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latency The delay experienced by an entitiy (e.g. frame, packet, or flit) in the
course of its propagation between two points in a network, measured
from the time that a known reference point in the frame passes the first
point to the time that the reference point in the frame passes the second
point [11].
maintainability The ability to be retained in, or restored to a state to perform
as required, under given conditions of use and maintenance Given
conditions would include aspects that affect maintainability, such as:
location for maintenance, accessibility, maintenance procedures and
maintenance resources [52].
mixed-criticality Function of different safety level, e.g., safety-critical and
non safety-critical in the same system. In this context, a critical func-
tion is essential for the safety of the system. Therefore, this function is
developed with high diligence and so the behaviour (i.e. timing) is well
specified and tested. For non-critical functions the confidence in the
characteristics is lower, i.e., the possibility that the function deviates
from the specification is higher.
multiprocessor system on chip (MPSoC) A system-on-chip (SoC) that in-
cludes multiple microprocessors/processing units.
network interface (NI) The network interface connects a node to the NoC.
network interface unit (NIU) see NI.
network-on-chip (NoC) A network-on-chip (or on-chip network) is a
network-based communication subsystem in an integrated circuit, such
as, for example, in a system-on-chip (SoC).
predictability The capability to dervie a consistent repetition of a state,
course of action, behavior, or the like, making it possible to know in
advance what to expect. Predictability is the degree to which a correct
prediction or forecast of a component’s or system’s state can be made
either qualitatively or quantitatively. Formal methods (e.g. analysis)
can be used to predtict the bahaviour of a system or component, see
Analysability.
quality of service (QoS) The collective effect of service performances,
which determine the degree of satisfaction of a user of the service.
These characteristic performances may, for example, relate to: trans-
mission quality, timing, failures, fault frequency and duration [52].
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real-time system A system which is able to manage tasks continually, so
that it is possible to react as directed on process events in a pre-
determined time period [52]. For a real-time (or time-critical) ap-
plication or syste the correctness of the application or system function
depends not only on functional but also on temporal aspects.
recoverability The ability to recover from a failure, without corrective
maintenance. The ability to recover may or may not require exter-
nal actions. For recovery where no external actions are required, see
self-recoverability. Recoverability may be quantified using measures
such as the probability of recovery within a specified time interval [52].
reliability The ability to perform as required, without failure, for a given
time interval, under given conditions. The time interval duration can be
expressed in units appropriate to the item concerned, e.g. calendar time,
operating cycles, distance run, etc., and the units should always be
clearly stated. Given conditions include aspects that affect reliability,
such as: mode of operation, stress levels, environmental conditions,
and maintenance [52].
safety Freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to
the health of people, either directly, or indirectly as a result of damage
to property or to the environment [15].
self-recoverability The ability to recover from a failure, without external
action. Self-recoverability is a special case of recoverability [52].
stream A unidirectional flow of data (e.g., audio and/or video) from a
sending network node (Talker) to one or more network nodes (Listen-
ers) [11].
sufficient independence Sufficient independence of implementation in a
mixed-criticality system is established by proving that timing interfer-
ence or the probability of a dependent failure between the non-safety
and safety-related parts is sufficiently low in comparison with the
highest safety integrity level associated with the safety functions [15].
While a failure can result from, for example, a fault, wilful timing
attack, or wilful memory manipulation and influence timing, data
consistency, or other parameters of the system.
system-on-chip (SoC) An integrated circuit, which contains all the required
components of an electronic system on a single chip [50].
virtual channel (VC) A virtual channel is a separate FIFO buffer inside the
input module of a network switch [54; 63; 69].
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worst-case execution time (WCET) Maximum possible time during which
a program is actually executing [8]. In scope of this thesis, the worst-
case execution time of a flit at a network router describes the maximum
possible time the router is actively procesing the flit exluding blocking
through other flits.
worst-case responce time (WCRT) Maximum possible time between re-
ceiving a stimulus and delivering an appropriate response or reac-
tion [8]. In scope of this thesis, the worst-case response time of a flit
at a network router describes the maximum possible time between the
arrival of the flit at the router and its forwarding including blocking
through other flits.

Acronyms
ADAS advanced driver assistance system.
BCET best-case execution time.
BCRT best-case response time.
BE best-effort.
COTS commercial off-the-shelf.
CPA compositional performance analysis.
CPU central processing unit.
CT control traffic.
DSP digital signal processor.
DTS distributed traffic shaping.
ECU electronic control unit.
flit flow control digit.
GALS worst-case response time.
GL guaranteed latency.
GPU graphics processing unit.
GT guaranteed throughput.
MPSoC multiprocessor system on chip.
NI network interface.
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NIU network interface unit.
NoC network-on-chip.
NoC-RM network-on-chip resource management.
QoS quality of service.
RTE runtime environment.
SoC system-on-chip.
VC virtual channel.
WCET worst-case execution time.
WCRT worst-case response time.
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